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President Clinton and O.J. Simpson have one thing in common:
Their umbrella insurance policies are helping to pay their enor-
mous legal bills.... Simpson's insurer is paying some of the legal
bills from his wrongful-death civil lawsuit. And Clinton's insurers
are paying to defend him in the sexual-harassment lawsuit brought
by Paula Jones, even though the policies don't cover sexual har-
assment.... Although these high-profile cases have created new
interest in personal liability policies, they are by no means typical.
Unlike Clinton and Simpson, most policyholders rarely get to pick
a high-powered lawyer. In fact, they usually have no choice.... If
you are sued, your insurance company... will decide if and when
to settle [or defend] the case.'
INTRODUCTION
Each year in America, consumers, homeowners, small businesses,
corporations, directors and officers, private individuals, professionals,
private and public institutions, and associations spend an estimated
$200 billion2 purchasing third-party liability insurance' from property
and casualty insurers. For some observers, this purchasing behavior
is both astounding and highly irrational. Consider the following sta-
tistics: The "assets of property and casualty insurers were $675.1 bil-
1. Christine Dugas, Insurance Can Help With Legal Bills, USA ToDAY, Feb. 17, 1997, at 2B;
see also Pamela Yip, Homeowners Test Limits of Policies, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 10, 1997, at DI
(noting that President Clinton and O.J. Simpson are atypical in their use of umbrella insurance
policies to help pay enormous legal bills).
2. See THE AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OVERVIEW (visited Dec. 26, 1996)
<http://www.aiadc.org/aiaover.htm> ("AIA member companies... manage more than $196
billion in assets and underwrite nearly $60 billion a year in direct written premiums, representing
more than 27 percent of the U.S. property/casualty industry's assets and more than 23 percent of the pre-
mium volume. ) (emphasis added).
3. Third-party liability insurance contracts are for "the benefit of the public as well as for
the benefit of the named or additional insured." Jackson v. DBonohue & Builders Transp., Inc.,
193 S.E.2d 524, 529 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 408
S.E.2d 358, 359 (W. Va. 1995)). The following types of insurance policies are included in this
category: Accident, automobile, homeowners' insurance, comprehensive general liability
("CGL"), professional liability insurance-including medical malpractice and legal malpractice
insurance-general business liability contracts, and directors and officers ("D&O") policies. See
generally Scott M. Seaman & Charlene Kittredge, Excess Liability Insurance: Law and Litigation, 32
TORT & INS. LJ. 653, 654 (1987) (discussing various types of excess insurance policies avail-
able).
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lion at the end of 1993, and [their] investments were $533 billion."'
Yet, "[i] n 1993, claims from property and casualty insurers (including
some industry expenses related to handling those claims) totaled
$187.4 billion."" Quite simply, on an annualized basis, the over-
whelming majority of consumers and businesses pay for "protection"
that they rarely use. This finding raises two questions. First, why do
insurance consumers spend such large, annual sums of money secur-
ing third-party coverage when the likelihood of their need to draw on
the policy is so small? Clearly, the enactment and enforcement of
compulsory liability insurance laws explain some of this behavior.
Several states force residents to purchase third-party liability insur-
ance if they own or operate motor vehicles within their jurisdictions.5
In addition, many who purchase third-party insurance are adhering
to commonly accepted business practices, preparing for the un-
known, or simply responding to a low tolerance for risk.7 There also
is another reason: property and casualty insurers' highly successful
marketing strategies8 have convinced consumers to purchase liability
4. INSURANCE NEWS NETWORK, INSURANCE INDUSTRY ECONOMIC IMPACT-PREMIUMS,
BENEFITS, INVESTMENTS LIFE AND PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURERS (visited Sept. 24, 1998)
<http://www.insure.com/impact.html>.
5. Id.
6. SeeALASKASTAT. § 28.15.081 (Michie 1996);ARIz. REV. STAT.§ 20-1123.01 (1996);ARK.
CODE ANN. § 21-9-303 (Michie 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38A (West 1996 & Supp. 1997);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1204.1 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.733 (West 1996); IDAHO CODE § 49-
1212 (1996); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-601 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3104 (1996 & Supp. 1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.39-080 (Banks-Baldwin 1995); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 12-305 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 90 § 1A (West 1996); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 63-15-11 (1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 105.1070 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-6-144
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.291 (1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 264:19 (1993); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 66-5-224 (Michie 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-41-15 (1966); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4509.01 (Anderson 1997 & Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 7-324 (West 1996 & Supp.
1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 31-47-1 (1956 & Supp. 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-9-10 (Law. Co-op
1976 & Supp. 1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-23 (Michie 1996 & Supp. 1997); TEx. TRANSP.
CODE ANN. § 601.071 (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-1303 (1953 & Supp. 1997); VA.
CODEANN. § 38.2-2205 (Michie 1950); W. VA. CODE § 6-12-1 (Michie 1996).
7. See, e.g., Microtunneling, TUNNELS & TUNNELING INT'L, Oct. 1, 1997, available in 1997
WL 14406330, at 3 (noting that high costs of unpredictable events cause tunneling contractors
to buy third-party liability insurance).
8. See, e.g., NATIONWIDE INSURANCE, NATIONWIDE WHAT'S NEW: STRONG 1995 PROPERTY
CASUALTY RESULTS ANNOUNCED (visited Sept. 24, 1998) <http://www.nationwide.com/
insurance/whatsnew/press-releases/property-casualty.html> (noting large growth in sale of
property-casualty insurance policies due to continued policy growth, success in retaining cus-
tomers, reduction in rates and aggressive cost management efforts); DPIC COMPANIES, DPIC:
The Professional Liability Specialist of the Orion Capital Companies (visited Dec. 24, 1996)
<http://www.dpic.com/orion-ac.html> ("DPIC Companies, Inc., the professional liability special-
ist of Orion, develops and markets insurance and loss prevention programs for accountants, ar-
chitects, engineers, environmental consultants, and lawyers in North America. ... Orion Capi-
tal Corporation has assets in excess of $2 billion. As of September 30, 1995, the Orion Capital
Companies had a statutory policyholders' surplus of $520,709,000.") (emphasis added); The
Galtney Group, Inc.-Business Overview (visited Dec. 24, 1996) <http://www.galtney.com/
overview.html> ("The Galtney Group, Inc.... has expanded to include... professional liability
malpractice insurance brokerage operations... and medical malpractice underwriting opera-
1134
INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND JUDICIAL DISCORD
insurance, even where statistical evidence shows the need for such in-
surance is extremely low.
This, therefore, leads to the second and more compelling ques-
tion: When third-party victims file claims or lawsuits against insureds,
are property and casualty companies more likely to respond in a
timely manner, settling the claims and/or providing quality legal de-
fense? Or are they more likely to reject the claims, showing little
concern for the victims' interests, and thereby force the insureds to
defend themselves? Fairly recent findings reveal that although some
carriers try to settle third-party claims,9 an unacceptable number of
liability companies simply refuse to settle or defend third-party suits.'
Consider, for example, the case of former football star, O.J. Simp-
son. A jury acquitted Simpson of criminal charges in the deaths of
Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman." After the criminal
trial, Nicole's and Ronald's families filed two wrongful-death suits
against O.J. Simpson. 2 Shortly thereafter, the football star filed a
claim under his general business liability policy, which he had pur-
chased from CNA Financial Corporation ("CNA").'3 The liability in-
surer rejected the claim and informed Simpson that CNA would not
defend him in the wrongful-death litigation.14 However, reports are
tions .... The Galtney Group placed over $150 million of premiums in 1994.... Total assets
have reached $131 million with combined net worth of $39 million.").
9. SeeSteven B. Fillman, Note, Braesch v. Union Insurance co., 237 Neb. 44, 464 N. W 2d 769
(1991): Policy Rationales of the Bad Faith Cause of Action and Implications to Non-Insurance Commer-
cial Contracts, 72 NEB. L. REV. 608, 610 (1993) (stating that in defense and settlement of third-
party claims, insurance company owes insured duty of good faith); Cindie Keegan Mcmahon,
Annotation, Duty of Liability Insurer to Initiate Settlement Negotiations, 51 A.L.R. 5th 701, § 2 (1997)
(explaining the fiduciary duty that exists between insurers and the insureds and implying that
carriers often honor their duty to defend and settle claims against insureds in good faith).
10. See generally William M. Shernoff & Sharon J. Arkin, Insurance Law--Focusing on Insur-
ance Bad Faith, TRIAL, Dec. 1, 1996.
In the 1950s, Americans put their trust in God, the president, and their insurance
companies. But it gradually became apparent that insurance companies were some-
times more interested in protecting their pocketbooks than their insureds. The first
area of disillusionment came in the context of liability policies. If an insurance com-
pany would not properly defend its insured or would not settle a liability action within
policy limits, there was little or no risk for the insurer.
Id. at 19.
11. See William Claiborne, From Cheers To Tears: Verdict Splits America, WASH. Posr, Oct. 4,
1995, at Al ("In an emphatic conclusion to a case that transfixed the nation, a jury of 10
women and two men today acquitted OJ. Simpson of murder.").
12. See Simpson Begins Depositions in Wrongful-death Suit, STAR TRIB.,Jan. 23, 1996, at 5A.
13. See Insurance Co. Trashes OJ's Claim, NEWSMAN (Mar. 5, 1996) <http://www.cybercomm.
net/-cdonline/wwwboard/messages/15.html> (noting that policy would defray expenses in
Simpson's wrongful-death suits).
14. See id. (stating that the policy did not cover the activity in the civil suit and therefore
CNA had no duty to defend Simpson). Most umbrella liability policies, contrary to public per-
ception, do not cover claims made as a result of adverse legal judgments. See Leslie Scism, Not
All Umbrella Policyholders Can Expect Presidential Service, WALL ST.J., Feb. 13, 1996, at C1. The in-
accuracy of public perception may be partly due to the current bankrolling of the President's
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circulating which state that "most of Simpson's expenses in the
wrongful-death lawsuit[s] are being paid by the underwriter of his
homeowner's insurance policy."' 5
Therefore, consider another question: If you were a judge and
Simpson sued CNA in your court for declaratory relief, would you
rule in favor of Simpson or CNA? To repeat, the jury in the criminal
trial decided that Simpson did not commit the intentional act of capi-
tal murder. More important, there is no assertion that Simpson
failed to pay his annual premiums. Therefore, would you force the
liability carrier to honor its contractual obligation and defend Simp-
son against civil claims? What legal standards or tests would you em-
ploy to ensure that your decision was reasonable, fair, and void of
your prejudices, "moral outrage," or unsatisfied expectations?
Each year, thousands of consumers-homeowners, physicians, law-
yers, business owners, directors and officers, clergy, managers, educa-
tors-as well as insurers petition state and federal courts for declara-
tory relief. 6 The simple question asked in these cases is: Do liability
insurers have a duty to defend policyholders when third-party com-
plainants only allege that insureds committed immoral or intentional
acts? 7 Indeed, state and federal, trial and appellate judges decide
this question on a regular basis; but their declarations are often per-
plexing and highly inconsistent.
More disturbing, evidence uncovered in this study suggests that
some-judges' duty-to-defend declarations are exceedingly biased. Put
simply, statistical analyses 8 reveal that the gender, ethnicity, occupa-
tion or profession, marital status, age, residence, and geographic lo-
cation of the insured, as well as of the third-party victim, play a major-
ity role in determining whether insurers have a duty to defend
policyholders' allegedly immoral or intentional conduct. These vari-
defense in PaulaJones's sexual harassment suit by two insurance companies. See id. But see Sec-
ond Clinton Insurer to Stop Paying Bills From Jones's Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1997, at B10
(noting that the second of President Clinton's two personal-liability insurers planned to discon-
tinue paying legal bills resulting from the Jones's sexual harassment lawsuit because it was no
longer legally liable for defense costs under terms of its umbrella-liability policy which did not
cover the main sexual harassment charge, but only ancillary charges that were subsequently
dismissed).
15. See Insurance Company Trashes O.J. 's Claim, NEWSMAN (Mar. 5, 1996)
<http://www.cybercom.net/-cdonline/wwwboard/messages/15.html>.
16. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
17. Intentional acts include, but are not limited to, the following allegations: Wrongful-
death, molestation, rape, statutory rape, invasion of privacy, battery, assault, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, trespass to land and chattel, conversion, fraud, intentional misrepre-
sentation, intentional employment, age, racial, gender or religious discrimination under state
and federal civil rights statutes and regulations, and intentional antitrust, securities, RICO,
criminal and banking violations under state and federal statutes and regulations.
18. See infra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
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ables are producing another undesirable outcome: some very specific
state and federal courts are more inclined to award declaratory relief
only to the insured, while other tribunals are more likely to declare
in favor of liability insurers.
For example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee recently upheld a
trial court's decision that a national medical-malpractice insurer must
defend a physician who allegedly molested and sexually assaulted a
young, female patient during an examination.' 9 On the other hand,
the Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed a trial judge's ruling
and declared that a South Carolina medical-malpractice carrier did
not have to defend a dentist-"a specialist in oral and maxillofacial
surgery"-who allegedly sexually assaulted three adult female pa-
tients. 2 In both cases, the third parties did not prove that the in-
sureds actually committed the allegedly intentional acts.2 , The par-
ties' complaints only presented allegations.22 Yet, one professional
liability insurer was forced to defend; the other was not. Why? Did
certain background variables influence the rulings?
Also consider allegations made against members of the legal pro-
fession. Clients often accuse attorneys of committing various im-
moral acts, intentional torts, and crimes. To be sure, prudent attor-
neys and law firms purchase liability insurance to help defend against
such charges. But do trial judges compel these carriers to defend
lawyers when clients only allege-rather than prove-that lawyers
19. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Tenn. 1994)
(holding that insurance company must defend doctor because alleged molestation occurred
during the course of providing professional services).
20. See South Carolina Med. Malpractice Liab. Ins. Joint Underwriting Ass'n v. Ferry, 354
S.E.2d 378, 380 (S.C. 1987) (holding that insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allega-
tions set forth in a complaint against the insured); see also Prior v. South Carolina Med. Mal-
practice Liab. Ins. Joint Underwriting Ass'n, 407 S.E.2d 655, 656-57 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(declaring that professional liability insurer did not have to defend physician who allegedly
sexually assaulted female patient "during an examination for birth control pills").
21. See Topoco, 879 S.W.2d at 834 (noting that the issue of whether an insurance company
has a duty to defend an insured turns on whether the alleged tortious conduct, if it occurred at
all, "took place in the course of... the providing of professional services to the insured") ;Feny,
354 S.E.2d at 380 (noting that "no ultimate facts in support of" allegations of misconduct were
set out).
22. See Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d at 832 (alleging that the defendant engaged in sexual acts with
plaintiff, "taking advantage of her tender years, her lack of knowledge, and exploiting her trust
in him as a doctor of medicine"); Feny, 354 S.E.2d at 380 (complaining of intentional tort of
taking indecent liberties of plaintiffs body, invading her privacy, and negligently and recklessly
failing to exercise ordinary care in the administration of anesthesia and performance of a
physical examination).
23. See Torpoco, 879 S.W.2d at 832 (holding that facts alleged in complaint against insured
are, as a matter of law, sufficient to require insurer to defend insured);Ferry, 354 S.E.2d at 381
(holding that as set out in the original complaint, when a complaint alleges tortious conduct
on the part of the insured and the policy explicitly exempts such conduct from coverage, the
insurer has no duty to defend).
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committed intentional acts? Once more, declarations are mixed.
Judges in some jurisdictions order a defense, while judges in other
venues do not. Note, however that this discrepancy exists even where
disgruntled clients' allegations are identical or substantially the
same. 4 And again, why?
Of course, there are other examples of inconsistent declarations
involving insureds who are employed in different occupations and
professions.25 However, some final illustrations involving homeown-
ers' insurance should highlight the extent and severity of the prob-
lems surrounding duty-to-defend declaratory judgments.
First, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Berray,26 an Anglo-American and a
Mexican-American-the insured and the third-party victim, respec-
tively-were drinking, playing pool, and gambling in a local pub.27
Shortly thereafter, the two adult males exchanged words and the in-
sured grabbed a .357 Magnum pistol and shot the victim.28 The vic-
tim "sustained serious injuries."' The insured asked his home-
owner's insurer to defend him in the civil suit. The insurer refused,
stressing that the insured intentionally used the .357 Magnum." The
trial judge accepted the insurer's argument and awarded declaratory
24. Compare Madden v. Continental Cas. Co., 922 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996)
(declaring that professional liability insurer had no duty to defend attorneys accused of fraud,
intentional misrepresentation, and attempted theft), and National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Shane
& Shane Co., 605 N.E.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (declaring that insurer had no
duty to defend the lawyer accused of fraudulent conduct), with Conner v. Transamerica Ins.
Co., 496 P.2d 770, 774 (Okla. 1972) (declaring that insurer must defend attorney charged with
conspiracy to defraud client), and Morissey v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 605 N.Y.S.2d
55, 55 (1993) (declaring that professional liability insurer must defend attorney accused of
fraudulent conduct).
25. Compare Servants of the Paraclete, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 866 F. Supp. 1560, 1583-
84 (D.N.M. 1994) (declaring that liability insurer unjustifiably breached its duty to defend
priest who allegedly sexually molested young boys), and Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B.,
846 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1993) (declaring that professional liability insurer must defend junior
high school teacher who was accused of sexually molesting and harassing 13-year-old female
student), and Zurich-American Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Cos., 539 N.E.2d 1098, 1098 (N.Y.
1989) (declaring that liability insurer must defend church employees in suits arising out of al-
leged sexual abuse of day-care children), with Maryland Cas. Co. v. Havey, 887 F. Supp. 195, 197
(C.D. Ill. 1995) (declaring that liability insurers had no duty to defend priest who allegedly
sexually molested several eleven- and twelve-year old boys), and Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kelly,
889 F. Supp. 535, 543 (D.R.I. 1995) (declaring insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify in
tort action brought by persons who claimed to have been assaulted by priests), and Houg v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 481 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (declaring that pro-
fessional liability carrier did not have to defend a Lutheran pastor who allegedly sexually
abused a parishioner), and American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Sch., 645 F. Supp. 628, 634
(E.D. Va. 1986) (declaring that professional liability insurer had no duty to defend a school
teacher who allegedly squeezed buttocks of 11-year-old school girl in a sexual way).
26. 694 P.2d 191 (Ariz. 1984).
27. See id. at 192.
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 193.
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relief.3 ' The Arizona Supreme Court, however, rejected the insurer's
argument and reversed the ruling.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, however, reached a very different
conclusion in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Victor," In this case, the
homeowner and the third-party victim were neighbors.- After a
party, the homeowner believed that the neighbor had stolen money
from the homeowner's guests. 5 The insured then confronted the
neighbor and shot him with a .357 Magnum pistol. 6 The neighbor
died. A jury convicted the homeowner of manslaughter, and the de-
cedent's estate then filed a civil suit against the homeowner. The
insurance company refused to defend the action, arguing that the in-
sured intentionally used the weapon.38 The trial judge and the Ne-
braska Supreme Court agreed that the insurer had no duty to defend
an insured who intended to injure another."'
Finally, in Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Todd,4 a father allegedly im-
prisoned and sexually assaulted his 17-year-old daughter.4 ' The trial
judge declared that the homeowner's insurer had a duty to defend
the father. 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed 3
But this same Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a contrary view
in American National Fire Insurance Co. v. Estate of Fournelle.44 In that
case, a father shot his two teenage sons in the head, killing them.
The father then committed suicide. 45 The children's estate brought a
wrongful-death suit against the father's estate, claiming that the kill-
31. See id. (agreeing with insurer that the insured's "intentional act" relieved it from the
"duty to defend").
32. See id. at 194 (rejecting the insurer's argument that aiming a loaded gun and pulling
the trigger in and of itself is an "intentional act" within the meaning of the policy exclusion).
But see Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. McKenna, 565 P.2d 1033, 1037 (N.M. 1977) (declaring that
homeowner's insurer did not have to defend insured who allegedly criminally assaulted a
Mexican-American). See Table 3, infra p. 1203 and the accompanying discussion (discussing
importance of ethnicity).
33. 442 N.W.2d 880 (Neb. 1989).
34. See id. at 881.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 881-82.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 881.
39. See id. But see Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Phalen, 597 P.2d 720, 728 (Mont. 1979)
(declaring that homeowner's insurer had duty to defend insured who criminally assaulted a
member of a racial minority).
40. 547 N.W.2d 696 (Minn. 1996).
41. See id. at 697.
42. See id. at 697-98.
43. See id. at 700 (holding that false imprisonment is limited to the overall intent of the
crime and is therefore excluded from coverage under intentional bodily harm provision of the
homeowner's policy).
44. 472 N.W.2d 292 (Minn. 1991).
45. See id. at 293.
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ings were intentional.46 The father's homeowner's insurer filed a de-
claratory judgment action, asserting it had no duty to defend the fa-
ther's estate.47 The trial judge agreed." The Supreme Court of Min-
nesota reversed, however, ruling that the policy's exclusion clause49
did not apply.0
There is a prevailing view among jurists and practitioners that a
declaratory judgment action is an efficient, effective, and equitable
method of helping litigants determine legal relations, rights, and ob-
ligations,5s especially under liability insurance contracts. 2 It even has
been argued that securing declaratory relief decreases the need to
file multiple lawsuits to settle disputes involving legal rights.53 But
46. See id.
47. See id. at 292-94 (asserting that the severability clause of the household exclusion of a
homeowner's insurance policy excludes coverage for a named insured's killing of two chil-
dren).
48. See id. at 293 (agreeing that the severability clause of the policy "is immaterial to de-
termination of [the] lawsuit where the exclusion, by its terms, applies to 'any insured'").
49. See Fournelle, 472 N.W.2d. at 293 (stating that"[f]irst, the policy contains what is com-
monly known as a 'household exclusion"). This exclusion provides:
2. Coverage E-Personal Liability, does not apply to: ... f. bodily injury to you and any
insured within the meaning of part a. or b. of Definition 3. 'insured'. The term 'You'
is defined as follows: Throughout this policy, 'you' and 'your' refer to the 'named in-
sured' shown in the Declarations and the spouse if a resident of the same house-
hold.... The following definition of 'insured' appears in Definition 3, parts a. and b.
of the policy: 3. 'insured' means you and the following residents of your household:
a. your relatives; b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the care of any per-
son named above. Finally, the policy also contains a severability clause, which states:
2. Severability of Insurance. This insurance applies separately to each insured. This
condition shall not increase our limit of liability for any one occurrence.
Id.
50. See id. at 295 (stating that "[t]he very purpose of the severability clause appears to pro-
vide separate coverage to the two named insureds").
51. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Cook, Reconciling the First Amendment with the Individual's Reputa-
tion: The Declaratory Judgment as an Option For Libel Suits, 93 DicK. L. REv. 265, 273 (1989)
(noting that declaratoryjudgments provide plaintiffs with findings of truth and do so at greater
speed than traditional damages suits); Marc A. Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Cur-
rent Libel Law, 74 CALiF. L. REv. 809, 810 (1986) ("Even more so than in other civil actions, pe-
cuniary awards are not the only form of recourse for defamation. A declaratory judgment ap-
proach offers a promising remedy for the parties and society."); Brian D. Shannon, Declaratory
Judgments Under the Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act: An Underutilized Weapon,
41 BAYLOR L. REv. 601, 602 (1989) (arguing that use of declaratory judgments in connection
with administrative actions is a valuable, underutilized legal tool).
52. See, e.g., Dianne K. Ericsson, Declaratory Judgment: Is it a Real or Illusory Solution?, 23
TORT & INS. L.J. 161, 180 (1987) (arguing that the"use of a declaratory judgment action by an
insurer may be beneficial if the insurer is anxious to have an early determination of its obliga-
tions under the contract" and encouraging insurers to "consider filing a declaratory judgment
action to determine [their] rights and obligations"); George J. Schwinghammer, Jr., Insurance
Litigation in Florida: Declaratory Judgments and the Duty to Defend, 50 U. MArMI L. REv. 945, 946
(1996) (arguing that the "declaratory judgment action is one tool that insurers can use to de-
termine which claims fall outside of coverage" and proposing "a method for using the declara-
tory judgment to allow the parties to determine their rights early in litigation, in order to
maximize judicial efficiency" in state courts).
53. See 10B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2751, at
458 (3d ed. 1998) (stating that a declaratoryjudgment proceeding "helps avoid a multiplicity of
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does statistical and historical evidence strongly support these assump-
tions? The short answer is no. Without doubt, a declaratory judg-
ment action is not the most effective or efficient means to resolve
disputes under liability insurance contracts, because "filing for de-
claratory judgment may result in two lawsuits and two jury trials."54
This Article will present some compelling evidence arguing against
the use of the declaratory judgment action to resolve duty-to-defend
controversies in state and federal courts.
Part I presents a brief overview of federal and state declaratory
judgment statutes and of the scope and purpose of liability (third-
party) insurance contracts. Part II discusses the origin and scope of
insurers' duty to defend and pay defense costs under liability con-
tracts. A central question in this Article is: Must insurers defend in-
sureds' allegedly immoral and intentional conduct? Another ques-
tion is: What are the appropriate legal standards for determining
whether there is a duty to defend? Part III addresses these difficult
and complex changes. Part III also reports that both questions gen-
erate serious conflicts among state and federal courts.
Part IV discusses whether insurers must defend lawyers and physi-
cians who have been accused of immoral conduct. Once more, this
Article reports that federal and state courts are hopelessly divided on
this issue. Parts V and VI examine whether homeowners' insurers
have a duty to defend insureds against two extremely serious and
widespread allegations-"sexual molestation" and "wrongful-death."
Some courts declare that insurers must defend only if third-party vic-
tims are adults. A significant number of tribunals order a legal de-
fense only if insureds and third-party victims are minors. Still other
courts require a legal defense only where courts find "no intent to
harm as a matter of law." Parts V and VI discuss the legal, as well as
social implications of such diverse declaratory rulings.
Finally, Part VII presents an empirical analysis of federal and state
courts' duty-to-defend declaratory judgments between 1900 and
1997. The evidence presented in this section supports the proposi-
tion that trial and appellate court declaratory rulings are highly
prejudicial, inconsistent, and legally untenable. More important,
evidence outlined in Part VII gives credence to the notion that fed-
actions by affording an adequate, expedient, and inexpensive means for declaring in one ac-
tion the rights and obligations of litigants").
54. See Donna Willis Darroch & Darren W. Penn, Intervention, Interpleader and Defense and
Indemnity Agreements, BRIEF, Summer 1995, at 22 ("Whenever a coverage dispute arises between
an insurer and its insured, the first idea that comes to mind about how to resolve the dispute
usually is to file for declaratoryjudgment. A declaratory action is not the only-and frequently
not the most efficient or effective-way to resolve the coverage dispute.").
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eral and state judges are likely to order "national" liability insurers to
provide a legal defense only if third-party victims and insureds have
very specific socio-economic and geographic characteristics.
The Article concludes by encouraging litigants to weigh seriously
the efficacy of asking courts to determine whether liability insurers
must defend third-party suits involving intentional torts or allega-
tions. To be sure, declaratory judgment actions clearly outline rights,
relations, and obligations in every instance. But trial and appellate,
state and federal judges often employ their own "moral" principles,
questionable public policies, and personal biases, rather than sound
legal principles, to declare whether liability insurers must defend
consumers against third-party suits. Therefore, insureds and con-
sumer activists should ask state legislatures to amend their respective
insurance codes to read: If a third-party victim accuses an insured of
committing an intentional act, the liability insurance company must provide
a complete legal defense and/or settle the claim in a timely manner. Neither
the insured nor insurer may file a declaratory judgment action in state or Fed-
eral courts to determine whether the insurer has a duty to defend.
I. A REVIEW OF DECLARATORYJUDGMENT AcTs AND THIRD-PARTY
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
A. The Ostensible Purpose and Application of Declaratory Judgments in
State and Federal Courts
1. The UniformnDeclaratoyJudgnments Act of 1922
Seventy-five years ago, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association proposed
the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.55 The purpose of the Act
was: (1) to afford state "[c]ourts . . . the power to declare rights,
status, and other legal relations";56 (2) to harmonize state laws with
the laws of the various states regarding insurers' liability; and (3) to
harmonize, as far as possible, [state laws] with federal laws and regu-
lations on the subject of declaratory judgments., 57 Therefore, the
hope was that any question of construction or validity arising under a
contract of any insured could be determined and the rights, status, or
other legal relation of any insured definitively established.5 At this
55. SeeUNIF. DECLARATORYJUDGMENTSACT, 12-12A U.L.A. 309 (1996 & Supp. 1998).
56. Id. § 1, 12 U.LA 313 (1996).
57. Id. § 15, 12AU.L.A. 586 (1996).
58. See id. § 2, 12A U.LA. 3 (1996) (granting to any interested person the power to have
construed their "rights, status, or other legal relations" arising under a written instrument).
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time, nearly all states have adopted the Acte9 and two states have en-
acted substantially equivalent versions.
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the trial judge has
complete discretion to grant or deny declaratory relief under a liabil-
ity insurance contract.6 In addition, a state appellate court may not
review a trial judge's declaratory judgment unless evidence estab-
lishes that the lower court abused its discretion. 2 Finally, several
conditions must exist before a declaratory judgment action can pro-
ceed: (1) ajusticiable controversy must be present; (2) the interests
of the parties must be adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legally protected interest in the controversy; and (4) the
issues between the parties involved must be ripe for judicial determi-
nation.6-
2. The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act of 1934
Congress enacted the Federal DeclaratoryJudgments Act in 1934.64
59. See ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-220 to 6-6-232 (1935); ARiz. RE%,. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1831 to 12-
1846 (West 1927); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-111-101 to 16-111-111 (Michie 1953); COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 13-51-101 to 1-51-115 (West 1923);DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, §§ 6501-6513 (1981);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011-86.111 (West 1943); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-4-1 to 9-4-10 (1945); IDAHO
CODE §§ 10-1201 to 10-1217 (1933); 737 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/2-701 (West 1945);IND. CODEANN.
§§ 34-4-10-1 to 34-4-10-16 (West 1927); IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 261 to 269 (West 1943); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-1701-16 (1994); LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. arts. 1871-1883 (West 1948); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5951-5963 (West 1941); MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 3-401 to 3-
415 (1944); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231A, §§ 1-9 (West 1945); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 555.01-
555.16 (West 1933); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 527.010-527.140 (West 1935);MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-
8-101 to 27-8-313 (1935); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 25-21,149 to 25-21,164 (1929); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 30.010-30.160 (1929);N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A.16-50 to 2A-16-62 (West 1924); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-6-1 to 44-6-15 (Michie 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 to 1-267 (1931); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 32-23-01 to 32-23-13 (1923); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2721.01-2721.15 (Anderson 1933);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1651-1657 (West 1961);OR. REV. STAT. §§ 28.010-28.160 (1927);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7531-7541 (West 1923); P.R. LAwsANN. tit. 32, § 59 (1931); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 9-30-1 to 9-30-16 (1959); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-53-10 to 15-53-140 (Law Co-op 1948);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-24-1 to 21-24-16 (Michie 1925); TENN. CODEANN. §§ 29-14-101 to 29-
14-113 (1923); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-37.011 (West 1943); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78-33-1 to 78-33-13 (1951); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4711-4725 (1931);V.I. CODEANN.
tit. 5, §§ 1261-1272 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-184 to 8.01-191 (Michie 1922); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.24.010-7.24.144 (West 1935); W. VA. CODE §§ 55-13-1 to 55-13-16 (1941); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 806.04 (West 1927); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-37-101 to 1-37-115 (Michie 1923).
60. In 1921, California enacted its Declaratory Relief Act. New York Civil Practice Laws
and Rules also permit declaratoryjudgments. But the following jurisdictions have not adopted
the Uniform DeclaratoryJudgments Act of 1922: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Ken-
tucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire, and New York.
61. See Missouri Property Ins. Placement Facility v. McRoberts, 598 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that trial courts have wide discretion to administer the Uniform
DeclaratoryJudgments Act to provide relief from uncertainty).
62. See Huntsville Utility Dist. v. General Trust Co., 839 S.W.2d 397, 400 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that trial court's declaratory judgment should not be disturbed on appeal un-
less the trial court's declaration was arbitrary).
63. See Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1978) (holding that the court lacked juris-
diction where four preconditions necessary to render declaratoryjudgment were absent).
64. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
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It states:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.., any court
in the United States... may declare the rights and other legal rela-
tions of any interested party seeking such declaration .... Any
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a finaljudgment
or decree and shall be reviewable as such.r'
To be certain, federal judges have great discretion under this stat-
ute. Butjudges must weigh several important factors before granting
or denying declaratory relief. Some relevant factors include:
(1) whether declaratory judgment would settle the controversy,
(2) whether declaratory action would clarify legal relations,
(3) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase friction
between federal and state courts, and (4) whether an alternative,
more effective legal remedy exists.66
3. Conflicts over the purpose of declaratory judgments-legal, equitable, or
declaratory relief?
The intended purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act
and of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is clear: to allow fed-
eral and state courts to determine interested parties' rights, obliga-
tions and relations under various contracts. But we must ask: What
are the actual substantive and procedural effects of declaratory
judgments? Do they simply declare or define existing relations,
fights, and obligations? Do they provide equitable relief for an im-
moral or an illegal act? Or do they create new and unintended legal
obligations and rights?
Many jurists and commentators adopt the following view:
"Declaratory judgments... do not presuppose a legal wrong, nor are
they followed by coercive relief as they simply declare a right, duty, rela-
65. Id.
66. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 778 F. Supp. 925, 928 (E.D. Ky. 1991)
(citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mercier, 913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Fifth Circuit has
noted additional relevant factors:
(1) whether there is a pending state action in which all of the matters in controversy
may be fully litigated, (2) whether the plaintiff filed suit in anticipation of a lawsuit
filed by the defendant, (3) whether the plaintiff engaged in forum shopping in bring-
ing suit, (4) whether possible inequities in allowing the declaratory plaintiff to gain
precedence in time or to change forums exist, (5) whether the federal court is a con-
venient forum for the parties and witnesses, (6) whether retaining the lawsuit in fed-
eral court would serve the purposes ofjudicial economy,... whether the federal court
is being called on to construe a state judicial decree involving the same parties and
entered by the court before whom the parallel state suit between the same parties is
pending.
St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Louisi-
ana Farm Bureau Fed'n, 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993)).
67. See28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
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tion, immunity [or] disability."6 Put differently, declaratory judg-
ments only provide "an authentic confirmation of already existing
[relations, rights and duties]."9 But the evidence does not support
this point of view.
First, declaratory judgments often try to correct legal wrongs by
providing coercive relief. In fact, "declaratory relief is an equitable
proceeding .... The powers of a court. . . are as broad and extensive as
,,70those exercised by such court in any ordinary suit in equity ....
Second, "declaratory relief.., is as much legal as equitable ....
Thus, in a proper case, a court has the fullest liberty in molding its de-
cree to the necessities of the occasion.' Finally, "a cause of action
for declaratory relief may properly embrace... claims for... conse-
quential relief which might otherwise be regarded as separate causes
of action, including equitable relief and damages."
It is important to remember these latter observations, for they
should help to explain why federal and state courts are so hopelessly
divided over three broad issues: (1) whether liability insurers have a
duty to defend insureds' allegedly immoral and intentional acts; (2)
the origin of the duty to defend; and (3) the scope of that duty.
B. Brief Overview--Third-Party Insurance Contracts
1. Types of third-party insurance contracts-liability versus indemnity
contracts
In most instances, insurance consumers purchase third-party in-
surance to help pay third-party victims' claims in the event of a loss of
property, bodily injuries, or death. But some consumers purchase
third-party insurance contracts-for example, automobile and
homeowners' policies-to help pay their own personal expenses
when they experience property damage or bodily injuries. More sig-
nificantly, third-party insurance falls into two very broad categories-
liability contracts and indemnity contracts.
Liability contracts7 have several common features: (1) a coverage
68. See CHARLESALAN WRIGHT ETAL., FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2751, at 570-71
(2d ed. 1983) (stating that a declaratory judgment proceeding "helps avoid multiplicity of ac-
tions by affording an adequate, expedient, and inexpensive means for declaring in one action
the rights and obligations of the litigants").
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. Adams v. Cook, 101 P.2d 484,489 (Cal. 1940) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
71. First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 868, 870 (N.Y.
1968) (emphasis added).
72. City of Milwaukee v. Firemen's Relief Ass'n, 149 N.W.2d 589,592-93 (Wis. 1967).
73. Some insurance liability contracts listed under this heading include various types of
automobile, homeowners', legal-malpractice, medical-malpractice, professional-malpractice,
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clause that outlines the types of risks the insurer is willing to assume;
(2) a broad exclusion provision that highlights various types of risks
or behaviors that the insurance company is unwilling to assume; (3) a
narrower "intentional acts" provision stating that injuries or acts
"expected or intended" from the insured's perspective are excluded;
(4) a right-to-settle clause that gives the insurer the exclusive right to
settle all third-party claims filed against the insured; (5) a duty-to-
defend provision that compels the company to hire legal counsel for
the insured and pay defense costs; and (6) a duty-to-pay clause that
outlines the conditions under which the insurer will pay once liability
has been established.74
A major purpose of liability insurance is to help shield the insured
from having to pay damages to a third-party victim. In addition,
"[u]nder a liability policy... the insurer's obligation to pay arises as
soon as the insured incurs liability for [a] loss... ."75 Under an in-
demnity contract, however, the insurer is only required to make
whole the insured after he has sustained an actual loss after the in-
sured has paid or been compelled to make a payment to a third-party
claimant.76 In comparison, an insurer incurs an obligation to the in-
sured whereupon the insured has paid, or is obligated to pay a third-
party claimant. Although both liability and indemnity insurance con-
tracts exclude coverage for malicious, dishonest, and fraudulent con-
duct and for claims involving libel or slander, indemnity agreements
general-business, commercial general liability, renter's and multi-peril policies. See Leon E.
Wynter, Business &Race: Insurers Join the Effort to TackleDiscrimination, WALLST.J., Mar. 5, 1997,
at BI (reporting that so-called employee-practices liability insurance policies are spreading
and, therefore, such development "may place insurers in the role of watchdog for corporate
behavior").
74. See EMERIC FISCHER& PETER N. SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW app. F (2d ed.
1994); ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE app. I (Ist ed. 1989); KENNETH H. YORK ET AL., INSURANCE
LAW app. F (3d ed. 1994).
75. Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
76. Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp. 1426,
1432-33 (D. Colo. 1996); see also MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d at 793 ("In general, under an in-
demnity policy the insurer is obligated only to reimburse the insured for covered loss that the
insured himself has already paid.").
77. See, e.g., JMF, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 5-90-64, 1991 WL 325570, *1, 2-3 (Ohio
App. Oct. 16, 1991). The court stated:
The policy provided indemnity to an insured for losses incurred due to employee
theft, up to $10,000.00.... An exclusion to that provision declares that the insurance
coverage is automatically 'deemed canceled as to any employee immediately upon
discovery by the insured... of any fraudulent or dishonest act of such employee.
Id.; SchiffAssocs., Inc. v. Flack, 417 N.E.2d 84, 85 (N.Y. 1980). In this case, the court stated:
The 'insuring agreement' clause of each policy provides that the insurer will pay 'all
sums which the Assured shall become legally obligated to pay by reason of liability for
any error, omission or negligent act committed, or alleged to have been committed by
the Assured... while in the performance of services in the professional capacity of the
Assured as: (a) Actuaries, (b) Employee Benefit Plan Consultants, and (c) Life Insur-
ance Agents or Brokers.' Under the rubric 'exclusions', for which the policy states it
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generally do not contain a duty-to-defend provision. 78 Therefore,
with indemnity agreements, control of the legal defense resides ex-
clusively with the policyholder and with the legal counsel chosen to
defend the policyholder against the third-party allegations.
Insurers sell several types of so-called indemnity contracts: Profes-
sional indemnity plans, hospital indemnity insurance, workers com-
pensation indemnity plans, excess employers indemnity policies, and
industrial indemnity insurance." Directors' and officers' policies
("D&O"), however, appear to be the most widely distributed and well-
known type of indemnity contracts.,
2. Directors and officers contracts-indemnity or liability insurance?
"A D&O policy typically has two components: ... [a] corporate re-
imbursement [component that] covers officers and directors when a
company is named in a lawsuit. The other portion [-the executive-
liability or the directors-and-officers-liability part-] covers the execu-
tives" when they are defendants in a suit.
Generally, the executive-liability part states that the insurance
would not indemnify the assured, are listed policyholder conduct (1) '(which is)
[b]rought about by or contributed to by the dishonest (or) fraudulent... Act.'");
Greenberg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 711 A.2d 909, 912
(NJ. Super. Ct. 1998) (stating that"[e]xclusion (b) states that the[professional liabil-
ity insurance] policy does not apply 'to any claim arising out of any dishonest, fraudu-
lent or malicious act, error or omission of any insured, committed with actual dishon-
est, fraudulent, or malicious purpose or intent
Id.; Kentuckiana Sales, Inc. v. Security Ins. Company of New Haven, 394 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1965). The court noted that:
The basic question for decision is the proper interpretation of Exclusion, § 2 of the
policy of indemnity, which is thus worded: "Exclusion, Section 2. This bond does not
apply to loss, or to that part of any loss ... which ... is dependent upon an inventory
computation or a profit and loss computation; provided, however, that this paragraph
shall not apply to loss of money or other property which the insured can prove,
through evidence wholly apart from such computations, is sustained by the insured
through any fraudulent or dishonest act or acts committed by any one or more of the
Employees."
Id.
78. See, e.g., Julie J. Bisceglia, Practical Aspects of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance-
Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32U.C.L.A. L. REV. 690, 701-10 (1985)
(describing the demand for directors' and officers' liability insurance and the problems cre-
ated by an absence of a duty to defend).
79. This information came from the Internet after employing the AltaVista search engine
and typing in the word "indemnity."
80. Cf. Timothy L. O'Brien, Liability Premiums To Cover Directors, Officers Decline, WALL ST.J.,
Dec. 9, 1996, at B8 (stating that"[p]remiums for directors-and-officers ... insurance are going
down, despite a rise in frequency and size of claims according to a survey by Watson Wyatt &
Co .... The survey reports that 88% of its participants have some form of D&O insurance, with
banks and utilities the biggest users.").
81. O'Brien, supra note 80. "The survey reports that 88% of its participants have some
form of D&O insurance, with banks and utilities the biggest users. Among banks and utilities
that responded, 97% ... had D&O coverage. Construction and real-estate firms used D&O
insurance the least, with only 71% having coverage."
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company will pay on behalf of, or reimburse directors and officers for
"loss" arising from allegedly "wrongful acts."8 2 A "'wrongful act' gen-
erally means any error, misstatement, misleading statement, omis-
sion, neglect or breach of duty."'
Although most insurance consumers would call D&O policies
"indemnity" insurance, many directors and officers policies are not
true indemnity policies. In fact, federal and state courts are seriously
divided over the central question: whether D&O policies are liability
or indemnity contracts.84
Moreover, even where the word "indemnity" has appeared in the
insurer's name, a question has arisen over whether the company has
issued a genuine indemnity policy.
For example, MGIC Indemnity Corp. sells a D&O policy nation-
wide, describing it as an "indemnity-type policy. ''" Nevertheless, in
Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp.,7 the Ninth Circuit held that although
the company "cryptically refer[s] to its policy as an 'indemnity-type
policy' . . . the policy here is a liability policy."87 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit adopted a similar view in Little v. MGIC
Indemnity Corp.8 But consider the plight of a liability carrier that also
sells D&O policies across the country. In Zaborac v. American Casualty
Co.,89 the federal district court-although employing extremely im-
precise language-decided that the D&O contract was an indemnity
policy.90 On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit Appellate Court
82. See Minet, Directors & Officers Liability (visited Mar. 9, 1997) <http://www.minet-
tech.com/prop_cas/diroff.html> ("Directors & Officers Liability Insurance is essentially a two-
part coverage. One part pays on behalf of the insured company for reimbursement due directors
and officers as authorized by corporate bylaws and articles; the other part pays on behalf of the
directors and officers directly.") (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
85. See Okada v. MGIC Indemnity Corp., 823 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1986).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 280 (stating that if the policy is for liability rather than indemnity, payment for
loss is not conditioned upon the payment of damages by the directors, thus assuring policy.
holders that they need not expend their funds to receive protection for liability);see also Gon v.
First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the First State policy
was a liability policy because the language in the policy "paralleled" that found in the Okada
policy). Note, however, that in this case the court also stated that"there is no duty to defend
under the terms of the First State policy." Id. This conclusion is unduly bewildering because
liability policies generally have duty to defend provisions. See supra notes 75, 78 and accompa-
nying text (contrasting liability and indemnity insurance contracts).
88. 836 F.2d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 1987) (stating "[tihe language of [the definitions] sec-
tion ... is entirely consistent with the characterization of the policy as a liability policy").
89. 663 F. Supp. 330 (C.D. Ill. 1987).
90. See id. at 332 (stating that the liability insurance policy requires only that the insurer
indemnify its insured for losses incurred, including defense costs, thereby distinguishing it
from a general liability policy where "the insurer must defend an insured in addition to indemnify-
ing him against liability") (emphasis added).
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reached a different conclusion in McCuen v. American Casualty Co.91
The McCuen court said that the D&O policy was "clearly a liability
policy, despite American Casualty's attempt to treat it as an indem-
nity policy."'
Determining whether a D&O policy is a "liability" or an
"indemnity" contract is crucial, because the answer influences
whether courts will force insurers to defend officers and directors
who have been accused of committing immoral and intentional acts.
But the way state and federal courts decide this question should cause
alarm. Essentially, there is no evidence that courts are using a sound
methodology or legal standard to determine the true character of
D&O policies. Therefore, litigants and their attorneys should weigh
this observation fairly carefully before asking courts for a declaration
of the respective rights and obligation of the insurers and the in-
sured.
II. THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND AND PAY UNDER THIRD-PARTY
INSURANCE CONTRACTS
A. General Rules-The Origin of the Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend
Against Third-Party Claims
Many large liability insurers sell the same insurance contract in
every state. Moreover, each liability contract contains a duty-to-
defend statement or clause. 9
But determining whether and when liability carriers must defend
insureds in the respective states is not easily discernible. Consider,
for example, a fairly common occurrence. Each year, State Farm In-
surance Co. sells thousands of homeowners contracts in every state of
the union. A third-party victim from each state accuses a homeowner
of either sexual molestation, wrongful-death, or spousal abuse. Fifty
homeowners approach State Farm and ask for a legal defense.
Should the insurer review the liability contract to determine whether
it should commence a legal defense? Should the company examine
the third-party complaint to find the answer? Or should the com-
pany file a declaratory judgment action? Sadly, but for good reasons,
too many insurers elect to do the latter.
94
91. 946 F.2d 1401 (8th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 1401.
93. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW, § 9.1 (b) (1988) (stating that
"[l] iability insurance policies usually include provisions which state that the insurer will defend
an insured against any suit alleging bodily injury and property damage resulting from an occur-
rence that is within the scope of the insurance coverage").
94. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
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Simply put, there is no universal rule. More disturbing from both
the insureds' and the national insurers' perspectives, state supreme
courts have adopted a wide variety of conflicting and overlapping
tests to help determine whether the insurer must defend based on
the liability.
For example, the Iowa Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania have embraced the so-called "complaint-potentiality
rule": The duty to defend arises only where the third-party victim's
complaint suggests "potential liability" or when the complaint may
"potentially come within" policy coverage." The Arizona Supreme
Court9 and three other courts,7  however, have chosen the
"complaint-analysis of facts" rule: Generally, insurers must examine
the facts outlined in the third-party complaint-rather than the third-
party victims' allegations-to determine whether a defense is re-
quired.
At least thirteen state supreme courts instruct liability insurers to
review their insurance policies rather than the third-party com-
plaints.98 But within this group, there are a variety of tests. For in-
stance, the Supreme Courts of Michigan, Nevada, and Oklahoma
have embraced the "policy-obligation rule," which requires the in-
surer to defend when the policy language clearly requires a defense."
95. See McAndrews v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 349 N.W.2d 117, 119 (Iowa 1984) ("(An
insurer's] duty to defend arises whenever there is a potential or possible liability to pay based
on the facts at the outset of the case and is not dependent on the probable liability to pay based
on the facts ascertained through trial."); Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 188 A.2d
320, 321-22 (Pa. 1963) ("[T]he obligation to defend arises whenever the complaint filed by the
injured party may potentially come within the coverage of the policy.").
96. See Kepner v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 509 P.2d 222, 224 (Ariz. 1973) ("IT]he duty to de-
fend should focus upon the facts rather than upon the allegations of the complaint which may
or may not control the ultimate determination of liability.").
97. See Continental Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 528 P.2d 430, 435 (Alaska
1974) ("[T]he insurer must defend a suit where the complaint alleges facts that may be within
the policy coverage or where such facts are known or reasonably ascertainable by the insurer.");
Trisler v. Indiana Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) ("The insurer's duty to
defend is determined from the allegations of the complaint coupled with those facts known to
or ascertainable by the insurer after reasonable investigation."); Woodmen of the World Life
Ins. Soc'y v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 241 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Neb. 1976) (stating that "[a]n in-
surer's duty to defend an action against the insured must, in the first instance, be measured by
the allegations of the petition against the insured") (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.
v. Olson Bros., 188 N.W.2d 699, 702 (Neb. 1971)).
98. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., Stockdale v. Jamison, 330 N.W.2d 389, 392 (Mich. 1982) ("The duty to de-
fend.., arises solely from the language of the insurance contract. A breach of that duty can be
determined objectively, without reference to the good or bad faith of the insurer."); Home Say.
Ass'n v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 854 P.2d 851, 855 (Nev. 1993) ("An insurer obligated by con-
tract to defend an insured owes the insured a continuing duty to defend, and this duty contin-
ues throughout the course of the litigation against the insured.");Deffenbaugh v. Hudson, 791
P.2d 84, 86 n.8 (Okla. 1990) ("When an insurance policy provides indemnity against liability,
the insurer's duty to defend attaches immediately after the claim is made, and the insurer must
thereafter act in the name and on behalf of the insured; the insurer's legal position vis-a-vis
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In contrast, the New Mexico and South Dakota Supreme Courts have
fashioned the "arguably within policy rule": Liability companies are
required to defend when known, but unpleaded facts, bring a third-
party claim arguably within the scope of the policy's coverage provi-
sion.' °° The Wisconsin and Idaho Supreme Courts have established a
somewhat similar test-the "fairly debatable rule." It states that the
duty to defend may or may not arise if there is doubt about the like-
lihood of recovery under the policy 'Y
Five state supreme courts have adopted a position that may be de-
scribed as the "policy-potentiality rule., 112 For example, thirty-two
years ago, the California Supreme Court outlined the test in Gray v.
Zurich Insurance Co."3  The court stated: "[T]he duty to defend
should be fixed by the facts which the insurer learns from the com-
plaint, the insured, or other sources. An insurer, therefore, bears a
duty to defend its insured whenever it ascertains facts which give rise
to the potential of liability under the policy.' 0, 4 The Arkansas Su-
preme Court announced a closely related doctrine. It held that "the
duty to defend arises where there is a possibility that the injury or
damage may fall within the policy coverage."' 5
[sic] the injured party becomes coextensive with that of the insured.") (quoting Colie v. Arnett,
765 P.2d 1203, 1206-07 (Okla. 1988)).
100. See American Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Progressive Cas. Co., 799 P.2d 1113, 1116 (N.M.
1990) ("The duty of an insurer to defend arises from the allegations on the face of the com-
plaint or from the known but unpleaded factual basis of the claim that brings it arguably within
the scope of coverage."); Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Clifford, 366 N.W.2d 489, 491 (S.D.
1985) ("[W]e adopt the view that if it is clear or arguably appears from the face of the pleadings
in the action against the insured that the alleged claim, if true, falls within policy coverage, the
insurer must defend.").
101. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Brady, 907 P.2d 807, 810 (Idaho 1995) ("An insurer seeking
to establish that it has no duty to defend faces a difficult burden since, at this stage, any doubts
as to coverage must be resolved in favor of the insured."); Elliott v. Donahue, 485 N.W.2d 403,
406 (Wis. 1992) (stating that "[a]n insurer does not breach its contractual duty to defend by
denying coverage where the issue of coverage is fairly debatable as long as the insurer provides
coverage and defense once coverage is established").
102. See infra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
103. 419 P.2d 168 (Cal. 1966).
104. Id. at 177; see also Standard Oil Co. v. Hawaiian Ins. & Guar. Co., 654 P.2d 1345, 1349
(Haw. 1982) ("An insurer's duty to defend arises whenever there is a potential for indemnifica-
tion liability of insurer to insured under the terms of the policy."); Spruill Motors, Inc. v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Ins. Co., 512 P.2d 403, 407 (Ran. 1973) (adopting the rule announced in
Milliken v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 338 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1964), holding that an insurer has a duty
to defend if the facts brought to its attention or "any facts which could be reasonably discov-
ered" give rise to a potential of liability under the policy);James Graham Brown Found., Inc. v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 814 S.W.2d 273, 279 (Ky. 1991) (holding that"insurer has a
duty to defend if there is any allegation which potentially, possibly or might come within the
coverage of the policy"); First Wyo. Bank, v. Continental Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1064, 1075 (Wyo.
1993) (affirming "obligation to defend arises from the allegations in the complaint directed to
the potentiality of covered liability") (citations omitted).
105. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. of Am. v. Henshall, 553 S.W.2d 274, 277 (Ark. 1977)
(affirming circuit court's holding that under homeowner's policy, insurer had duty to defend
but reversing judgment on duty to pay damages that may be recoverable by injured party until
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Of course, the majority of state supreme courts compel liability in-
surers to examine the third-party victim's complaint as well as the in-
surance contract to determine whether a duty to defend exists.'0 In
Texas, the doctrine is known as the "eight comers rule":
This rule requires the trier of fact to examine... the allegations in
the complaint and the insurance policy [to] determin[e] whether a
duty to defend exists. The duty to defend is not affected by facts
ascertained before suit... [or during] the process of litigation, or
by the ultimate outcome of the suit.'°7
In Florida,08 Illinois,'0 Minnesota,"0 New York,"' Ohio," 2 Washing-
ton," 3 and several other jurisdictions,"4 the doctrine is termed the
facts are developed at personal injury trial).
106. See infra notes 104-14 (discussing an insurer's duty to defend).
107. American Alliance Ins. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
(applying "eight comers" or "complaint allegation" rule).
108. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Lenox Liquors, Inc., 358 So. 2d 533,535 (Fla. 1977)
(stating that "insurer is under a duty to defend a suit against an insured only where the com-
plaint alleges a state of facts within the coverage of the insurance policy").
109. See Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d 842, 847 (Il.
1995). The court stated:
Whether an insurer's duty to defend has arisen is determined by looking to the allega-
tions in the underlying complaint and comparing these allegations to the policy provi-
sions.... If the facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall within or even poten-
tially within policy coverage, the insurer has a duty to defend its insured against the
complaint.
Id.
110. See Republic Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Buehl, 204 N.W.2d 426,429 (Minn. 1973).
[A] n insurance company's duty to defend is contractual, to be determined by the al-
legations of the complaint against the insured and the indemnity coverage afforded by
the policy. Where the allegations of a complaint state a cause of action within the
terms of policy coverage, the insurance company must undertake to defend the in-
sured.
Id.
111. See Goldberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 77 N.E.2d 131, 133 (N.Y. 1948) ("[T]he
insurance company's duty to defend... [arises) when it appear[s] from the allegations.., that
the injury [is) within coverage of the policy.").
112. See Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 59 N.E.2d 199, 203 (Ohio 1945).
The duty of an insurance company to defend an action brought against its insured is
determined from the plaintiff's petition and, when that pleading on its face discloses a
case within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is required to make defense regard-
less of its 'ultimate liability' to the insured.
Id.
113. See State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139, 1145 (Wash. 1984) ("[T]he
duty to defend hinges not on the insured's potential liability to the claimant, but rather on
whether the complaint contains any factual allegations rendering the insurer liable to the in-
sured under the policy.").
114. See, e.g., Ladner & Co. v. Southern Guar. Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 100, 103 (Ala. 1977)
(finding duty to defend "when the allegations of the complaint show that the injury alleged
is... within the coverage of the policy"); Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811
P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1991) ("An insurer's duty to defend arises when the underlying com-
plaint against the insurer alleges any facts that might fall within the coverage of the policy");
LaBonte v. Federal Mut. Ins. Co., 268 A.2d 663, 665 (Conn. 1970) ("[A] duty to defend an in-
sured arises if the complaint states a cause of action which appears on its face to be within the
terms of the policy coverage."); Continental Cas. Co. v. Alexis I. DuPont Sch. Dist., 317 A.2d
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101, 103 (Del. 1974) ("In determining whether the third party's action against the insured
states a claim covered by the policy, we must look to the allegations of the complaint.... The
test is whether the complaint alleges a risk within the coverage of the policy."); American Con-
tinental Ins. Co. v. Pooya, 666 A.2d 1193, 1197 (D.C. 1995) (concluding that the complaint
should be examined "to ascertain whether the allegations of the complaint state a cause of ac-
tion within the policy coverage ... which gives rise to a duty to defend under the terms of the
policy"); Great Am. Ins. Co. v. McKemie, 259 S.E.2d 39, 40-41 (Ga. 1979) (holding that even if
the allegations in the complaint are groundless, the allegations are the focus when determining
whether the insurer is obligated to provide a defense); American Home Assurance Co. v.
Czarniecki, 230 So. 2d 253, 259 (La. 1970) ("Insurer's duty to defend suits brought against its
insured is determined by the allegations of the injured plaintiffs petition, with the insurer be-
ing obligated to furnish a defense unless the petition unambiguously excludes coverage."); La-
voie v. Dorchester Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 560 A.2d 570, 570 (Me. 1989) (holding that insurer is re-
quired to defend if there is a "legal or factual basis that could be developed at trial"); Brohawn
v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 347 A.2d 842, 850 (Md. 1975) ("If the plaintiffs in the tort suits allege
a claim covered by the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend."); Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Tri-state Transit Co., Inc., 1 So. 2d 221, 223 (Miss. 1941) ("The duty of the insurer to defend
that suit is to be measured by the allegations of the declaration in that case. .. ."); McAlear v.
Saint Paul Ins. Cos., 493 P.2d 331, 334 (Mont. 1972) (holding that"if the complaint in the ac-
tion brought against the insured upon its face alleges facts which come within the coverage of
the liability policy, the insurer is obligated to assume the defense of the action"); Zipkin v.
Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 754 (Mo. 1969) ("Ordinarily the insurer's duty to defend is deter-
mined from the policy provisions and the allegations of the petition.") (citations omitted);
White Mountain Constr. Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 631 A.2d 907, 909 (N.H. 1993) ("[A)n
insurer's obligation to defend its insured is determined by whether the cause of action against
the insured alleges sufficient facts in the pleadings to bring it within the express terms of the
policy, even though the suit may eventually be found to be without merit."); Voorhees v. Pre-
ferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1259 (NJ. 1992) (deciding that"[w hen [the language of
the complaint and the policy) correspond, the duty to defend arises, irrespective of the claim's
actual merit") (citations omitted); Waste Management, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374,
377 (N.C. 1986) ("When the pleadings state facts demonstrating that the alleged injury is cov-
ered by the policy, then the insurer has a duty to defend, whether or not the insured is ulti-
mately liable."); Kyllo v. Northland Chem. Co., 209 N.W.2d 629, 634 (N.D. 1973) ("The general
rule on a liability insurer's duty to defend its insured is that the insurer is under an obligation
to defend only if it would be held bound to indemnify the insured in case the injured person
prevailed upon the allegations of his complaint.") (citations omitted); Ferguson v. Birmingham
Fire Ins. Co., 460 P.2d 342, 347 (Or. 1969) ("Thus, if a complaint contains two counts, one
based upon willful conduct [which is excluded from coverage) and one based upon negligent
conduct [which is not excluded], the insurer would have a duty to defend because of the alle-
gation falling within policy coverage."); Grenga v. National Sur. Corp., 317 A.2d 433, 435-36
(RI. 1974) ("If the allegations in the complaint fall within the risks covered against in the pol-
icy, the insurer is duty-bound to provide a defense for its insured regardless of whether the al-
legations are groundless, false, or fraudulent."); Gordon-Gallup Realtors, Inc. v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 265 S.E.2d 38, 40 (S.C. 1980) ("The insurer is under a duty to defend if the complaint al-
leges a state of facts within the policy's coverage."); First Nat'l Bank v. South Carolina Ins. Co.,
341 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tenn. 1960) (holding that an insurance carrier must look to the content
of its policy and averments of pleading to determine its obligation) (citations omitted); State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Kay, 487 P.2d 852, 855 (Utah 1971) ("[W]here the facts alleged in a
complaint against the insured support a recovery for an occurrence covered by the policy.., it
is the insurer's duty to defend unless relief is obtained by way of a declaratory judgment.");
Commercial Ins. Co. v. Papandrea, 159 A.2d 333, 335 (Vt. 1960) (holding that"the duty of the
insurance carrier to defend a claim is measured by the allegations upon which the claim is
stated," and "[t]he provision in the policy requiring the insurer to defend the insured. ... .");
Norman v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902, 906 (Va. 1978) ("[The] insurance policy
cast upon the defendant the duty to defend, initially at least, only if the suit against its insured
stated a case covered by policy.") (citations omitted); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pitrolo, 342
S.E.2d 156, 160 (W. Va. 1986) ("As a general rule, an insurer's duty to defend is tested by
whether the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint are reasonably susceptible of an interpreta-
tion that the claim may be covered by the terms of the insurance policy.").
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"allegation of the complaint rule." Perhaps the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts has stated the rule most intelligibly: "the initial duty of
a liability insurer to defend third-party actions against the insured is
decided by matching the third-party complaint with the policy provi-
sions .... [I]f the allegations of the complaint .. .reasonably [fall
under the coverage provisions], the insurer must undertake the de-
fense.""5
B. An Analysis of Specific Factors Triggering Liability Insurers' Obligation
to Defend
Even if insurers know they must examine either the contract, com-
plaint, or both documents to determine whether a defense is neces-
sary, there is still another conflict-generating question: What specific
act, incident, or behavior triggers the duty? Put another way: assum-
ing an insurer knows a defense is required, does the insurer have dis-
cretion to commence the representation at will? Or may the insured
compel the insurer to start the legal representation immediately, on
a specific date, or upon occurrence of a specific event? Without
doubt, this is a serious issue, because the majority of state supreme
courts embrace the rule that liability insurers have the exclusive right
to organize, commence, and control the legal defense. 
6
Although they have recognized insurers' right to control a defense,
state and federal courts still have adopted some very broad, conflict-
ing, and less-than-intelligible instructions that dictate when insurers
should start spending money to protect insureds' interests. For ex-
ample, a few courts have employed the "exposure rule" and held that
the duty to defend is triggered when the initial exposure to an injury-
causing condition takes place.17  Conversely, some courts have ap-
plied the "manifestation rule," which suggests that where manifesta-
tion of an injury is delayed, coverage or the duty to defend is not
triggered until third-party injuries or property damages become
known to the victims."8 Some additional tribunals have embraced
115. Continental Cas. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 461 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Mass. 1984).
116. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Sherwood Brands, Inc., 680 A.2d 554, 564
(1996) ("Generally, the insurer has exclusive control over litigation against the insured, who
must in turn surrender all control over the conduct of the defense to the insurer."); Ticor Title
Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 368, 373 (1995) ("As a general rule, under Califor-
nia law the primary insurer alone owes a duty to defend, with the corresponding right to con-
trol the defense.").
117. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 63 F.2d 1212, 1223
(6th Cir. 1980) (applying "exposure rule" which triggers coverage in any policy period in which
exposure to cause of injury occurred); Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128, 1145
(5th Cir. 1981) (following the "exposure rule").
118. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 110, 118 (D. Mass.
1981) (applying "pure" or "strict manifestation" rule which triggers coverage upon actual dis-
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the "injury-in-fact rule." This rule states that coverage is triggered
when actual property damage or a personal injury first occurs."9 Still,
other federal and state courts have adopted the so-called "multiple"
or "triple-trigger" approach, which requires coverage under policies
during a period of continuing exposure and manifestation. °
Of course, there is more confusion. Some courts ignore these
rules altogether and conclude that the duty to defend is triggered:
(1) "when there is a 'suit,' [although] ... standard policies often fail
to define 'suit"';... (2) when insureds exhibit "coincidental involve-
ment in the underlying accidents";'2 (3) when "a suit... allege[s] an
injury";'23 (4) "when a complaint is filed against the insured";1 24 and
(5) "when the injury takes place. " "zs Clearly, these various rules are
onerous and are sources of much conflict. However, there is one
rule that is superior to the former and is fairly easy to follow: liability
insurers must commence a legal defense when they first discover,
covery of injury); see also Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12, 24 (1st
Cir. 1982) (applying relaxed manifestation rule which triggers coverage in first policy period
during which discovery of injury is possible).
119. See American Home Prods. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 565 F. Supp. 1485, 1497
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (applying injury-in-fact rule, which requires insured to"prove the cause of the
occurrence (accident or exposure), the result (injury, sickness, or disease), and that the result
(injury, sickness, or disease), and that the result occurred during the policy period"); Kief
Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 28, 33 (N.D. 1995) (stating
that "[c]ourts have applied the 'injury-in-fact' rule, holding that where the manifestation of
injury is delayed, liability insurance coverage is triggered when real personal injury or actual
property damage first occurs"); see also Sentinel Ins. v. First Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 894, 917 (Haw.
1994) (explaining that injury-in-fact theory "diverges from the manifestation and exposure
theories only when injury-in-fact is not simultaneous with manifestation or exposure").
120. See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1046-47 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(applying the "multiple" or "triple-trigger" approach); Kief Farmers Coop., 534 N.W.2d at 33
(confirming that "[o]ther courts have applied the 'continuous exposure' rule [which holds]
that where manifestation of injury is delayed, liability insurance coverage is triggered so that
insurance policies in effect during different time periods from exposure to harm through
manifestation of injury... all impose a duty to defend or indemnify").
121. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 874 P.2d 142, 148 (Wash. 1994) (revealing
that "[t]he case law across the country is split [over] what constitutes a 'suit' for purposes of the
duty to defend"); see also Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 655 N.E.2d
842, 847 (11. 1995) ("Without a complaint, there is no 'suit.' And without a 'suit,' [the] duty to
defend.. is not triggered.").
122. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 537 N.W.2d 879, 881 (Mich. 1995).
123. Select Design, Ltd. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 798, 800 (Vt. 1996).
124. Shunn Constr., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 897 P.2d 89, 90 (Idaho 1995). But seeTri-
State Co. v. Bollinger, 476 N.W.2d 697, 704 (S.D. 1991) ("[M]ere allegations of negligence in a
transparent attempt to trigger insurance coverage by characterizing intentionally tortious con-
duct as negligent will not persuade [this] court to impose a duty to defend.") (citations omit-
ted). But cf Hawaiian Holiday Macdamia Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co., 872 P.2d 230, 235 (Haw.
1994) ("The ... complaint did not allege claims sounding in negligence and therefore did not
trigger [the] duty to defend.").
125. Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 699 (Cal.
App. 1996) (stating that California case law has established that the operative even"triggering"
coverage is the injury although the word "trigger" is not found in the CGL policies or the in-
surance code).
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learn, or receive information indicating that insureds have injured a
third-party.
C. The Scope of Insurers'Duty to Defend Under Liability Contracts
Again, the central focus of this Article is whether liability insurers
have a duty to defend insureds' allegedly "immoral" and
"intentional" acts under various circumstances. As will be discussed
more thoroughly in Parts III through VII, this is a question of law to
be decided by federal and state courts. But courts already have estab-
lished some definitive rules governing the scope of a legal defense.
They have embraced scope-of-defense rules without being concerned
about whether third-party allegations involved negligent, immoral,
intentional, or criminal acts.
First, if an insurer believes it has no duty to defend, the carrier may
(1) defend the action with a reservation of rights;2 8 (2) file a separate
declaratory judgment action to determine its rights and obligation
before trial; 127 (3) file a cross-complaint for declaratory relief in the
underlying personal-injury action;2 1 or (4) deny the request for a de-
fense and promise to reimburse the insured if a court determines
subsequently that a defense is required.1 2 But there is consensus:
"[t] he best approach is for the insurance company to defend under a
reservation of rights."'30
126. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jacober, 514 P.2d 953, 958 (Cal. 1973); see also
Restighini v. Hanagan, 18 N.E.2d 1007, 1008 (Mass. 1939) (holding that insurer"could, pend-
ing ascertainment of... its liability under the policy, take the usual measures in the defense of
the actions without barring itself from subsequently withdrawing when it discovered that the
contract... did not cover the [insured's claim]").
127. SeeShell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 946, 949 (I1. App. Ct. 1995) (citing La Ro-
tunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 408 N.E.2d 928, 935 (Il. App. Ct. 1980)); American Employer's
Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 533 P.2d 1203, 1207 (N.M. 1975) (concluding that companies may sue for
a declaratory judgment-before undertaking a defense-to determine their liability).
128. See RJ. Reynolds Co. v. California Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 235 Cal. App. 3d 595, 599 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1991).
129. See Dykstra v. Foremost Ins. Co., 14 Cal. App. 4th 361, 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(allowing an insurer to deny a request for a defense when insurer agreed to reimburse the in-
sured for attorney's fees if investigation demonstrated that the insured was actually covered);
Waite v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. C.o., 467 P.2d 847, 851 (Wash. 1975) (holding that insurer may in-
struct insured to pay for his own defense and subsequently reimburse insured for defense cost
if finaljudgment establishes company's liability).
130. Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Wis. 1993); see alsoHecla
Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1089 (Colo. 1991) (holding that insurer
should provide defense for insured even if it believes it is under no obligation to do so, and
seek reimbursement later if facts prove it to be correct); Trovillion v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 474 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Il1. App. Ct. 1985) (stating that"[a]n insurer's duty to defend
under a reservation of rights or to seek a declaratory judgment is not satisfied by simply refus-
ing to participate in the litigation and waiting for the insured to institute litigation against the
insurer to determine their respective rights and duties"). But seeAmerican Gen. Fire & Cas. Co.
v. Progressive Cas. Co., 799 P.2d 1113, 1117 (N.M. 1990) ("[T]he insurer's unconditional de-
fense of an action brought against its insured constitutes a waiver of the terms of the policy and
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Second, in addition to fully informing the insured of the com-
pany's reservation-of-fights defense, an insurer also has "an enhanced
obligation of good faith"'' to defend the insured against third-party
claims. To guarantee that an insured receives a "good-faith" defense,
an insurer must: (1) take control of the litigation;'32 (2) "thoroughly
investigate the cause of the insured's accident and the nature and se-
verity of the [third-party victim's] injuries";" (3) "refrain from en-
gaging in any action which would demonstrate a greater concern for
the insurer's monetary interest than for the insured's financial
risk";' (4) give equal consideration in all matters to the well being of
its insured;' (5) defend an entire case even if some claims are not
covered under the policy;3 6 (6) hire a competent defense counsel;137
and (7) provide a separate, independent counsel for each insured
named in a third-party complaint.
There is more. The insurer must also give the defense attorney
sufficient funds to conduct the defense 39 and stay abreast of the pro-
gress and status of the litigation.4 ° In addition, the defense lawyer
must "continue to represent the insured after settlement, if neces-
sary.... "'' Quite simply, if an insurer refuses to provide a "good
an estoppel of the insurer to assert the defense of noncoverage.") (quoting Pendleton v. Pan
Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 317 F.2d 96,99 (10th Cir. 1963)).
131. See Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137-39 (Wash. 1986) (listing
the specific criteria that must be fulfilled to meet the enhanced obligation).
132. See Waste Management Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins., 579 N.E.2d 322, 333
(11. 1991) (stating that "[w]here the insurer has the duty to defend, that duty includes the right
to assume control of the litigation").
133. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1137; see also Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 503
(Wash. 1992) (stating that one of the criteria of the insurer's enhanced obligation is to
"thoroughly investigate the cause of the insured's accident and the nature and severity of the
plaintiff's injuries").
134. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1137.
135. SeePerkoski v. Wilson, 92 A.2d 189, 191 (Pa. 1952) ("Good conscience and fair dealing
[require] that the company pursue a course that [is] not advantageous to itself while disadvan-
tageous of its policyholder.").
136. SeeBabcock & Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531, 537 (8th Cir. 1970) ("[Once
a complaint states one claim within the policy's coverage, the insurer has a duty to accept de-
fense of the entire lawsuit even though other claims in the complaint fall outside of the policy's
coverage."); Bituminous Ins. Cos. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 427 F. Supp. 539, 555
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (following the rule that where insurance contract obligates insurer to defend
insured against one claim in complaint, insurer must also defend against claims which are not
within coverage of policy).
137. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Lesher, 231 Cal. Rptr. 791, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(reiterating that insurer has duty "to hire competent defense counsel").
138. See Bituminous, 427 F. Supp. at 555 (concluding that where conflict existed between
insureds' respective interests-both of whom insurer had a duty to defend-insurer must pro-
vide separate counsel); First Ins. Co., Inc. v. Minami, 665 P.2d 648, 654 (Haw. 1983) ("Where
the interests of... codefendants do not coincide, the insurer is required to provide separate
counsel by selecting independent outside counsel for each insured.").
139. SeeMerritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511,527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
140. See id.
141. See, e.g., Maguire v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co, 602 A.2d 893, 896 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) ("The
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faith" defense, it does so at its own peril, for a liability insurer who
decides not to defend its insured against third-party allegations is li-
able for the cost of the defense as well as for bad faith damages if a
court later determines that the insurer had a duty to defend.'
Finally, this "enhanced obligation of good faith" rule also requires
the insured's defense or trial counsel to act responsibly. Among
other requirements, counsel must understand that she represents the
insured's interests rather than the insurer's interests.'43 Therefore,
she must fully disclose all conflicts of interests and material informa-
tion" and manage the legal defense. 45 And if defense counsel can-
not or refuses to provide a "good faith" defense, the insured may
commence a legal-malpractice, "bad faith," or negligence action
against the attorney and, where appropriate, against partners and the
law firm. 46
exercise of good faith prevents an insurer from entering into a dubious release in order to
quickly exhaust the limit of its liability to the insured."); see also Parei v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536
So. 2d 417, 423 (La. 1988) ("An insurer which hastily enters a questionable settlement simply to
avoid further defense obligations under the policy clearly is not acting in good faith and may
be held liable for damages").
142. SeeFirestine v. Poverman, 388 F. Supp. 948, 950 (D. Conn. 1975). The court stated:
If the insurer chooses not to defend, and if its insured is found liable, and if a court
later finds that the insurer did have a duty to defend, the insurer will be liable to re-
imburse him for the cost of his defense and to pay the damages for which its insured
was found liable, up to the policy limits, whether or not it might have had a good de-
fense to the claim that it had a duty to indemnify.
Id. (emphasis in original). A Louisiana court reached a similar conclusion:
La. R.S. 22:1220 imposes a good faith duty on insurers to adjust claims fairly and
promptly, and to make a reasonable effort to settle claims. Breach of this duty makes
the insurer liable for any damages sustained as a result of the breach. Additionally,
the insurer can be liable for penalties. Recovery under the penalty provisions of La.
R.S. 22:1220 extends to third parties in addition to the insured.... Third parties can
recover penalties and attorney's fees based on an insurer's arbitrary and capricious
failure to defend.
Gredeur v. McCullough, 685 So. 2d 300, 303 (La. App. Ct. 1996).
143. SeeVan Dyke v. White, 349 P.2d 430, 436 (Wash. 1960) (noting that professional stan-
dards require a lawyer to be loyal to an insured/client).
144. The Washington Supreme Court identified three aspects to defense counsel's duty to
full, continuous disclosure to the insured:
First, potential conflicts of interests between insurer and insured must be fully dis-
closed and resolved in favor of the insured.... Second, all information relevant to
the insured's defense, including a realistic and periodic assessment of the insured's
chances to win or lose the pending lawsuit, must be communicated to the insured.
Finally, all offers of settlement must be disclosed to the insured as those offers are pre-
sented.
Tankv. State Farm Fire & Cas., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137-38 (Wash. 1986).
145. See Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 527 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) ("The con-
duct of the actual litigation, including the amount and extent of discovery, the interrogation,
evaluation and selection of witnesses, the employment of experts, and the presentation of the
defense in court, remains the responsibility of trial counsel.").
146. See Betts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 544-46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
that defense counsel and law firm failed to provide good faith defense by failing to disclose per-
tinent information, failing to protect insured's interests, manufacturing a false record, dis-
couraging insured's attempt to assign her rights to third-party victim, and interfering with in-
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D. The Scope of Insurers'Duty to Pay and Reimburse Defense Costs Under
Liability and Indemnity Contracts
Without question, money is the major variable that fans the debate
over whether an insurer must defend an insured's allegedly immoral
and intentional acts. In fact, regardless of the types of third-party al-
legations, the amount of money allocated and spent for defense costs
under either liability or indemnity contracts is a source of much con-
troversy. The reason for the controversy is that, on the one hand, in-
surers think defense costs are excessive and undermine profits, while
on the other hand, insureds assert that exorbitant premiums without
adequate representation fly in the face of the very purpose of premi-
147
ums-to cover litigation expenses.
Are defense costs too expensive? The answer depends upon one's
point of view. But some things are clear: "[i] n absolute terms, de-
fense costs are increasing faster than indemnity costs, and in some
lines [they] may now exceed indemnity."4 1 Additionally, defense
costs are often greater than the policy limits under both liability and
indemnity contracts. 9 Moreover, the average cost of representing or
indemnifying directors and officers under indemnity policies contin-
ues to rise annually.' Furthermore, the cost of defending insureds
in certain types of cases can approach tens of millions of dollars a
year.'
dependent attorney's effort to represent insured).
147. See Louis Potter, Insureds Should Be Informed of Defense Costs, NAT'L UNDERWRITER PROP.
& CASUALTY-RISK BENEFITS MGMT., Oct. 7, 1991, at 2, available in 1991 WL 2889193 ("Whether
viewed as lawyer clients or insurance company customers, insureds are getting something of
value ... when defense services are provided under a liability policy. Further, they are paying for
those services through the insurance premium mechanism.") (emphasis added).
148. Id.
149. SeeDave Lenckus, CIGNA Argues for Reorganization, BUS. INS., Dec. 4, 1995, at 1, available
in 1995 WL 7497753 (reporting that evidence shows that "defense costs typically range between
four and five times their policy limits").
150. See Looking Back, BUS. INS., Oct. 30, 1992, at 8, available in 1992 WL 9480423, ("The
second annual D&O survey conducted by The Wyatt Co. reveals that... defense costs average
$181,500, based on responses from 1,321 U.S. corporations.") (emphasis added); Rodd Zolkos,
Bus. INS., INS., Mar. 6, 1995, at 5, available in 1995 WL 7496863 ("[D]efense costs continue to
represent a significant component of D&O losses.... with the average defense cost hitting
$967,000 in 1994, a record high since Wyatt started doing the surveys in 1973. Defense costs
averaged only about $750,000 in 1993.").
151. See Alfred G. Haggerty, California Insurers Lose Challenge on Defense Cost, NAT'L UN-
DERWRITER PROP. & CASuALTY-RiSK & BENEFITS MGMT., Dec. 13, 1993, at 2, available in 1993 WL
3029315 ("Defense costs ... can run into the tens of millions of dollars a year in large envi-
ronmental cases."); Harriet Chiang, Setback for Insurers in Environmental Cases: High Court Rules
on Who Must Pay for Trial Defense Expenses, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 23, 1993, at A15 (stating that de-
fense costs can be "the big-ticket item" and that in large environmental cases defense costs can
be the primary expense.); Trouble Ahead, ISO Chief Warns, Bus. INS., Jan. 18, 1993, at 3, available
in 1993 WL 7805193 ("Rising general liability defense costs ... amounted to 39 cents per dollar
of indemnity in 1991, compared with 12 cents in the late 1950s.").
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It is generally accepted that an insurer's duty to defend under a li-
ability insurance contract is distinct from and broader than the in-
surer's duty to pay defense costs under an indemnity contract. 152 The
duty to defend carries with it a concomitant obligation to pay legal
expenses as they are generated and billed. This means that insurers
must spend hundreds of millions of dollars each year for various
court costs, 53 travel, document productions and the fees of attorneys,
experts and investigators. More significantly, these large sums of
money must be spent before a trial even commences or before liabil-
ity has been established.
What is the scope of the insurer's duty to pay under a directors'
and officers' indemnity contract? Is there an obligation to pay ex-
penses contemporaneously? Or may an insurer wait and pay ex-
penses after the litigation is over? Unfortunately, there is serious
disagreement among courts considering these questions. The courts
of appeals and lower courts in the Third,'M Fifth,'55 and Ninth' Cir-
cuits have ruled that indemnity insurers must reimburse defense costs
contemporaneously or as they incur because that is when insureds
are "legally obligated to pay."
152. See Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Booth, 824 F. Supp. 76, 80 (M.D. La. 1993) ("The duty
to provide reimbursement for costs as they are incurred is separate from the duty to defend.");
U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.Johnson Shoes, Inc., 461 A.2d 85, 87 (N.H. 1983) (holding that it is
well-settled that duty of insurer to defend is not necessarily coextensive with its duty to pay);
Guerdon Indus., Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 123 N.W.2d 143, 147 (Mich. 1963) ("It is settled that
the insurer's duty to defend the insured is measured by the allegation in plaintiff's pleading.")
A Maryland case explains the difference in indemnity versus defense costs as follows:
The duty to defend is broader than and different from the duty to pay. ... Absent
some special limiting provision in the policy, an insurer generally has a contractual
duty to defend 'if there is a potentiality that the claim could be covered by the pol-
icy'... Unlike the duty to pay, which becomes fixed upon the rendition of ajudgment
(subject to increases for post-judgment interest and costs if it is not discharged
promptly,) the duty to defend is necessarily a continuing one that commences upon
notice of the claim and extends at least until a judgment is entered and all appeals
from it have been resolved. The duty [to defend] thus arises at an earlier point than
the duty to pay and may extend to a later time.
Luppino v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 677 A.2d 617, 622 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
153. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Booth, 824 F. Supp. 76, 80 (M.D. La.
1993) (stating that "[t] his [c~ourt, like the majority of courts facing this issue, finds that St. Paul
is required to pay defense costs when they are incurred by the insured").
154. See Little v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 836 F.2d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 1987) (agreeing that the
policy could be interpreted to impose a duty to pay an insured's defense cost due to ambigui-
ties in the policy's language).
155. See Booth, 824 F. Supp. at 80 ("This [clourt, like the majority of courts facing this issue,
finds that St. Paul is required to pay defense costs when they are incurred by the insured.").
156. See Gon v. First State Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that an insurer
must pay legal expenses as they are incurred, because an insured is obligated to pay such ex-
penses as soon as they are rendered); Okada v. MGIC Indem. Corp., 823 F.2d 276, 279, 282
(9th Cir. 1986) (affirming the district court's holding that insurer had to pay defense costs as
they became due); see also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 695 F. Supp.
469,476 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (following Okada holding that insurer must pay defense costs as they
are incurred).
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Other courts, however, disagree. Courts in the Second'57 and Sev-
enth"" Circuits, for example, assert that indemnity contracts give in-
surers the option to advance funds contemporaneously to cover de-
fense costs, although the practice is not mandatory. Some courts,
however, argue against contemporaneous payments because if courts
force insurers to advance defense costs before resolving the underly-
ing third-party action, "insurers inevitably would pay some losses that
are not covered by [the] policy [and] [i]nsurers would be prejudiced
by such a result, even if the insureds were required to reimburse the
insurers ..."""
There is more discouraging news which has generated serious con-
flicts within the Sixth,' 60 Eighth, 6' Tenth,162 and Eleventh' Circuits.
157. See Kenai Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 136 B.R. 59, 63-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
The Court held that despite:
the absence of an option clause in this case, there are strong independent reasons for
finding that the insurer has no duty to advance defense costs .... In light of the plain
meaning of the terms of the D&O policy [the Court] rejects ... conclusion that the
policy requires National Union to make contemporaneous interim advances of de-
fense expenses, finding that no such advances are necessary.
Id.
158. See Zaborac v. American Cas. Co., 663 F. Supp. 330, 334 (C.D. Il. 1987) (finding that
insurer's partial advance payments of defense costs did not obligate insurer to continue such
payments and holding that insurer had the "option, but not the obligation, to advance defense
costs as they are incurred").
159. Kenai Corp., 136 B.R. at 64. While some courts have compelled insurers to defend all
claims in a suit, even if some are not covered by the policy, the situation is different in indem-
nity cases:
Unlike duty to defend policies under liability contracts, which require the insurer to
defend claims even if they are only arguably entitled to coverage, policies requiring
the insurer to reimburse damages and defense costs [involving] wrongful acts entitle
the insured to cost only when the underlying claims are covered by the policy.
Id. at 63.
160. Compare Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Burdette, 718 F. Supp. 649, 661 (E.D. Tenn.
1989) (citing contract clause that gave insurer option to advance money for defense but hold-
ing that insurer "must pay the defense costs of the officers and directors when they become
legally obligated to pay them (when the defense services are rendered and a bill for payment is
submitted) provided the other provisions of§ 5(c) are complied with"), with Enzweiler v. Fidel-
ity & Deposit Co., No. CIVA. 89-99, 1986 WL 20444, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. 1986) (citing contract
clause that gave insurer the option to advance money for defense and concluding "that the in-
surance company may elect.., to wait the outcome of the underlying litigation against an in-
sured before advancing any payments").
161. Compare McCuen v. American Cas. Co., 946 F.2d 1401, 1407 (8th Cir. 1991)
(interpreting contract's loss and expenses clauses and concluding "that the policy obligated the
insurer to pay the cost of defense as the insureds incurred them."), with American Cas. Co. v.
FDIC, 677 F. Supp. 600, 606 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (interpreting contract's option and loss clauses
and concluding that former clause "merely provides American Casualty with the discretion to
advance defense expenses, but it does not require [it]").
162. Compare Fight Against Coercive Tactics Network, Inc. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 926 F. Supp.
1426, 1434 (D. Colo. 1996) (construing "the ambiguity against the insurer and find[ing] the
[p]olicy create[d] a legal obligation... to pay defense legal expenses when they
[were]incurred and fees when they [were] billed"), with Bank of Commerce & Trust Co. v. Na-
tional Union Fire Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 474, 476 (N.D. Okla. 1986) (refusing to compel insurer
to pay insured's defense costs until underlying court determined that such costs were losses
under indemnity contract).
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In these jurisdictions, some appellate and lower courts force indem-
nity insurers to pay defense costs contemporaneously, while other
courts allow insurers to wait until the final disposition of the underly-
ing third-party action. The persistence of these intra- and inter-
jurisdictional disputes demonstrate that neither state supreme courts
nor the U.S. Supreme Court is prepared to address this matter in a
serious and definitive manner.
III. DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS--THE EMPLOYMENT OF "LEGAL" AND
"EQUITABLE" DOCTRINES TO INTERPRET INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Thus far, there is a significant amount of information about impor-
tant ancillary issues which help fuel the debate over whether insurers
must defend insureds' allegedly "immoral" and "intentional" con-
duct. And as mentioned before, some courts compel insurers to de-
fend such allegations and others do not. However, it is difficult to
understand federal and state courts' inconsistent and often bewilder-
ing duty-to-defend declarations without a clear understanding of the
various doctrines or strategies that judges employ to help clarify
rights, obligations and relations under insurance contracts.
A. The Employment of "Legal"Doctrines to Define Rights and Obligations
Generally, the interpretation of the language in an insurance con-
tract is a question of law.'6 Therefore, state and federal courts em-
ploy a number of legal doctrines to help determine whether they
should award declaratory relief. More important, depending upon
temporal factors and the circumstances surrounding a controversy,
state and federal courts may use a combination of these doctrines to
determine rights and obligations under liability and indemnity con-
tracts.
For instance, some courts use so-called rules of contract construc-
tion to decide whether to award declaratory relief.'65 Under this ap-
proach, courts view liability and indemnity policies as negotiated in-
struments and evaluate and interpret them the same as all
163. Compare National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown, 787 F. Supp. 1424, 1434 (S.D. Fla.
1991) ("A plain reading of the insuring clause and the definition of 'loss' ... leads to the con-
clusion that defense costs in the ... D&O [p]olicy are payable at the time the directors and of-
ficers incur them, not at some future time."), with Luther v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 679 F. Supp.
1092, 1093 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (interpreting contract's option clause and concluding that insurer
may advance expenses including attorney's fees to insured but insurer "is not obligated to do
so ... prior to final disposition of any claim").
164. See Town of Londonderry v. New Hampshire Mun. Ass'n Property Liab. Ins. Trust, Inc.,
667 A.2d 1024, 1025 (N.H. 1995) (stating that courts should interpret the meaning of language
in insurance policies as a question of law).
165. See infra notes 166-68.
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contracts." 6 Here, courts assume that insureds and insurers have
equal bargaining positions and the legal competence to negotiate the
terms of a contract.167  Notably, courts employing this approach
merely examine the disputed language in the policy and try to de-
termine insureds' and insurers' intent. 6  Courts embracing this per-
spective refusal to construe the contract narrowly in order to impose
liability.
At other times, courts employ the doctrine of contra proferentem.
This theory states that ambiguities in contractual agreements should
be strictly construed against the author of the contract's language,
regardless of the parties' relative bargaining powers.' The Texas
Supreme Court, for instance, has occasionally employed this perspec-
tive and concluded that policies with ambiguous or inconsistent lan-
guage that reasonably could be construed more than one way, should
be strictly construed against the insurer.
7 1
A number of courts use the "doctrine of plain meaning" to help
uncover rights, relations, and obligations under liability insurance
contracts. For example, one court stated that "insurers are free to
limit coverage to meet their needs; however, all exceptions, limita-
tions, and exclusions must be plainly expressed... [and] any doubts
will be construed against the contract drafter."'7' The Illinois Su-
preme Court stated this rule another way: "[A] n insurance policy...
is to be read as any other contract, that is, according to the plain and
ordinary meaning of its terms."'7 The Texas Supreme Court adopted
166. See Barnett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. 1987) (noting that courts
have considered insurance policies to be contracts and have applied the same rules of con-
struction as applied to contracts in general).
167. See id. at 665-66 (explaining that both parties' interpretation of ambiguity in a contract
can be reasonable).
168. See id. at 666 (noting that the language and terms of an insurance policy, although
usually chosen by the insurer, can be reasonably construed differently by the insured).
169. See Anderson v. Vrahnos, 500 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (commenting that
"[w]here an insurance policy is ambiguous, it will be construed in favor of the insured and
against the insurer who drafted the policy").
170. See Gonzalez v. Mission Am. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. 1990) (holding that
ambiguous or inconsistent insurance policy provisions with more than one reasonable inter-
pretation should be construed to afford coverage); Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678
S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984) (finding that strict construction of insurance policies to favor in-
sured party avoids exclusion of coverage, unless the insurer's interpretations of the term at is-
sue is the only reasonable view); Ramsey v. Maryland Am. Gen. Ins. Co., 533 S.W.2d 344, 349
(Tex. 1976) (noting that strict construction of insurance policies in favor of insured is a well-
settled issue).
171. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 618 N.E.2d 31, 33 (Ind. Ct. App.
1993); see also Sharp v. Indiana Union Mut. Ins. Co., 526 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that contract language must be given its plain meaning if contract is clear and unambi-
guous).
172. Dora Township v. Indiana Ins. Co., 400 N.E.2d 921, 922 (IIl. 1980); see also Houston
Petroleum v. Highlands Ins., 830 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App. Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ de-
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a similar view, finding that courts have a duty to give the words used
their obvious meaning when the words are not ambiguous.
Federal and state courts also utilize the "doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectation" to help resolve declaratory judgment disputes. 7' This doc-
trine has been stated many ways. To illustrate, the West Virginia Su-
preme Court stated: "[T]he doctrine of reasonable expectations
[means] that 'the objectively reasonable expectations of applicants
and intended beneficiaries... will be honored even though painstak-
ing study of the policy provisions would have negated those expecta-
tions.""75  And the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated: "[I]f the in-
surer or its agent creates a reasonable expectation of coverage in the
insured which is not supported by policy language, the expectation
will prevail over the language of the policy.'
' 76
Finally, some courts apply the "doctrine of adhesion" to help de-
clare rights and obligations under liability and indemnity contracts.
Generally, consumers of goods and services are offered standardized
forms called adhesion contracts on a "take it or leave it basis.' Al-
though insurance policies are contractual in nature, adhesion con-
tracts are created between parties who are not equally situated.7R
Moreover, it is important to remember that the "adhesion contract"
doctrine is a defense to the enforceability of a contract.' Conse-
quently, courts are more likely to apply this legal theory only when
they discover clearly unequal bargaining powers among insureds and
nied) (stating that "[lianguage in insurance provisions is only ambiguous if the court is uncer-
tain as to which of two or more meanings was intended").
173. See Puckett, 678 S.W.2d at 938 (holding that a court must give effect to the plain mean-
ing of the policy language).
174. See infra notes 175-76.
175. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon & Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495 (W. Va. 1987)
(quoting Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 961,967 (1970)).
176. Max True Plastering Co. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864
(Okla. 1996).
177. Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 400 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that the plaintiffs did not have adhesion contracts because they themselves negotiated
the contract-it was not a standardized form).
178. See Meier v. NewJersey Life Ins. Co., 503 A.2d 862, 869 (NJ. 1986) (noting that courts
apply the doctrine of adhesion because insurance companies are in a much stronger bargain-
ing position than the individual seeking an insurance policy). Courts have often construed
contracts found to be adhesion contracts in favor of the party with less bargaining power,
namely the insured party. See Barabin v. AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc., 921 P.2d 732, 737 (Haw.
1996) (stating that "[b]ecause insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, they must be con-
strued liberally in favor of the insured and all ambiguities resolved against the insurer....");
Finstad v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 392, 398 (N.D. 1981) (finding that ambiguous lan-
guage is to be strictly construed against the insurer because insurance policies are adhesion
contracts).
179. See JOHN D. CAIAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF coNTRAcrs 382-88 (4th ed.
1998).
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insurers."*
Duty-to-defend litigants should always ask: (1) what is the "true"
test for determining an insured's "reasonable expectation"?,' and
(2) what is the definition of "ambiguity"?82 In addition, some courts
embrace the rule that words and phrases in an insurance contract
must be given their "plain meaning." Therefore, litigants also should
ask: whose "plain meaning"-the insureds', the insurers' or the fed-
eral and state judges? Trial and appellate courts have not answered
these critical questions, either definitively or satisfactorily, and it ap-
pears they never will. A careful examination of some enlightened re-
search provides sufficient support for this assertion.
B. The Employment of "Equitable" or "Moral" Doctrines to Define Rights
and Obligations
Again, the following is worth repeating: standard liability and in-
demnity insurance policies are legally binding and enforceable
agreements. They are contracts, and consequently, one would expect
courts of law to use only "general rules of contract construction" to
decipher insurers' and insureds' rights and obligations. This rarely
occurs. Federal and state courts also use a number of other "legal
principles" to help resolve contractual disputes. More important,
duty-to-defend litigants also should know that courts are increasingly
using so-called "equitable doctrines" to decide whether to award de-
claratory relief.""8
180. See Afeier, 503 A.2d at 869 (observing that "[c]ourts apply the adhesion doctrine be-
cause of the unequal bargaining power of the parties" and noting that "insurance companies
possess all the expertise and unilaterally prepare the varied and complex insurance policies").
181. See Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretation of Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a
Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543, 552-53, 581 (1996) (reporting that courts
have been unable to outline the specific factors which constitute "reasonable expectation" and
"plain meaning"); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. LJ. 823, 823-24 (1990). In his article, Professor Henderson
notes that:
[The doctrine] has become the subject of considerable comment in the legal litera-
ture. Some commentators have applauded this development... whereas it has been
greeted with stern criticism in other quarters. Still others.., have noted that... the
principle provide[s] little guidance in the way of doctrinal content .... (E]ven after
two decades, there ... seems to exist a great deal of uncertainty [about] the doctrinal
content .... In short, questions remain [about] whether the principle has developed
into a full-fledged doctrine which can be applied in a predictable and evenhanded
manner ....
Id. (footnotes omitted).
182. See Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance Con-
tracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171, 178 (1995) (stating that
"[d]iscussions of the ambiguity rule often have been marred by a failure to describe the rule
precisely .... The first and most important ambiguity within the ambiguity rule relates, ironi-
cally, to the definition of 'ambiguity'").
183. See infra notes 184-88.
11651998]
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1131
Theoretically, equity and common law are divergent bodies of ju-
risprudence,184 but most jurisdictions readily reject the distinction be-
tween the two' 85 On the other hand, there are venues that consider
an action for declaratory relief as an "equitable action."'6 Conse-
quently, judges in these latter jurisdictions apply the equitable de-
fense of "unclean hands"'8 7 or the defense of in pari delicto' 8 to justify
184. See Gilles v. Department of Human Resources Dev., 521 P.2d 110, 116 (Cal. 1974)
(arguing that an "equity and good conscience" standard is broad and requires trier of fact to
base ruling on precepts ofjustice and morality rather than strict adherence to established rules
of notice); see also BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979) ("[U]nder equity, justice [is]
administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of common
law. It is based on a system of rules and principles which originated in England ... and which
were based on what was fair in a particular situation.").
185. See e.g., City of Pomona v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 918
(Cal. App. 1992) (commenting that law-equity distinction has effectively been abandoned in
California); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1216 (Il. 1992).
In Outboard, the court stated:
That it is of little consequence whether the remedy is in the form of legal or equitable
relief is especially true in the context of the broad protective purposes of a CGL in-
surance policy. Such a policy would be of little utility in protecting its purchaser if its
coverage rises or falls upon.., whether the underlying complaint prayed for legal or
equitable relief.
Id.
186. See, e.g., First Nat'l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 868, 870
(N.Y. 1968) ("As Professor Borchard has noted, 'declaratory relief is sui generis and is as much
legal as equitable."); Culbertson v. Cizek, 37 Cal. Rptr. 548, 553 (1964) ("An action brought
under section 1060 of the Code of Civil Procedure for declaratory relief is an equitable pro-
ceeding and the powers of a court.., are as broad and as extensive as those exercised by such
court in any ordinary suit in equity."); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 86.111 (West 1996) ("The exis-
tence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief....
The court has power to give as full and complete equitable relief as it would have had if such
proceeding had been instituted as an action in chancery.").
187. See Hocker v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting
that "unclean hands" doctrine is a fundamental principle of equity); Long v. Kemper Life Ins.
Co., 553 N.E.2d 439, 441 (Ill. App. 1990) (stating that"unclean hands" doctrine applies when
party seeking equity has committed misconduct, fraud or acts of bad faith toward the other
party and prohibits the party seeking equitable relief from profiting from his own wrongdo-
ing); Rushville Nat'l Bank of Rushville v. State Life Ins. Co., 1 N.E.2d 445, 450 (Ind. 1936)
(reaffirming the principle that a wrongdoer cannot estop an injured party bringing an action
for redress because the party seeking equity must demonstrate that he has unclean hands);
Tytel v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. 903, 1995 WL 551268, *4-5 (Md. App. 1995) (per
curiam) (stating "[ t] he doctrine of unclean hands precludes equitable relief to 'those guilty of
unlawful or inequitable conduct pertaining to the matter in which relief is sought.' ... 'What is
material is not that the plaintiff's hands are dirty, but that he dirties them in acquiring the
rights he now asserts"'); Associated East Mortgage Co. v. Young, 394 A.2d 899, 907 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1978) (referencing the "unclean hands doctrine" and refusing relief to plaintiff
whose conduct violated court's idea of good conscience, goodwill and other equitable princi-
ples).
188. SeePinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 632 (1988). In Pinter, the court stated:
The equitable defense of in pari delicto, which literally means "in equal fault," is rooted
in the common-law notion that plaintiffs recovery may be barred by his own wrongful
conduct .... Contemporary courts have expanded the defense's application to situa-
tions more closely analogous to those encompassed by the "unclean hands" doctrine,
where the plaintiff has participated "in some of the same sort of wrongdoing."
Id. (quoting Perma Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138 (1968)). But see
Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (3d Cir. 1977) (observing that in pari
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favorable or adverse declaratory judgments. More disturbing, some
courts often cite poorly defined moral principles to decide whether
to grant declaratory relief in cases involving various insurance-related
controversies.'8
For example, in Hartogs v. Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance
Co.,'" the court held that it would not compel the insurer to defend a
psychiatrist who allegedly sexually molested his patient.19' According
to the court, to hold otherwise would be an endorsement of immoral-
ity."' 2 A Georgia appellate court adopted a similar position in Na-
tional Enterprises, Inc. v. Davis'9" where it stated: "A contract will not
be construed so as to authorize one of the parties to take advantage
of his wrong."'94 And, as early as 1933, the Alabama Supreme Court
stated in Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy:95
There can be no valid insurance coverage which will protect or in-
demnify the insured or indemnitee against a loss which he may
purposely and willfully create, or which may arise from his immoral,
fraudulent, or felonious conduct. Such an express contract of in-
surance or indemnity is void as against public policy.'"
But another court has held that when deciding whether an insurer
delicto is a common law doctrine created to preclude wrongdoers from profiting from their
wrongs and bars guilty parties from receiving damages when their losses were substantially cre-
ated due to activities the law forbade them to engage in); Mark Georg Strauch, Rule 10b-5-
Application of the In Pari Delicto Defense In Suits Brought Against Securities Brokers by Customers Who
Have Traded on Inside Information, 37 VAND. L. REV. 557, 562 (1984). Strauch states:
Courts recognize four situations in which they will not allow defendants to hide be-
hind the in pari delicto defense: (1) the defendant used fraud or duress to induce
plaintiff to participate in the illegal act; (2) the plaintiff is in the class of people the
law seeks to protect by making the activity illegal; (3) the plaintiff did not know that
the activity was illegal or participated in an independent wrong; and, (4) the denial of
relief... would be unjust or against public policy.
Id.
189. See infra notes 190-98 and accompanying text.
190. 391 N.Y.S.2d 962 (1977).
191. See id. at 965 (noting that plaintiffs actions were beyond the intended scope of his
malpractice policy).
192. See id.; (stating that court will not enforce illicit behavior on public policy grounds).
The court explained that:
There are ... situations in which [c]ourts as a matter of public policy refuse to allow
themselves to be used to enforce illicit or immoral or unconscionable purposes ....
[This court], as public policy, holds here that it will not afford this [insured] resort to
the processes of the [c]ourt. To hold otherwise would be to indemnify immoral-
ity....
Id.
193. 231 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. App. Ct. 1976).
194. Id. at 491.
195. 146 So. 387 (Ala. 1933).
196. See id. at 390; see also Industrial Sugars v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 338 F.2d 673, 676
(7th Cir. 1964) ("A contract of insurance to indemnify a person for damages resulting from his
own intentional misconduct is void as against public policy and the courts will not construe a
contract to provide such coverage.").
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should defend an insured in a third-party action, a court is "not re-
quired to find that the [insured's] alleged activities were immoral, il-
legal or against public policy .... ,,197 At that stage of the litigation,
the insured "has not been adjudicated a wrongdoer."'98 Instead, a
court need only decide whether "the allegations are sufficient to
bring the suit within the ambit of the contract to require the insurer
to defend."'" Also the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that if an
insured does not have the mental capacity "to understand the moral
character... the general nature, consequences and effect" of his
conduct, an insurer must honor its contractual obligations.' °°
At this point it is important to ask whether it is proper for courts to
award declaratory relief-under any circumstances--on the basis of
whether an insured's conduct was "moral" or "immoral." If the an-
swer is yes, there is an additional question: Should courts use an ob-
jective or a subjective test to determine whether the underlying con-
duct was moral or immoral? Or should courts simply rule that the
conduct was moral or immoral as a matter of law? Frankly, these ques-
tions have generated little concern among practicing attorneys. But
concern is warranted, for, as the discussions in Parts IV through VI
will reveal, federal and state courts often conclude as a matter of law
that the third-party allegations involved immoral conduct and rule
against the insured. Far too many courts engage in such absurdity
and deny declaratory relief. Moreover, an unacceptable number of
federal and state courts rarely force insurers to prove that insureds
committed immoral acts, committed an intentional act or came to
court with unclean hands.
197. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 296 S.E.2d 126, 128 (Ga. App. Ct. 1982).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 189 A.2d 204, 208 (NJ. 1963); see also Life Ins. Co. v.
Terry, 82 U.S. 580, 591 (1872). In Teny, the Court stated that:
If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured ... when his reasoning facul-
ties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character... of
the act he is about to commit.., such death is not within the contemplation of the
parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable.
Id. at 591.
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IV. DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS-PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURERS'
DUTY TO DEFEND LAWYERS' AND PHYSICIANS' ALLEGEDLY
INTENTIONAL CONDUCT
A. Conflicts Over Whether Insurers Must Defend Lawyers Where Clients'
Allegations or Claims Fall Within Both the Coverage and Exclusion Clauses
The typical coverage provision in a legal-malpractice policy ex-
plains that insurer will "pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages... aris-
ing out of the performance of professional services for others in the in-
sured's capacity as a lawyer."' The policy's exclusions clause usually
states, "[tihis [p]olicy [d]oes [n]ot [a]pply... to any dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of the insured, any
partner or employee., 20 2 Arguably, the scope of protection under the
coverage provision is rather broad, while under the exclusion section
it is narrow and specific.
Consequently, in recent years, these provisions have generated a
very spirited debate, as well as poorly reasoned decisions within and
among federal courts of appeals, over whether insurers must defend
lawyers if disgruntled clients' allegations involve both "covered" and
"excluded" claims. To illustrate, in Battisti v. Continental Casualty
Co.,23 a client filed a mixed-claims lawsuit against his lawyer. The cli-
ent alleged that the attorney failed to construct, execute, and deliver
a certain will04 in breach of an expressed warranty, and perpetrated
201. See, e.g.,Jensen v. Snellings, 841 F.2d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 1988). InJensen, the following
insuring agreements are presented:
COVERAGE A - Individual Coverage:
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of any act or omission of the insured, or of any other
person for whose acts or omissions the insured is legally responsible, and arising out
of the performance of professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a
lawyer ....
COVERAGE B -Partnership Coverage:
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obli-
gated to pay as damages because of any act or omission of the insured, or of any other
person for whose acts or omissions the insured is legally responsible, and arising out
of the performance of professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a
lawyer provided one or more claims arising out of the same professional services are
made (1) jointly or severally against two or more members of the partnership insured
hereunder or against any member and such partnership, (2) against the partnership
or (3) against the insured solely because he is a member of the partnership insured
hereunder.
Id.
202. Brooks, Tarton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 832 F.2d
1358, 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
203. 406 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1969).
204. See id. at 1319-20 (explaining that client expected attorney to prepare wife's will in
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fraud and deceit upon the client.25 The attorney asked his insurer to
defend the action. °6 The insurer said it had no duty to defend, °7 and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed.2 O Conveniently ig-
noring that the breach-of-warranty claim was a covered act under the
policy, the court held that "the pleading alleged facts of an over-all
scheme... that was grossly 'dishonest,' 'fraudulent,' and(malicious.",209
In contrast to its earlier opinion in Battisti, the Fifth Circuit later
reached a very different and arguably, disingenuous conclusion in
210Jensen v. Snellings, where clients also filed a mixed-claims-
"excluded" and "covered"-lawsuit against a law firm and its attor-
neys.211 Disgruntled clients alleged that the attorneys violated federal
and state RICO and securities statutes, and breached their fiduciary
and contractual duties.1  Citing Battisti, the insurer refused to de-
fend the attorneys and firm,'213 arguing that the insureds' over-all
scheme was 'fraudulent or grossly dishonest.2 4 The Fifth Circuit, how-
ever, refused to conduct an "over-all scheme" analysis as it did in Bat-
tisti.21 5 Instead, the court cited the doctrine of contra proferentem and
ordered the insurer to defend the lawyers. 6 The court stated that
such a way that he would be beneficiary of her entire estate).
205. See id. at 1319 (seeking relief for an "'over-all fraudulent scheme'").
206. See id. at 1321 (disagreeing with attorney's contention that actions fell within negli-
gence or malpractice standards of the insurer, thus compelling insurer to defend).
207. See id. at 1320 (reporting that the insurer argued that "the policy expressly excluded
coverage for suits alleging 'an dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission"').
208. See id. at 1321 (holding that allegations of facts contained within exclusion provision of
insurance policyjustified insurer's refusal to defend lawsuit).
209. Id. (emphasis added) ("[The insured] argues that certain of his alleged acts.., fall
short of the culpability required in the exclusion clause. Such acts, he says, are more in the
nature of negligence or malpractice, and thus within coverage of the policy. With this we defi-
nitely cannot agree.").
210. 841 F.2d 600 (5th Cir. 1988).
211. See id. at 615 (concluding not all of the plaintiff's allegations fell within exclusion pro-
vision of malpractice insurance policy).
212. See id. at 604. The court also explained that "[iun addition to fraud and dishonesty, the
Jensens' complaint also alleges, against Snellings and the Firm separately, claims that do not
rise to the level of fraud, and are thus outside the policy exclusion." Id. at 615.
213. See id. at 614 (arguing that attorneys' alleged conduct was also imputable to the firm
and therefore insurer's duty to defend applied to neither).
214. Id.
215. See id. at 615 (stating that "[w]hile the alleged acts in Battisti, if true, were all clearly
fraudulent, dishonest or criminal, the same cannot be said for the allegations in the instant
case"). But common sense and a careful reading of the case reveals that all acts were not clearly
fraudulent or criminal. Instead the underlying lawsuit involved mixed claims, both covered
and excluded acts. See Battisti, 406 F.2d at 1319-21 (setting forth facts regarding attorney's
problematic preparation of documents, including a will, and indicating defendant believed
some of his alleged acts were covered by malpractice insurance policy).
216. SeeJensen, 841 F.2d at 615 (concluding that because not all allegations fell clearly
within the policy provision excluding coverage, the complaint "does not 'unambiguously ex-
clude coverage'") (quoting American Home Assurance Co. v. Czarniecki, 230 So. 2d 253, 259
(La. 1969)).
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"[i]n analyzing the pleadings.... [we must] liberally construe the al-
legations ... and resolv[e] any ambiguity in favor of finding a duty to
defend. Strict construction against the insurer is especially appropriate
when interpreting exclusionary clauses in insurance policies. 21 7
In contrast, Donnelly v. Transportation Insurance Co. 2 '8 and Brooks,
Tarlton, Gilbert, Douglas & Kressler v. United States Fire Insurance Co.
219
provide an excellent illustration of inter-circuit confusion over
whether national insurance companies must defend legal malpractice
suits involving allegedly excluded and covered claims.22 First, Don-
nelly and Brooks were filed in the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, respec-
tively!"' Second, in Donnelly, the aggrieved client, who filed the un-
derlying suit, accused the attorney of improperly retaining funds,
selling the client's securities without authorization, and misrepresen-
tation.m The client who filed the underlying lawsuit in Brooks alleged
that her attorney committed the following violations: breach of the
confidential relationship between client and attorney, breach of trust,
breach of the attorney-client privilege, fraud, duress, undue influ-
ence, and deceptive trade practices. m Clearly, the claims outlined in
each complaint were mixed, involving malpractice, negligence, and
intentional acts. More important, "[w]ith no significant deviation,
the insurance policy before the court in Donnelly was the same
one ... before [the court in Brooks]."224 And the insurers' argument
in both cases were identical: the exclusion provision relieved the in-
surer of the obligations to provide a legal defense. 5 In Donnelly, the
Fourth Circuit cited the doctrine of contra proferentem, decided that
the exclusion clause was unclear, and ordered the insurer to defend
217. Jensen v. Snelling, 841 F.2d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted).
218. 589 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1978).
219. 832 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1987).
220. See Donnelly, 589 F.2d at 763-66 (setting forth claims of an attorney's alleged unauthor-
ized sale of securities, receipt of funds through misrepresentation and improper retention of
funds for which attorney sought defense from insurance policy); Brooks, 832 F.2d at 1363-77
(discussing insurance policy language, relevant law, and providing analysis of whether insurer
owed plaintiff a duty to defend under the policy).
221. See Donnelly, 589 F.2d at 761; Brooks, 832 F.2d at 1358.
222. See Donnelly, 589 F.2d at 764 (seeking additional punitive damages on claims of unau-
thorized sale of securities and misrepresentation).
223. See Brooks, 832 F.2d at 1359 (holding that the defendant insurance company breached
terms of the plaintiff's insurance policy).
224. Id. at 1365. In Brooks, the exclusion clause stated: "This Policy Does Not Apply: (a)
to any dishonest, fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission of the Insured, any partner
or employee." Id. at 1363.
225. See id. at 1360 (explaining that insurers found allegations in petition to involve fraud,
dishonesty, criminal or malicious acts); Donnelly, 589 F.2d at 768 (noting that insurers relied on
the holding in Battisti to deny coverage).
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the lawyer.2  In Brooks, however, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
221Circuit ordered the insurer to provide coverage. In fact, this latter
court stated emphatically:
Whatever the validity of the Fourth Circuit's opinion as it construes
the law of the District of Columbia, we do not believe that its result
can ultimately be squared with either the express terms of the pol-
icy or Texas law. Consequently, we decline to adopt the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning in Donnelly, and conclude that the insurance
policy in issue is unambiguous. 2s
Bluntly put, the Fifth Circuit's conclusion and its assertion that the
District of Columbia's and Texas' laws cannot be harmonized is mis-
placed. Why? For years, the rule in the District of Columbia has
been clear: "[if a] complaint alleges a liability not within the cover-
age of the policy, the insurance company is not required to defend.
[I]n case of doubt such doubt ought to be resolved in the insured's
favor." 2 In addition, the Fifth Circuit tells us in Brooks:.
[In Texas, it] "is a fundamental rule of law that insurance policies
are contracts and as such are controlled by rules of construction which
are applicable to contracts generally." Usually, the first question
faced in contract interpretation is whether the contract terms in
dispute are ambiguous .... [And] [t]he test for determining
whether a contract is ambiguous is whether, after applying estab-
lished rules of construction, the contract is reasonably susceptible to
more than one meaning.2"
226. SeeDonnelly, 589 F.2d at 768-69. In explaining its holding, the court stated:
In the first place, it is to be noted that the policy makes no express reference to the in-
surance company being excused from defending suits in which dishonest, fraudulent,
criminal or malicious acts are alleged .... [Moreover,] there are no... reasons why
an innocent person, charged with such acts, should not have the benefit of a defense.
Policy language, susceptible of more than one interpretation, is construed, if reasonably possible,
to provide coverage. In Conner v. Transamerica Insurance Co., 496 P.2d 770 (Okla.
1972).... [the court] held that plaintiffs liability insurance carrier owed him the duty
of a defense. Conneris an even stronger case for the insurance company than the case
at bar, and we cannot improve on the [law] of that case... which we apply here: "In
interpreting the language of an ambiguous contract of insurance, defining the scope
of the insurer's liability, words of inclusion are liberally construed in favor of the in-
sured and words of exclusion are strictly construed against the insurer."
Id. at 768 (emphasis added). In addition, the Fourth Circuit stated that"[i]f any of the three
charges made against Donnelly in the [underlying] suit could arguably fall within the [policy's
coverage provision], insurer owed Donnelly the duty to defend all charges." Id. at 766
(emphasis added). See also Jefferson-Pilot Fire & Cas. Co. v. Boothe, Prichard & Dudley, 638
F.2d 670, 675 (4th Cir. 1980) (restating doctrine of contra proferentem and concluding that in-
surer had duty to defend a law firm against underlying malpractice suit because client's
.complaint alleged acts which, if proved, would have arguably triggered coverage and which did
not automatically fall into the exclusionary clause. .. .") (emphasis added).
227. See Brooks, 832 F.2d at 1366 (stating that the insurance policy is unambiguous).
228. Id.
229. Boyle v. National Cas. Co. 84A.2d 614, 615-16 (D.C. 1951).
230. Brooks, 832 F.2d at 1364 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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To be sure, the district court in Brooks found ambiguity in the con-
tract." ' Furthermore, the Texas Supreme Court, like the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals consistently has held that in general, any
ambiguity in an insurance contract is construed against the insurer. 2
At the same time, the Fifth Circuit said inJensen v. Snellings:. "In ana-
lyzing the pleadings, [we must] liberally construe the allegations...
and resolv[e] any ambiguity in favor of finding a duty to defend.
' ss
Given the inconsistency of the federal courts, duty-to-defend liti-
gants would be wise to avoid their jurisdictions. Should such litigants
insist on petitioning the Fifth or other Federal Circuit Courts for de-
claratory relief, however, they should be prepared for the possibility
of an indefensible decision like the Fifth Circuit's decision in Brooks.
B. Conflicts Over Whether Lawyers' Allegedly Intentional Activities "Arise
Out of Professional Services"
Once more, the typical exclusion provision appearing in legal-
malpractice contracts reads as follows: this policy does not apply to
any "intentional acts"-reckless, deceitful, fraudulent, dishonest, ma-
licious or criminal act or omission-of any insured, partner or em-
ployee.24 The standard coverage clause typically reads as follows: the
231. See id. at 1367. The court stated that:
[T]he district court evaluated the allegations in the six petitions... filed against the
Lawyers [sic]. According to the [district] court, "all of the petitions alleged the same
basic claims...." The exclusion provision.., however, excluded only "dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts." As the court read the allegations,... two
claims were not "clearly beyond the coverage of [the lawyers'] policy." Consequently,
the court held that "even if the exclusionary language did pertain to [the insurer's]
duty to defend, not all of the claims... [fell] under the listed exclusion." Therefore,
[the insurer] has a duty to defend and summary judgment for the Lawyers [sic] was
appropriate.
Id.
232. See, e.g., National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex.
1991) (holding that ambiguous clauses are construed against insurer); Barnett v. Aetna Life
Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 666 (Tex. 1987) (holding that, generally, any ambiguity in an insur-
ance contract is construed against the insurer); Puckett v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 678
S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984) (holding that only when there is one reasonable construction of
the term in question is there any favor to the insurer); Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Spillars,
368 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex. 1963) ("As a general rule, contracts of insurance are to be strictly con-
strued in favor of the insured... .").
233. 841 F.2d 600,615 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
234. See generaUy Brooks, 832 F.2d 1358, 1363 (demonstrating a general exclusion provision
in an insurance policy, which courts have held to be both ambiguous and unambiguous). Com-
pare National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Shane & Shane Co., 605 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (Ohio Ct. App.
1992) (holding that if the language does not state the coverage, then no coverage exists), with
Donnelly v. Transportation Ins. Co., 589 F.2d 761, 768 (4th Cir. 1978) (stating that"[p]olicy
language, susceptible of more than one interpretation, is construed, if reasonably possible, to
provide coverage"), and Continental Cas. Co. v. Cole, 809 F.2d 891, 895 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Any
doubt as to whether the cause of action falls within the terms of the policy must be resolved in
the insured's favor.").
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insurer agrees to pay on behalf of the insured all sums that the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as money damages because of any
claim or claims made against the insured arising out of the performance
of professional services in the insured's capacity as a lawyer. 5
Clearly, the coverage clause is a promise-to-pay-damages rather
than a promise-to-defend provision. Yet, over the years this clause
has generated much tension and litigation between legal-malpractice
insurers and their insureds.236 Moreover, the heart of this debate has
little, if anything, to do with when or whether the insurer should sat-
isfy the agreement and pay money damages. Instead, the debate cen-
ters on which clause is superior-the coverage or the exclusion
clause.
Lawyers argue that professional liability insurers must always pro-
vide a legal defense when an unsatisfied client files a third-party suit.
Why? According to lawyers, their disgruntled clients' allegations-
whether the claims concern intentional or unintentional acts-always
"arise out of' or are associated with the lawyers' discharging some
professional service. On the other hand, malpractice insurers argue
that the language in the exclusion clause is superior and there is no
duty to defend when a client alleges that an attorney has committed
an intentional act.23
7
Over the years, federal and state courts have tried to resolve this
major conflict with little success, especially among cases where clients
have accused attorneys and law firms of committing a variety of inten-
tional acts that were unquestionably excluded under the terms of the
policy. For example, in Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,2
Donnelly v. Transportation Insurance Co.239 and Jensen v. Snellings, 40 cli-
ents accused their respective attorneys of committing an assortment
235. See generally Toms v. Lawyers Mut. Liab. Ins., 408 S.E.2d 206, 208 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991)
(describing a policy that covered damages resulting from certain professional services); Hofing
v. CNA Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 864, 867 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (reporting a portion of the
professional liability coverage part of the plaintiffs' policy); Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam
Cas. Co., 152 A.2d 484,485 n.1 (Pa. 1959) (describing a portion of a standard policy coverage).
236. See, e.g., L & S Roofing Supply Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fires & Marine Ins. Co., 521 So. 2d
1298, 1304 n.1 (Ala. 1987) (listing cases that support proposition that where there is a reserva-
tion of rights, the insured is entitled to defense counsel of its choice whose fees the insurer is
required to pay).
237. See infra notes 238-41 and 248-49 and accompanying text.
238. 152 A.2d 484, 485 n.4, 489 (Pa. 1959) (discussing causes of action involving breach of
contract and conspiracy against an insurance provision that excluded coverage for "dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious act or omission").
239. 589 F.2d 761, 763-64 (4th Cir. 1978) (involving claims and unauthorized sale of securi-
ties, misrepresentation, and improper retention of client funds).
240. 841 F.2d 600, 614-15 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that while claims of fraud and dis-
honesty fell under exclusion, client's additional claims of failure to supervise employees, pro-
viding faulty tax advice, and inaccurate figures on profitability of investments did not).
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of intentional acts that were clearly excluded under the respective
policies. Citing the exclusion clauses, the insurers argued that they
had no duty to defend the attorneys.2 1
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 242 and the Courts of Appeal
for the Fourth243 and Fifth244 Circuits disagreed. Each court held that
the lawyers' allegedly intentional conduct-deceit, fraud, deceptive
practices, dishonest acts, and federal RICO violations-arose from
the performance of professional services and therefore, was covered
under the respective policies. 5 The Courts of Appeals for the
Sixth246 and D.C.247 Circuits also have reached similar conclusions.
But on several occasions, state and federal courts in the Third248 and
241. See Cadwallader, 152 A.2d at 488 (stating that defendant argued cause of action was
based on facts outside scope of policy); Donnelley, 589 F.2d at 764 (stating that insurer denied
coverage for defense despite agreement to defend);Jensen, 841 F.2d at 604.
242. See Cadwallader, 152 A.2d at 487. In Cadwallader, the court stated:
It is of course clear that if there [is] any ambiguity in the contract of insurance it must
be resolved in favor of the insured since it was the insurer who wrote the contract ....
[Therefore,] [ult cannot seriously be contended that the breach did not arise out of
the "performance of professional services."
Id.
243. See Donnelly, 589 F.2d at 768 ("[lt is to be noted that the policy makes no express ref-
erence to the insurance company being excused from defending suits in which dishonest,
fraudulent, criminal or malicious acts are alleged .... Policy language, susceptible of more
than one interpretation, is construed, if reasonably possible, to provide coverage.").
244. SeeJensen, 841 F.2d at 614 ("Resolving any doubt in favor of the insureds, we conclude
that some of the acts and omissions with which Snellings is charged arose 'out of the perform-
ance of professional services for others in the insured's capacity as a lawyer.'") (citation omit-
ted).
245. See supra notes 198, 238, 239 (describing policy language and holdings of cases).
246. See Home Ins. Co. v. Bullard, 850 F.2d 692, (6th Cir. 1988). The court stated:
[N]ot every act of a lawyer constitutes the rendering of professional services within the
meaning of an insurance policy.... [T]o be considered a professional service, the
conduct must arise out of the insured's performance of his specialized vocation or
profession .... To be covered, the liability must arise out of the special risks inherent
in the practice of the profession. At least one act of which Bullard and Hayes is ac-
cused, i.e., the refusal to split fees in the agreed-upon manner, arose because of the ren-
dering of professional services to clients, i.e., an act required by the policy to merit
coverage.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). But another case originating in the Sixth Circuit
reached a different conclusion. In National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Shane & Shane, 605
N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992), the complaint alleged that the plaintiff contracted with a
law firm, who was currently the defendant, to agree to pay the firm twenty-five percent of any
money collected on his behalf. See id. at 1325. The court refused to hold that a "fee dispute is
the same as rendering professional services." Id. at 1329. Instead, the court ruled that under
the insurance policy's terms, the fee dispute between the parties "was neither part of the cover-
age nor contemplated by the parties." Id.
247. See Continental Cas. Co.v. Cole, 809 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Continenta; the pol-
icy in question was limited to damages stemming from the lawyers' performance of services as a
lawyer where the lawyer committed an "'error, negligent omission or negligent act'." Id. at 895.
The court held that mere allegations of malice by a third party, were not enough to justify the
insurer's refusal to defend. See id. at 897.
248. SeeHoffingv. CNA Ins. Co., 588 A.2d 864 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). InHoffing,
the client charged that the lawyer not only violated standards of professional conduct, but also
standards regarding attorney's fees as outlined by the New Jersey courts. See id. at 866. The
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Ninth2 49 Circuits have refused to declare that lawyers' allegedly inten-
tional acts arose out of the rendering of professional services.
What explains these inconsistent holdings? Why do some federal
and state judges declare that lawyers' intentional acts arise out of the
"performance of professional services," while others do not? Argua-
bly, judges who decide that legal-malpractice policies cover lawyers'
intentional acts are more likely to invoke legal doctrines of reason-
able expectation, adhesion, or contra proferentem. On the other hand,
judges, who declare that "professional services" do not include inten-
tional acts, are more likely to invoke the doctrine of plain meaning
and general rules of contract construction. A careful study of the
cases mentioned above gives some support to this conclusion. But an
examination of the medical-malpractice cases outlined in the next
section, reveals that some courts include intentional acts in the defi-
nition of "professional services."
C. Conflicts Over Whether Medical Professionals' Allegedly Intentional
Activities "Arise Out of Professional Services"
Like most responsible and prudent attorneys, health-care profes-
sionals-including dentists, gynecologists, physicians, psychiatrists,
psychologists, therapists, and medical technicians-spend millions of
dollars purchasing medical-malpractice insurance from state, re-
gional, and national liability insurers. For example, the St. Paul Fire
lawyer's insurance policy stated that a wrongful act included any "'negligent act, error or omis-
sion in: A rendering of or failure to render, professional services.'" Id. at 867. The policy in
question also contained an exclusion clause which stated that the insurer would "not defend or
pay ... for any fine, penalty or claim for return of fees...." Id. Finding that the insured's al-
legations fell within the scope of the exclusion, the court determined that the insurer was not
obligated to defend the lawyer. Id. at 868-69. While the court explained that "[a]n insured's
reasonable expectations are circumscribed by genuine ambiguities and misleading terms and
conditions of insurance contracts," it affirmed that in this case the exclusion was clear and
there was "no ambiguity or misleading terms and conditions.... " Id. at 868; see also Harad v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 839 F.2d 979, 980-81, 985 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that claims involving
malicious prosecution conspiracy and misrepresentation were excluded under policy and
therefore did not arise out of rendering of professional services).
249. SeeJohnson v. First State Ins. Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 163 (Cal. App. Ct. 1994).
The court stated:
There is no objectively reasonable expectation that the insuring clause would cover
[attorney] Johnson for damages caused by a conspiracy action brought byJohnson on
his own behalf.... Here,Johnson was not required to sue [client] Rollins as part of
his defense of the malpractice action brought by third parties .... Johnson brought
the conspiracy action on his own behalf. The connection, if any, between the render-
ing of professional services to others and the malicious action is too remote to give
rise to an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage under the policy.
Id. at 165-66; see also Krasner v. Professional Prototype Ins. Co.Ltd., 983 F.2d 1076, 1076 (9th
Cir. 1993) (ruling that attorney sued by third parties for alleged intentional and fraudulent
conduct was not covered under defendant's policy because said policy unambiguously ex-
cluded coverage for such conduct and because when an attorney acts fraudulently he "is not
acting in his capacity as an attorney").
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& Marine Insurance Company, the largest medical-liability company
in the nation, sells and renews thousands of medical-malpractice
policies each year.' The language appearing in St. Paul's medical-
liability contracts is very similar to that appearing in legal-malpractice
policies. Typically, the coverage provision states: "This agreement
provides protection against professional liability claims which might
be brought against you in your practice as a physician or sur-
geon .... Your professional liability protection covers you for dam-
ages resulting from... [y]our providing or withholding of professional se-
ices."
25 1
But consider St. Paul's legal plight. For at least thirty years, St.
Paul-as well as its insureds-has asked state and federal courts to
decide whether St. Paul must defend doctors, dentists, psychiatrists,
and other medical professionals who allegedly seduced, battered,
sexually assaulted, molested or sodomized their patients. 2 As ex-
pected, St. Paul's defense has been consistent: these intentional inju-
ries do not "arise out of' or "result from rendering professional serv-
ices.' 3 The medical-liability carrier, however, has not prevailed in
every case, even though the third-party patients' allegations involved
allegedly intentional acts excluded by St. Paul's insurance contracts.2
4
Unlike cases involving legal malpractice, state courts have either
refused or failed to employ various legal doctrines to help determine
whether "deviant" physicians and medical technicians are "rendering
professional services." Instead, these tribunals have permitted some
250. See St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, St. Paul Medical Services (visited
March 1, 1998) (<http://www.stpaul.com/stpaulmedicalservices/index.htm) ("St. Paul Medi-
cal Services is the nation's largest underwriter of medical liability insurance .... A 60-year his-
tory of customizing products to meet new customeris'] needs puts St. Paul Medical Services in
an excellent position to maintain market leadership....").
251. Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 440, 443 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)
(emphasis added); see also Smith v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn.
1984) ("The 'plain english [sic] professional insurance' policy provides: Your professional li-
ability protection covers you for damages resultingfrom... [yiour providing or withholding of pro-
fessionalservices. I) (emphasis added); Marx v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 157 N.W.2d 870,
871 (Neb. 1968).
[T] he carrier agrees [to] pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury arising out of. (a) mal-
practice, error or mistake of the insured, or of a person for whose acts or omissions
the insured is legally responsible ... in rendering or failing to render professional serv-
ices.... (alteration in original).
Id. (emphasis added).
252. See supra notes 248-51 and accompanying text (discussing cases where for various rea-
sons an attorney's behavior fell outside the scope of protection under his or her malpractice
insurance).
253. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 541 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986).
254. See, e.g., id. at 540 (holding that physician's sexual assaults were covered by insurance
contract).
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generalized notion of public policy to influence whether some insur-
ers, for instance, the St. Paul Insurance Company, must defend their
insureds in cases involving sexual assault.
255
Perhaps more egregiously, both state and federal courts often al-
low, arguably, impermissible factors to influence their declarations.
Consider the following question: Should medical professionals' spe-
cialties influence whether courts decide that the seduction, molesta-
tion, and sexual assault of female and adolescent patients is
"rendering professional services"? Or stated another way: Should
the legal community be alarmed if courts conclude that surgeons
who sexually assault and sodomize patients are "rendering profes-
sional services," but obstetricians who commit such acts are not? Of
course, the answer to the first question is no; and the answer to the
second question is yes. However, a careful review of courts' declara-
tory rulings involving the St. Paul Insurance Company and other car-
riers reveals a disturbing pattern.
A number of state and federal courts have ruled that St. Paul and
other insurers have no duty to defend dentists who allegedly sexually
assaulted and abused patients during office visits. Why? The dentists'
assaults and abuses were not a part of, or did not occur, while
"rendering professional services."'  On the other hand, state and
federal courts have held that St. Paul must defend some psychiatrists,
255. Compare St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Asbury, 720 P.2d 540, 541-42 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1986) (ordering the company to defend because the sexual conduct "was committed in the
course of and as an inseparable part of the professional services" rendered, and because "the
public policy of Arizona favors protecting the interests of injured parties"), and vigilant Ins. Co.
v. Kambly, 319 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Mich. App. Ct. 1981) (ordering insurance company to pay
doctor's malpractice claims for sexual abuse because the case lacked "public policy considera-
tions... which [would] prohibit the insurability of criminal or intentional tortious conduct"
and payment would compensate the innocent victim for her injuries, not the insured), with St.
Paul Ins. Co. v. Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. 349, 352 (N.D. Ala. 1991) (refusing to order the com-
pany to indemnify because all contracts insuring against damage from intentional conduct-
whether professional or otherwise-are void as against public policy in Alabama), and Rivera v.
Nevada Med. Liab. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 71, 72, 74 (Nev. 1991) (rejecting the gynecologist's argu-
ment that "the need to compensate the victim should make the criminal and sexual act exclu-
sions ... void as a matter or public policy" and finding that doctor's insurance company had no
obligation to pay for victim's injuries).
256. See, e.g., Roe v. Federal Ins. Co., 587 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Mass. 1992) (holding that a den-
tist's sexual assault of a patient in his office did not occur in rendering "professional services"
within the scope of his liability insurance); Niedzielski v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 589
A.2d 130, 133 (N.H. 1991) (holding that a dentist who sexually assaulted a child in his office
before filling her tooth was not covered by his insurance policy because "[r]easonable persons
would not define 'professional services' as including either sexual contact or assault between a
dentist and his patient"); South Carolina Med. Malpractice Liab. Ins. Joint Underwriting Ass'n
v. Ferry, 354 S.E.2d 378, 381 (S.C. 1987) (denying indemnification under malpractice insur-
ance to a dentist who sexually assaulted his patient); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Blakeslee, 771
P.2d 1172, 1177 (Wash. 1989) (holding that professional liability insurance did not cover inju-
ries to a patient who was drugged and sexually abused by her dentist because the harm was not
caused in rendering professional services).
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who allegedly mishandled the "transference phenomenon" and
sexually assaulted patients, because what occurred resulted from the
"rendering of professional services.' '2 7
Still other judges have forced the St. Paul Insurance Company to
defend a gynecologist and a dentist who intentionally sexually abused
and manipulated patients' genitalia during routine gynecological and
dental examinations.2 From the judges' perspective, legal defenses
were warranted because these professionals' tortious acts were
"intertwined with and inseparable from the services provided. ''s 9
Other federal and state courts held, however, that St. Paul had no
duty to defend physicians and a medical technician who allegedly
sexually assaulted patients. 2 0 Why? The assaults did not constitute
257. SeeVigilant Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins., 626 F. Supp. 262, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding
that the insurer must defend the psychiatrist's sexual acts with his patient because, due to the
transfer phenomenon, such acts are sufficiently related to professional services covered by the
policy); see also St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Love, 459 N.W.2d 698, 702 (Minn. 1990)
(finding a duty to defend when sexual relations between psychiatrist and patient arise from a
mishandling of the transfer phenomenon because such conduct is sufficiently related to pro-
fessional services covered by the policy); Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. McCabe, 556 F. Supp. 1342,
1351 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding that the medical-malpractice insurer must defend because the
psychiatrist's intentional acts arose from his professional services); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Mitchell, 296 S.E.2d 126, 127 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that the insurer must defend
the insured because the insured psychiatrist's alleged mishandling of the transference phe-
nomenon, which resulted in sexual relations with the client, stemmed from the rendering of
professional services); Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. 1968) (en banc) (finding
that the insurer must defend because the psychiatrist's mishandling of the transference phe-
nomenon and sexual assault resulted from the rendering of professional services).
258. See Asbury, 720 P.2d at 542 (holding that a gynecologist who intentionally and improp-
erly manipulated patients' genitalia during routine gynecological examinations was covered by
his professional liability insurance because his tortious acts were "intertwined with and insepa-
rable from the services provided"); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Shernow, 610 A.2d 1281,
1285-86 (Conn. 1992) (holding that a dentist who over-gassed and sexually assaulted a patient
in the dentist's chair was covered by his malpractice insurance because the dentist's medically
negligent procedure was "inextricably intertwined and inseparable from [his] intentional con-
duct"). But see Rivera, 814 P.2d at 73 (holding that a gynecologist who intentionally and im-
properly sodomized his patient during a routine gynecological examination was not covered by
his professional liability insurance because insured's policy specifically excluded misconduct).
259. Asbury, 720 P.2d at 542.
260. See Cromeans, 771 F. Supp. at 352-53 (denying indemnification or duty to defend under
malpractice policy covering professional services to a physician for his sexual abuse of two fe-
male patients, noting that all contracts insuring against damage from intentional misconduct
are void as against public policy under applicable Alabama law); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 683 P.2d 440, 444 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (concluding that physician who drugged and
sexually assaulted young male patient in his office during examination of hand injury was not
covered by his professional liability insurance because assault did not constitute professional
services); Standlee v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 693 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Idaho Ct. App.
1984) (concluding that physician who sexually assaulted young male patient in hospital during
physical examination was not covered by his professional liability insurance because assault did
not constitute professional services); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Quintana, 419 N.W.2d
60, 63 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the sexual assault of female patient by an EEG tech-
nician was not professional services covered by professional liability insurance); Smith v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 353 N.W.2d 130, 132 (Minn. 1984) (holding that malpractice in-
surance did not cover liability of an insured physician who sexually assaulted several young
male patients since physician's acts were not part of medical treatment); New Mexico Physi-
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professional services. Again, should an insured's professional status
influence whether courts order St. Paul or other medical-malpractice
carriers to defend? Probably not.
V. DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS: HOMEOWNERS INSURERS' DUTYTO
DEFEND INSUREDS AGAINST THIRD-PARTY WRONGFUL-DEATH CLAIMS
Earlier, this Article reported that CNA, one of O.J. Simpson's li-
ability carriers, refused to defend him in the wrongful-death civil
trial.26' Although a criminal jury acquitted Simpson of first-degree
murder charges, CNA insisted that Simpson murdered Nicole Simp-
son and Ronald Goldman, and told Simpson that his liability contract
did not cover his intentional, criminal conduct.262 Again, this poses
the following question: If you were the judge and Simpson filed a pe-
tition for declaratory relief in your court, would you have forced CNA
to defend him in the wrongful-death suit? If you decided not to or-
der a legal defense, how would you justify your decision? After all,
the petit criminal jury determined that Simpson did not kill Ronald
and Nicole, intentionally or othenise.
Relatives of third-party victims, however, commonly file wrongful-
death actions against homeowners who were either charged with or
convicted of first and second-degree murder or of involuntary ta and
voluntary264 manslaughter. And fairly often homeowners ask their
insurers for a legal defense. Homeowners insurers' response is
somewhat predictable; they ask federal and state judges for declara-
tory relief. During these proceedings, insurers argue that they have
no duty to defend homeowners charged with and found guilty of
committing murder or manslaughter.6
More specifically, insurers maintain that criminal charges, convic-
tions, and guilty pleas conclusively establish that a homeowner had
the requisite intent to harm a third party, which absolves insurers
from having to defend wrongful-death actions in civil courts. To be
cians Mut. Liab. Co. v. LaMure, 860 P.2d 734,737-38, 742 (N.M. 1993) (finding that the physi-
cian's sexual assault of a male patient did not constitute "rendering professional services"
within the coverage provision of the policy).
261. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (noting that insurance company refused
to defend Mr. Simpson because his general business insurance policy did not cover the activity
that led to his civil suit).
262. See supra notes 13-14 (discussing the position of Mr. Simpson's insurer, CNA).
263. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Honeycutt, 108 S.E.2d 485, 486 (N.C. 1959) (defining invol-
untary manslaughter as unintentional killing of person without malice).
264. See, e.g., State v. Baldwin, 68 S.E. 148, 151 (N.C. 1910) (defining voluntary manslaugh-
ter as intentional killing of a person without malice).
265. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 583,585 (4th Cir. 1973); Aetna Cas. &
Ser. Co. v.Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 416-20 (Conn. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 571 N.Y.S.2d 429,
430 (N.Y. 1991).
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sure, both insurers and insured have spent a considerable amount of
money and exploited judicial resources litigating the intent to harm
issue. Regrettably, courts have not been able to develop an intelligi-
ble procedure or methodology that helps litigants determine
whether a homeowner has the necessary intent to injure. Instead, for
nearly thirty years, courts have delivered imprecise and convoluted
declarations that have generated more confusion than guidance.
A. Conflicts Over Whether Collateral Estoppel Prevents Relitigating "Intent"
in Wrongful-Death Suits
The exclusion provision in a standard homeowners insurance pol-
icy states in relevant part:
We will pay all sums arising from the same loss which an insured
person becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage covered by this part of the pol-
icy .... We do not cover any bodily injury or property damage
which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional...
acts of an insured person or which is in fact intended by an insured
person.2
Fairly often, homeowners insurers cite this intent language to jus-
tify their decision not to defend insureds in wrongful-death actions.
In particular, insurers argue that the intent to cause bodily injury,
which precludes coverage under a homeowners' policy, and the in-
tent to kill, as defined in a capital-murder or manslaughter trial, are
identical. Or, stated another way, insurance companies argue that
collateral estoppe2 67 prevents parties from relitigating the issue of in-
266. Buczkowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 526 N.W.2d 589, 594 n.9 (Mich. 1994) (emphasis
added); see also Cary v. Allstate Ins. Co., 922 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Wash. 1996). In Gary, the court
stated that:
We do not cover bodily injury or property damage resulting from... [a]n act or omis-
sion committed by an insured person while insane or while lacking the mental capac-
ity to control his or her conduct or while unable to form any intent to cause bodily in-
jury or property damage. This exclusion applies only if a reasonable person would
expect some bodily injury or property damage to result from the act or omission. We
do not cover bodily injury or property damage resulting from ... [a] criminal act or
omission.
Id.
267. See Sysco Food Servs. v. Trapnell, 890 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Tex. 1994). The court in Sysco
held:
[The] party seeking to assert the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel must estab-
lish that (1) facts to be litigated in the second action were fully and fairly litigated in
the first action; (2) that those facts were essential to the judgment in the first action;
and (3) that the parties were cast as adversaries in the first action.
Id.; see also Butzer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 534, 536-37 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). The court
in Butzerstated that:
To invoke collateral estoppel, a party must establish (1) that both the present and
prior action presented the "identical" issue, (2) that the prior adjudication was"a final
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tent. Therefore, they argue that there is no duty to defend home-
owners in wrongful-death suits.
2 6e
Do federal and state courts support insurers' arguments? Or do
courts order insurers to defend insureds who allegedly committed in-
tentional acts?26 As mentioned earlier, courts are divided over this
issue,27 ° and the source of the conflict centers on whether homeown-
ers were convicted or pleaded guilty during the criminal proceed-
ings. Several courts have ruled that even if a homeowner pleads
guilty to capital offenses, an insurer still must defend the homeowner
in the wrongful-death suit.21' Why? The Fourth Circuit's explanation
is worth repeating here: "[A] plea of guilty [should] ... be consid-
ered.., no more than an admission which may be explained rather
than a conclusive statement which is binding when there has been no
initial litigation of the [intent issue] . But the Fourth Circuit also
ruled that a guilty plea prevents parties from relitigating the issue of
intent273 and that insurers have no duty to defend wrongful-death
claims. 4
Other courts also have held that a guilty plea precludes insurers
judgment on the merits," (3) that the estopped party was a party, or in privity with a
party, in the prior adjudication, and (4) that the estopped party received"a full and
fair opportunity to be heard" on the merits.
Id.; see also Van Dyke v. Boswell, O'Toole, Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. 1985)
(finding issue preclusion or collateral estoppel bars relitigating identical facts or laws which
were actually litigated and essential to ajudgment in prior suit).
268. See generally supra note 265 (citing Zuk, St. Pau4 and Aetna).
269. See supra notes 176-84 (discussing cases where court has supported insurer in refusing
to defend insured because insured's behavior was immoral or otherwise wrong).
270. See infra notes 271-78 and accompanying text.
271. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niziolek, 481 N.E.2d 1356, 1364 (Mass. 1985)
(holding that the taking of a guilty plea is not equivalent to adjudication on the merits and
thus, the defendant is not estopped from relitigating the issue in civil trial); Prudential Prop-
erty & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Kollar, 578 A.2d 1238, 1240-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding
that a plea of guilty to aggravated arson does not establish that defendant intended to cause the
specific property damage because a plea does not constitute "full and fair litigation of the is-
sues"); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. McGrath, 708 P.2d 657, 660 (Wash. 1985) (concluding that
criminal conviction based on an "Alford-type guilty plea" to second degree assault would not
preclude the defendant in a civil suit from relitigating the issue of intent because the defendant
had not had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues" in the criminal case).
272. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Lack, 476 F.2d 583, 586 (4th Cir. 1973).
273. SeeStout v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 307 F.2d 521,522 (4th Cir. 1962) (holding that
the insurer did not have to defend the action because the "defense in wrongful-death suit was
that death was not intentional and policy excluded coverage for death inflicted intentionally").
274. See id. at 525. In Stout, the defendant was indicted for murder and ultimately entered a
plea of guilty to manslaughter. The court then described the insurance company's situation:
[T]o compel [the insurer] to defend plaintiff would place (the insurer] in an impos-
sible situation, that is, it would urge in defense of the wrongful-death suit that plaintiff
was free of conduct resulting in negligent or intentional injury while contending at
the same time that the policy did not cover occurrence because death was intention-
ally caused.
Id. at 523-25.
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from defending homeowners.2 Some tribunals have ruled that only
ajury conviction can prevent parties from relitigating whether the in-
sured had the requisite intent.2Y6 But the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit adopted an even stricter position. In United States v. Be-
jar-Matrecios,17 the Ninth Circuit held that, as a general rule, "the doc-
trine of [issue preclusion] applies equally whether the previous
criminal conviction was based on a jury verdict or a guilty plea., 278
Clearly, the majority of these holdings are anti-consumer. This Arti-
cle suggests ways to help homeowners correct such injustice.
B. Conflicts Over Whether the "Intent to Act" or the "Intent to Injure"
Determines Insurers'Duty to Defend in Wrongful-Death Suits
National insurance companies also argue that they have no duty to
defend a homeowner convicted of murder or manslaughter, because
a conviction proves that the insured "intended the act" that caused the
third-party victim's deathY9 On the other hand, homeowners stress
that insurers must defend if they cannot prove that a homeowner in-
275. See, e.g., Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Winker, 319 N.W.2d 289, 296-97 (Iowa 1982) (holding
that a guilty plea entered in criminal prosecution precludes convicted party from relitigating
issue of criminality in subsequent declaratory action brought against him by insurer to construe
exclusionary provision of policy); State Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bragg, 589 A.2d 35, 38 (Me. 1991)
(finding argument that unilateral action in pleading guilty should not preclude victims from
pursuing negligence remedy "unpersuasive" and relieving insurer of duty to defend); State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Johnson, 466 N.W.2d 287, 289 (Mich. 1990) (holding a"plea of guilty
dispels any triable factual issue regarding [defendant's] intent or expectation to cause injury"
and finding insurer had no duty to defend); Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Vigilant
Ins. Co., 595 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1008-10 (1993) (finding that a guilty plea, for purposes of collateral
estoppel, is equivalent to conviction and that insurer had no duty to indemnify insured in sub-
sequent civil suit); State ex rel. Leach v. Schlaegel, 447 S.E.2d 1, 4 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that a
guilty plea to battery estops defendant from denying that very action in subsequent civil ac-
tion).
276. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 422 (Conn. 1991) ("In order for
collateral estoppel to be applicable, the meaning of the term 'intent,' as that word is used in
the insurance policy, must necessarily be included in the definition of intent applied by the
jury in [the] criminal trial."). But see State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. King, 851 F.2d 1369, 1372
n.4 (11th Cir. 1988) ("The district court correctly recognized that the state criminal jury's re-
jection of the intentional murder count did not foreclose a finding that King either intended
or expected bodily injury as understood by the insurance policy."). Compare In re Liquidation
of Nassau Ins. Co., 577 N.E.2d 1039, 1040 (N.Y. 1991) (concluding that"the criminal finding of
intent [was] conclusive, for purposes of determining whether... injuries and death [were] ex-
cluded from coverage under the... policy"), and D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
564 N.E.2d 634, 638 (N.Y. 1990) (stating thatjury's finding of intention in the criminal case was
sufficient... to establish the requisite element of intent in the action on the insurance policy
so as to make the policy exclusion [for intentional acts] effective"), with Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk,
574 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that"Allstate should not be permitted to use collat-
eral estoppel to deprive the Zuks of their only opportunity to determine the effect, if any, of
the conviction with its distinctively defined elements on the applicability of the exclusion
clause").
277. 618 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1980).
278. Bdar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d at 83.
279. See infra notes 281-92 and accompanying text.
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tended both the act and the results of the act (harm).8" What do federal
and state courts say? Not surprisingly, the rulings are mixed.
The Court of Appeals of New York, for example, has supported
homeowners' positions. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Zuk,281 the home-
owners' son, William Zuk, shot and killed his friend, Michael Smith,
when Zuk's gun accidentally discharged.2 2  Zuk was charged with
second degree manslaughter and was convicted after he pleaded
guilty to recklessly causing his friend's death.2  Zuk was insured un-
der his parents' homeowner's policy; but Allstate refused to defend
him in the subsequent wrongful-death action. 284 "Allstate argue[d]
that Zuk's second degree manslaughter conviction establishe [d] as a
matter of law that Zuk reasonably expected that his acts would cause
Smith's death. '8 The New York Court of Appeals disagreed and
held that "[a] person may engage in behavior that involves a calcu-
lated risk without expecting-no less reasonably-that an accident
will occur. Such behavior, which may be reckless for criminal re-
sponsibility purposes, does not necessarily mean that the actor rea-
sonably expected the accident to result."28
The Supreme Court of Ohio also has supported homeowners'
claims. In Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Estate of Kollstedt,2 7 local
authorities arrested and convicted Kollstedt after he shot and killed
Robert Hatmaker.288 At the time of the shooting, Kollstedt was suffer-
ing from degenerative dementia and was insured under a home-
owner's policy.2 9 Nationwide, however, refused to defend Kollstedt
in the wrongful-death action, arguing that the policy's exclusion pro-
vision refused to cover physical injury that the insured expected or
intended.29" Kollstedt countered by arguing that his dementia pre-
vented him from intending either the act, the shooting, or the subse-
quent death.29 1 The Ohio Supreme Court agreed and ordered the
company to defend the homeowner. 
2
280. See id.
281. 574 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1991).
282. See id. at 1036.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. Id. at 1038.
286. Id. (observing that Smith's death actually resulted from Zuk's shotgun accidentally dis-
charging while being cleaned, which does not establish as a matter of law that Zuk reasonably
expected Smith's death to result from his actions).
287. 646 N.E.2d 816 (Ohio 1995).
288. Seeid. at 817.
289. See id. at 816-17.
290. See id. at 817.
291. See id. at 818 (reporting that an expert stated that Kollstedt's mental state prevented
him from planning or premeditating an action in a purposeful manner).
292. See id. at 819 (holding that provision in liability insurance policy excluding coverage to
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In both Zuk and Kollstedt, the insured homeowners were guilty of
killing third-party victims, and both supreme courts ordered the re-
spective insurers to provide a civil defense. Now consider the plight
of the homeowner in Cooperative Fire Insurance Ass'n v. Bizon.29 Rob-
ert Bizon shot and killed James Ashcroft, a suspected burglar who was
attempting to steal liquor from Bizon's home garage.l 4 A criminal
jury acquitted Robert Bizon of involuntary manslaughter.25  Never-
theless, the insurer refused to defend Bizon in the wrongful-death ac-
tion, claiming that the shooting was excluded by the homeowner's
policy as an intentional act. 6 Both the trial court and the Vermont
Supreme Court agreed and ruled there was no duty to defend. 7 The
trial court stated that the exclusion clause applied "if Bizon fired the
gun at Ashcroft with the intention of hitting him with the bullet," but
added that it would be immaterial if Bizon intended to wound but
not kill Ashcroft.28 Other lower courts also have reached a similar
conclusion, although for a different reason.2
Consider for a moment the court's analysis in Cooperative Fire Insur-
ance Ass'n v. Bizon, where the Vermont Supreme Court used the doc-
trine of ambiguity to help determine whether a legal defense was re-
quired."' The court stated: "An insurance policy must be
interpreted according to its terms and the evident intent of the par-
ties as expressed in the policy language."' '3 The court also held that
insured when insured expected or intended to cause bodily injury or property damage, did not
apply under circumstances where insured was mentally incapable of committing an intentional
act); see also Michigan Millers Ins. Co. v. Anspach, 672 N.E.2d 1042, 1048-49 (Ohio App. Ct.
1996) (concluding that Michigan Millers did not meet its burden of proving that bodily injury
or death could be reasonably expected given the actual conduct of the Anspach brothers or to
show that they actually intended the resulting injuries for the exclusion provision to apply).
293. 693 A.2d 722 (Vt. 1997).
294. See id. at 724.
295. See id.
296. See id. The policy stated in pertinent part: "We will defend a suit seeking damages if
the suits resulted from bodily injury... not excluded under this coverage .... This policy does
not apply to liability which results directly or indirectly from ... an intentional act of an insured
or an act done as the direction of an insured...." Id.
297. See id. at 729 (stating that "[w]e find no clear error was committed by the trial court in
ruling that Cooperative Fire has no duty to defend or indemnify Bizon in the wrongful-death
suit brought by defendant").
298. See id. at 727 (noting that Bizon did fire the gun with intent to hit Ashcroft).
299. See generally Ziebart Int'l Corp. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 78 F.3d 245, 247-51 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the insurer had a duty to defend the employer on appeal and that the intentional
torts exclusion did not apply); American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Cordie, 478 N.W.2d 531, 532-34
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (affirming summary judgment for insured and stating that an inten-
tional act exclusion is inapplicable when the insured's mental illness precludes him from con-
trolling his actions); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Yon, 796 P.2d 1040, 1041-44 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990) (stating that murder conviction resulted in finding that intentional harm and barring the
heir's right to raise the issue of intent at a civil trial).
300. See Bizon, 693 A.2d at 727.
301. Id. (citing Select Design, Ltd. v. Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 674 A.2d 798, 800 (Vt.
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any ambiguity in an insurance contract must be interpreted in favor
of the policyholder and that reasonable contract constructions by the
trial court would be sustained."2
But some courts have cited neither the doctrine of ambiguity nor
the doctrines of reasonable expectation, adhesion, contra proferenten,
or plain meaning to help determine whether respective exclusion
provisions will block the obligation to provide a legal defense in a
civil case. For example, a careful reading of opinions from Arkan-
sas, 03 Idaho, °* Michigan,0 5 Minnesota, ° and Missouris7 Courts of
Appeals reveals that these courts have declared that an insurer has no
duty to defend a homeowner in a wrongful-death suit where a court
concludes as a matter of law that the insured intended to commit the
act that caused a death. Of course, the New York Court of Appeals
rejected this very argument in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Zuk.308
1996)).
302. See id.
303. SeeFireman's Ins. Co. v. Smith, 683 S.W.2d 234, 237-38 (Ark. Ct. App. 1985). In Smith,
the court stated:
There were no eyewitnesses to the killing. Roane's testimony that he intentionally
fired the pistol to repel what he believe to be an assault with a deadly weapon is un-
disputed. The intent to inflict injury can be inferred from the very character of the act. Any
reasonable person would expect or intend serious injury to be inflicted by shooting
another at point blank range with a .38 caliber pistol. Reasonable minds could not
conclude otherwise .... Roane's testimony is not extraordinary, improbable or sur-
prising .... It would establish every fact required to denude him of insurance cover-
age in the wrongful-death claim.
Id. (emphasis added).
304. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Yon, 796 P.2d 1040, 1044 n.2 (Idaho Ct. App.
1990). In Yon, the court concluded:
[T]he jury in the criminal trial necessarily had to determine that Yon intended to
cause the injury to Bussell when he pulled the trigger. We also infer as a matter of law
that the natural and probable consequences of Yon's conduct were to produce the
death of Bussell.
Id. (emphasis added).
305. SeeAetna Cas. & Sur. Co., v. Sprague, 415 N.W.2d 230, 231 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987). The
court in Spraguestated that:
[W]e [have] held that a conviction of aggravated assault could be used to show that
the insured intended to injure his victim ... [and] that a plea of guilty to second-
degree murder conclusively established that the insured expected death or serious bodily
harm to result from his actions .... Sprague was convicted of first-degree murder, a
necessary element of which it is the spetjflc intent to kill This established that Sprague
intended or at least expected that Wayne would die.
Id. (emphasis added).
306. SeeAuto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Smith, 376 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (finding
that defendant's conduct was so remorseless as to constitute intent to inflict bodily injury).
307. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Bollig, 878 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)
(determining that "absolute proof is not required .... Logic and common sense indicate that on these
facts it is more probable than not that [defendant] intentionally shot the (victim].") (emphasis
added).
308. SeeAllstate Ins. Co. v. Zuk, 574 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (N.Y. 1991). In Zuk, the court found:
[T]he accidental discharge of the shotgun Zuk was cleaning actually resulted in
Smith's death, and that his conviction for manslaughter... require[d] the result of
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VI. CAPRICIOUS DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS INVOLVING WHETHER
HOMEOWNERS' INSURERS HAVE A DUTY TO DEFEND SEXUAL-
MOLESTATION CIVIL SUITS
Fairly often, homeowners ask their insurers for a legal defense in
suits where third-party victims accuse them or their offspring of sexu-
ally molesting minors."' The insurers usually deny the claims and re-
fuse to defend, citing exclusion clauses and claiming that the in-
sureds intended to sexually molest a young child or teenager.
Shortly thereafter, these insurers rush to federal or state courts to ask
judges to declare as a matter of law that the insureds intended to harm
the third-party victims."
Without doubt, state and federal courts are hopelessly divided over
whether the intent to harm should be inferred as a matter of law in
sexual-molestation cases.312  Still, litigators who file duty-to-defend
cases and ask courts for declaratory relief need to know that whether
they prevail has little, if anything, to do with the judges' interpreta-
tion of the insurance contract. In other words, in cases involving
sexual molestation, courts spend very little effort attempting to de-
termine whether an insured's reasonable expectations were satisfied,
whether the contract language is ambiguous, or whether the lan-
guage in the exclusion clause is "unconscionable." 3'3
Instead, judges readily draw upon moral and ethical principles, as
well as psychiatric and psychological theories to determine whether
insurers should defend homeowners against sexual-molestation
suits.31 4 The next two sections will reveal that this willingness to em-
ploy moral, medical or psychological models rather than legal prin-
ciples has generated an exceedingly large body of unduly strained,
incredibly unsound, and highly irreconcilable rulings.
death as an element of the crime, do not establish as a matter of law that Zuk reasona-
bly expected Smith's death to result from his actions .... Here... Allstate chose to
incorporate into its exclusion.., clause a standard not found in the Penal Law-
reasonably expected to result-without further defining those terms. It is not possible
or appropriate to decide, as a matter or law,... whether Smith's death could
"reasonably be expected to result" from Zuk's actions.
Id.
309. See infra notes 331, 345, 366 (discussing cases concerning insurance liability for home-
owners' sexual misconduct).
310. See infra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
311. See id.
312. Compare Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989) (inferring intent
to harm), with Allstate Ins. Co. v.Jack. S, 709 F. Supp. 963,966 (D. Nev. 1989) (refusing to infer
intent to harm for young offender).
313. See infra notes 316-18.
314. See id.
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A. Conflicts Over Whether Adults' "Intent to Harm" Minors May Be Inferred
As a Matter of Law
To begin, consider the plight of the homeowners in Landis v. All-
state Insurance Co.35 In that case, Illeana and Frank Fuster operated a
licensed child-care facility in their home.15 Several parents whose
children attended the facility claimed that the Fusters sexually bat-
tered their children.31 7 After discovering the allegation, Allstate-the
Fusters' homeowner insurer-dashed off to court to determine its
rights and obligations under the contract. There, the insurer argued
that the Fusters intended to harm the children as a matter of law; and
consequently, it had no duty to defend.1 8
The trial court accepted Allstate's argument.3 9 The Florida Su-
preme Court affirmed, stating that it defied logic "[t]o state that a
child molester intends anything but harm and long-term emotional
anguish to the child... ... 10 But the Supreme Court reached its con-
clusion without soliciting, reviewing, or receiving any expert testi-
mony from a child psychologist or pediatrician. The majority ofjus-
tices simply assumed the role of a child psychologist and used a
psychiatric model to declare legal rights and obligations under the
insurance contract.
32 l
Employing a psychiatric or mental-health model to uncover con-
tractual rights and responsibilities under a homeowner's policy,
without receiving input from qualified mental-health professionals, is
highly irresponsible and suspect. Nevertheless, this has not pre-
vented other courts from adopting the inferred-intent rule and using
such extra legal models to determine whether liability insurers must
defend adults who allegedly abused or molested minors.2
For example, two years after Landis, the California Supreme Court
decided J. C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M.K 3 In J. C. Penney, a
five-year old girl told her mother that an adult male had sexually mo-
lested her 4 The suspect, a homeowner and neighbor who had often
baby sat the little girl, pleaded guilty to "willfully committing lewd or
315. 546 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1989).
316. See id. at 1052.
317. See id.
318. See id. at 1053.
319. See id. at 1052.
320. Id. at 1053 (emphasis added).
321. See id. (rejecting the argument that insured's diminished capacity made specific intent
to harm impossible insofar as "some form of harm inheres in and inevitably flow from the pro-
scribed behavior") (citation omitted).
322. See infra notes 317-27 (discussing cases wherein courts have deferred to logic, reason or
common sense to infer intent to harm in absence of corroborating psychological assessments).
323. 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991).
324. See id. at 690.
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lascivious acts with a child under the age of fourteen years ....
Shortly thereafter, J.C. Penney went to court and asked the judge to
declare that the insured intended to injure the child as a matter of
law; therefore, it had no duty to defend."2 6
The homeowner responded by arguing "that even an intentional
and wrongful act is not excluded from coverage unless the insured
acted with a preconceived design to inflict."' 7 The insured also ar-
gued that psychiatric testimony showed that molesters often did not
intend to harm the child, despite the depravity of their acts, and that
the molestation is often a misguided attempt to display love and af-
fection. " ' In response, the California Supreme Court assumed the
role of a child psychologist, declared there was no coverage as a mat-
ter of law,-' and stated: "We are reluctant to venture into uncertain
territory still being explored by psychiatrists .... [But] testimony,
psychiatric or otherwise, that no harm was intended flies 'in the face
of all reason, common sense, and experience." ' 330
The California Supreme Court also recognized that many jurisdic-
tions have embraced the inferred-intent psychiatric model in cases
where insurers refuse to defend alleged adult molesters. 3 ' Associate
Justice Broussard, the lone dissenter, observed: "[T] he clear line of
authority in [California cases states] that even an act which is
'intentional' or 'willful' within the meaning of traditional tort princi-
ple will not exonerate the insurer from liability... unless it is done
with a 'preconceived design to inflict injury.'3 '312 Furthermore, Asso-
325. Id.
326. See id. at 691.
327. Id. at 693.
328. See id.
329. See id. at 693 (concluding there is no coverage as a matter of law because a rational
person could not reasonably believe that "sexual fondling, penetration, and oral copulation of
a five-year old child are nothing more that acts of tender mercy").
330. Id. at 700.
331. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 1270, 1280-81 n.10 (D. Utah 1995)
(listing jurisdictions which have adopted the inferred-intent rule and concluding that "sexual
molestation of a minor by an adult falls within [a] category of cases... in which the resulting
injury is so likely to follow the conduct that the insured will not be [able] to deny any intent to
injure"); Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1120 (Ohio 1996) (concluding as a
matter of law that an adult's acts of sexual molestation of a minor do not constitute
.occurrences" for purposes of determining liability); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612
So. 2d 458, 463-64 nn.4-5 (Ala. 1993) (adopting inferred-intent rule and listing majority of
other jurisdictions that have adopted the rule in adult versus minor cases);J.E.M. v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co., 928 S.W.2d 668, 674-75 n.3 (Tex. Ct. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ)
(concluding that the act of sexual molestation constitutes an injury and finding an intent to
injure as a matter of law); State Mutual Ins. Co. v. Russell, 462 N.W.2d 785, 787-88 (Mich. App.
1990) (finding intent to harm as a matter of law and observing that homeowner's characteriza-
tion of his acts as impulsive and caused by an illness to be unpersuasive).
332. J.C. Penney, 804 P.2d at 700 (citing California Supreme Court's ruling in Clemmer v.
Hartford Insurance Co., 587 P.2d 1098 (Cal. 1978)).
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ciateJustice Broussard observed that, according to undisputed expert
testimony, the child molester may have intended no harm and
sharply criticized the majority for practicing psychiatry without a li-
333
cense.
Some courts, however, have refused to declare as a matter of law
that the intent to molest is the same as the intent to harm in situa-
tions involving adults and minors. For instance, in Lovefidge v.
Charier,3 4 forty-four year old Chartier engaged in multiple acts of
consensual sex with a fifteen-year-old female. 35 Chartier was never
criminally charged, 35 but the minor sued Chartier after he infected
her with the herpes simplex virus.337
Chartier's insurer, State Farm Insurance Company, refused to de-
fend him, claiming that the insured intended to injure the minor as a
matter of law.33 8 The Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected State Farm's
argument and declared: "This court will not create an exclusion
where one does not exist .... Therefore, we... cannot infer that an
adult insured intended to injure or harm a sixteen- or seventeen-year-
old as a matter of law when the insured engaged in consensual sexual
contact with the [minor] .
A similar outcome occurred in Teti v. Huron Insurance Co. 40 In that
action, a sixteen-year-old female had sex with a Philadelphia high-
school teacher and later claimed the teacher molested her3 ' The in-
sured asked his insurance company to defend him in the civil suit.34 '
The homeowner insurer refused, however, claiming that the insur-
ance contract excluded "injuries or damages which [were] 'expected
or intended by the insured.' 433 More specifically, Huron claimed
that it had no duty to defend Teti because, as a matter of law, he in-
tended to harm the minor .3  After reviewing Pennsylvania law, the
district judge declared that the rule of inferred intent to harm was
inapplicable because the minor was legally capable of consenting to
intercourse with Teti.345
333. See id. at 700 (stating that majority was doing a "terrible job" of practicing psychiatry).
334. 468 N.W.2d 146 (Wis. 1991).
335. See id. at 148.
336. See id. at 148 (observing that Chartier did not make any threats, promises, or misrepre-
sentations to induce Loveridge to engage in the acts).
337. See id.
338. See id. at 149.
339. Id. at 154.
340. 914 F. Supp. 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. Id. at 1133.
344. See id.
345. See id. at 1140. It is important to note, however, that the district court still did not or-
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B. Conflicts Over Whether Minors' "Intent to Harm" Minors May Be
Inferred As a Matter of Law
Often, a toddler or a minor claims that another child or teenager
sexually abused him. The parents of the alleged victim file a civil ac-
tion for damages. The alleged juvenile molester's parents ask their
homeowners insurer to defend the action. The insurer's response,
however, is predictable. The company asserts that the policy does
not cover intentional acts.346 In addition, the insurer asks a court to
declare, as a matter of law, that a minor or teenager intends to harm
whenever that child molests another minor, thereby relinquishing
the insurer's duty to defend.347 On the other hand, homeowners as
well as third-party victims assert that the insurer must settle the claim
or defend the action.348
A careful review of these types of claims reveals that federal and
state courts invariably deliver inconsistent declarations about whether
a minor intended to harm another minor when the former forced
the latter to engage in a sexual act. Although one might expect
courts to apply various legal doctrines to resolve these controversies,
this rarely happens. Instead, the propensity of both federal and state
judges3 49 to practice psychiatry regularly influences whether they or-
der insurers to defend minors accused of sexual molestation. Corre-
spondingly, the law in this area is unnecessarily mixed, even when the
controversies involve the same insurer and identical homeowners
policies.
To help illustrate this point, review only those cases in which All-
state Insurance Company, a large national carrier, petitioned courts
for declaratory relief. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Patterson,"'0 Brenda
Patterson-the mother of two children between the ages of five and
eight-years-old, Jens and Martin Dietz-sued Beverlee McLaughlin
and Clifford and Lila Forney, the parents of boys who were between
twelve and sixteen years old.35' The latter boys were accused of sexu-
der the insurer to defend Teti. Citing some generalized public policy of Pennsylvania, the
judge stated: "[A]n insurance contract is void and unenforceable as contrary to a defined and
dominant Pennsylvania public policy, when it provides for the defense and indemnification of a
public school teacher of claims that the teacher had sexual intercourse with a sixteen year-old
student." Id. at 1142.
346. See infra notes 344-54, 361-62, 368 and accompanying text (discussing cases where in-
surers have argued that a juvenile molester's intentional acts were not covered by their poli-
cies).
347. Id.
348. See infra notes 353, 362, 369 and accompanying text (discussing cases wherein home-
owners have asserted that the insurer must defend the action).
349. See infra notes 350-58.
350. 904 F. Supp. 1270 (D. Utah 1995).
351. Seeid.at1272.
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ally molesting the former.352 McLaughlin and the Forneys asked All-
state, their homeowner insurer, to defend the civil action. 3 Allstate
refused, arguing that their homeowner policy excluded intentional
acts.54 To garner support for its position, the insurer petitioned the
court for declaratory relief, claiming that, as a matter of law, the
McLaughlin and Forney boys intended to harm their victims during
the sexual assault. 55
The district court judge refused to endorse Allstate's assertion."
Adopting the role of a psychiatrist, the judge stated that not all sexual
contact is inherently harmful because of the age and status of the vic-
tim. 57 The judge further stated that "if the age of the victim is rele-
vant, then arguably the age of the perpetrator should also be rele-
vant... [and,] if a child cannot fully appreciate the consequences of
sexual activity, that is reason not to hold the child perpetrator to the
same standard as an adult ....
Based on this reasoning, the judge declined to rule as a matter of
law. Therefore, Allstate had to defend the McLaughlin and Forney
boys.
35 9
A similar result appears in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Jack. S.30 In that
controversy, the parents of a three-year-old boy claimed that the
child's baby sitter, a fourteen-year-old girl, sexually abused the tod-
dler.36' The sitter's parents asked Allstate to defend their daughter in
the civil suit.362 Allstate refused, claiming that the sitter's conduct was
intentional and therefore, was excluded from coverage under the
homeowners' policy. 33 Allstate asked the court to resolve the dispute
and to find an intent to harm as a matter of law.
36
Although the district judge said he was "not prepared to delve into
the psychological understanding of a fourteen-year-old girl and make
352. See id. (detailing various charges made against defendants).
353. See id. at 1272-73.
354. See id. at 1273.
355. See id. at 1277 (noting Allstate's argument that sexual molestation is an intentional act
which cannot be accidental).
356. See id. at 1289.
357. See id. at 1282.
358. Id. The court in Patterson concluded that "the Utah Supreme Court would not auto-
matically infer an intent to harm in the case of a minor who sexually assault[ed) other minors
but would look at all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the parties' ages, the
nature of their relationship and their past experience." Id. at 1284.
359. See id. at 1285.
360. 709 F. Supp. 963 (D. Nev. 1989).
361. See id. at 964.
362. See id. at 965.
363. See id.
364. See id.
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a determination of her intent as a matter of law, ""' that is precisely
what he did. The judge weighed and compared some generalized
notion of adults' and minors' intellectual capacities and concluded
that although a court could find as a matter of law that an adult in-
tended to harm a child, such an assumption could not properly be
inferred to a child.3
As expected, some courts have refused to force Allstate to defend
minors who allegedly molested other children. But these tribunals
also have used a psychiatric or psychological paradigm to decide
whether the child perpetrator intended to harm as a matter or law,
even though they claim otherwise. For example, in Allstate Insurance
Co. v. Baileyy a fifteen-year-old, Manuel Zayas, initiated and engaged
four-year-old James M. Bailey, Jr. in a variety of sexual acts. 3 6s Both
the toddler's parent and Zayas claimed that Allstate, the perpetrator's
insurer, had a duty to defend the underlying suit.
69
Allstate disagreed and asked the court for declaratory relief.37° The
insurer asserted that young Zayas' sexual acts were designed to harm
the child as a matter of law and were therefore excluded under the
policy. 7' The court supported Allstate's point of view and stated,
"Manuel Zayas's age or status as a minor, at the time of the alleged
improper fondling of [the child], does not influence this court's de-
,,372 ae
cision. Yet, later in the ruling, the court assumed the role of a psy-
chologist and repeated what the Florida Supreme Court stated in
Landis v. Allstate Insurance Co.: 73
"To state that a child molester intends anything but harm and long-
term emotional anguish to the child defies logic."... IT]he al-
leged physical and emotional injuries to James M. Bailey Jr. are ex-
actly the type that could reasonably be expected to result from the
365. Id. at 968.
366. See id. at 966; see also Fire Ins. Exch. v. Diehl, 545 N.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Mich. 1996).
The court in Diehl stated:
We agree that courts should infer the intent to injure where an adult sexually assaults
a child. However, we conclude that the intent to injure should not be inferred as a
matter of law where a child is the assailant .... Children, as a group, do not have the
capability to understand the consequences of their sexual acts.
Id.; see also Pawtucket Mut. Ins. Co. v. LeBrecht, 190 A.2d 420,423 (N.H. 1963) (refusing to find
that child intended to harm as a matter of law).
367. 723 F. Supp. 665 (M.D. Fla. 1989).
368. See id. at 666.
369. See id. at 667 (noting that both Zaya's and Bailey's parents argue that Allstate coverage
could only be excluded under the intentional injury exclusion if Zayas had a specific intent to
injure).
370. See id.
371. Sec id.
372. Id. at 668.
373. 546 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1989).
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intentional ... acts by an insured person ....374
In a similar case, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Steele,375 James O'Hara's
stepsister claimed that he raped her. 76 At the time of the alleged in-
jury, James O'Hara and the stepsister were sixteen and twelve years
old, respectively.3 7 7 Once more, Allstate refused to defend the under-
lying civil action and petitioned the court for held for Allstate.378 The
Federal District Court of Minnesota held for Allstate, holding that
the rape was a knowing and wrongful act. 7 Thus, the court con-
cluded that James O'Hara intended to cause the injury as a matter of
law.38
0
VII. A CASE STUDY: AN EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AND STATE
COURTS' DUTY-TO-DEFEND DECLARATORYJUDGMENTS-1900-1997
This Article has reported that state and federal judges employ
principles of contracts, as well as the doctrines of reasonable expecta-
tion, plain meaning, adhesion, and contra proferentem to determine
whether or when liability contracts require insurers to defend in-
sureds. In addition, there are a significant number ofjudges who use
the equitable doctrines of unclean hands and in pari delicto, as well as
principles of morality, to determine whether a defense is required.
However, the employment of various equitable, legal, and moral
principles has produced declaratory judgments that are exceedingly
strained, legally and rationally indefensible, unjust, and poorly rea-
soned. In addition, the application of these particular theories has
generated an excessive number of conflicting rulings involving na-
tional carriers and created a checkered pattern of declaratory relief
in cases where third-party victims' allegations and injuries are identi-
cal or substantially similar.
At this point, there is another issue. When deciding whether to
award declaratory relief, judges often and appropriately consider
374. Bailey, 723 F. Supp. at 669 (quoting Landis, 546 So. 2d at 1053).
375. 885 F. Supp. 189 (D. Minn. 1995).
376. See id. at 190.
377. See id.
378. See id. at 191.
379. See id. at 192 ("This was a knowing and wrongful act; it is not an act which lacked intui-
tion or design.").
380. See id.; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815, 821 (D. Alaska 1987)
(concluding that sexual-abuse claims were not covered by Allstate homeowner's policy because
those claims were intentionally caused); Cuervo v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1121, 1122
(Ohio 1196) (concluding that as a matter of law the insurer had no duty to defend a sixteen-
year-old minor who allegedly sexually molested two children between the ages of six and
eight); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Judith G., 379 N.W.2d 638, 642 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)
(concluding that insurer was not obligated to defend or indemnify a minor who sexually mo-
lested other minors).
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various doctrines, examine numerous facts, and weigh a number of
factors to reach a just conclusion. Certainly, a methodology that in-
cludes all or a combinations of these activities is an indispensable
part of judging. But, when deciding whether liability insurers must
provide a defense in cases involving intentional torts, do state and
federal judges, knowingly or unknowingly, allow specific factors to in-
fluence their rulings on a regular basis? Or stated another way, can
one accurately predict whether courts will award declaratory relief to
insureds or insurers on the basis of third-party victims' ethnicity or
gender, types of liability contracts that the insureds purchased, or
types of third-party victim claims? Unfortunately, the findings out-
lined below suggest it is possible.
Also, should insurers' and the insureds' ability to secure declara-
tory relief in state supreme courts depend on whether those courts
are located in the eastern, western, or northern regions of the coun-
try? Should the award of declaratory relief depend exclusively on
whether insureds, for example, file duty-to-defend actions against na-
tional carriers in the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits? By all reason-
able measures, these types of variables should not have any predict-
able influence on whether one receives declaratory relief in duty-to-
defend cases. Yet, a careful review of statistical findings outlined and
discussed below strongly suggests that such factors do influence fed-
eral and state judges' decisions.
A. Data Source, Sampling Procedures, and Background Attributes of
Insurers and Insureds
To support the proposition that federal and state judges are wit-
tingly or unwittingly allowing irrelevant factors to influence their de-
cisions to award or not award declaratory relief, the study tried to un-
cover every reported federal and state duty-to-defend case in which
either the insurer or the insured asked the court for declaratory re-
lief. Both WESTLAW and LEXIS computer retrieval systems were
used, and the search produced 107 district court (federal and state),
270 federal appellate court, and 107 state supreme court cases that
were decided between 1900 and 199 7 .m' Therefore, the findings re-
ported in this part are based on the statistical analysis of 547 reported
federal and state declaratory judgments.38'
381. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, COURTS File (Mar. 12, 1996); search of WESTLAW,
ALLSTATES, ALLUDES, MIN-CS, CTA, and DCT databases (Mar. 16, 1996).
382. SeeWilly E. Rice, An Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' Duty-to-Defend De-
claratory Judgments Between 1900-1997 (1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author). All databases, statistical procedures, and outputs, associated with this analysis are on
file with the author.
1998] 1195
1196 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:1131
TABLE 1. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACTIONS: SOME SELECTED
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF LITIGANTS WHO PETITIONED STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS TO DECLARE WHETHER LIABILITY INSURERS
HAvE A DUTY TO DEFEND POLICYHOLDERS WHO INTENTIONALLY
INjuRE THIRD PARTIES (N = 547)
State & Federal Federal Appellate State Supreme
District Courts Courts Courts
Demographic Characteristics (N = 107) (N = 270) (N = 170)
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Types of Insurance:
Automobile 14.0 13.8 10.6
Business 8.4 10.4 9.4
Homeowners 21.5* 10.0 26.5*
Liability (CGL) 47.7* 54.1* 46.5
Malpractice 1.0 5.9 2.9
Other 7.4 6.7 4.1
Region of Country:
East 19.0 12.2 14.0
Midwest 25.2 25.2* 26.0
South 11.2 23.0 19.0
Southwest 8.4 19.3 1.2
West 31.0* 19.0 31.2
Circuits:
First 6.5 .7 1.2
Second 6.5 5.6 7.6
Third 5.6 5.2 1.2
Fourth 9.3 4.8 8.2
Fifth 4.7 20.7* 1.2
Sixth 8.4 6.3 5.3
Seventh 5.6 10.4* 2.4
Eighth 13.1 11.1 15.9
Ninth 20.6* 14.4 24.7*
Tenth 14.0 9.6 9.4
Eleventh 3.7 10.0 12.4
Federal 1.9 1.1 .6
Declaratory-Judgment Actions-
Types of Complainants:
Assignees 1.9 .7 1.2
Banks .9 6.3 2.9
Corporations 24.3 30.4* 18.8
Employers - 1.5 4.1
Estates 5.6 1.9 3.5
Insured Individuals 34.6* 20.7 38.8*
Professionals 4.7 11.1 10.0
Small Businesses 7.5 6.3 10.0
Governments 3.7 3.7 5.9
Grounds for Disposing Actions
in District Courts
Merit 100.0 96.3 98.2
Procedural - 3.7 1.8
Grounds for Disposing Actions
in Federal Appellate Courts
Merit - 95.2 -
Procedural - 4.8
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Table 1 (continued)
State & Federal Federal Appellate State Supreme
District Courts Courts Courts
Demographic Characteristics (N = 107) (N = 270) (N = 170)
Grounds for Disposing Actions
in State Supreme Courts
Merit - - 95.3
Procedural - - 4.7
Disposition of Actions in
District Courts From
Complainants' View-
Favorable Outcome 36.4 38.9 42.4*
Unfavorable Outcome 63.6* 61.1* 57.6
Disposition of Actions in
Federal Appellate Courts From
Complainants' View.
Favorable Outcome - 43.0
Unfavorable Outcome - 57.0
Disposition of Actions in State
Supreme Courts From
Complainants' View:
Favorable Outcome - - 47.1
Unfavorable Outcome - - 52.9
Levels of Statistical Significance for Chi Square test: *p < .05
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Table 1 outlines the litigants' most relevant demographic charac-
teristics. First, .the left column, labeled State and Federal District Courts
(N =107), reports information on insureds and insurers who sought
declaratory relief only in a federal or a state district court. The mid-
dle column, entitled Federal Appellate Courts (N = 270), presents data
on federal litigants who decided to appeal adverse federal district
court rulings to one of the twelve federal courts of appeals. And the
right column, labeled State Supreme Courts (N =170), highlights the at-
tributes of state court litigants who decided to appeal unfavorable
district and appellate court rulings to various state supreme courts.
Perhaps the most salient finding appears near the bottom half of
the table. Among all three groups of cases, state and federal district
courts, federal appellate courts, and state supreme courts, the party
seeking declaratory relief is less likely to receive "that relief initially"
in a district court. The percentages of cases with unfavorable out-
comes from the complainants' view for the three columns are 63.6%,
61.1% and 57.6%, respectively. Among cases decided by a state su-
preme court, however, complainants were significantly more likely to
have received declaratory relief initially in a state district court. The
reported percentages are 42.4% versus 36.4% and 38.9%.
Also, among cases disposed of in federal courts of appeals, the ma-
jority, 57.0%, of those petitioning those courts for declaratory relief
did not prevail. Similarly, the majority, 52.9%, of complainants ask-
ing state supreme courts for declaratory relief were not successful.
Later, this Article will examine and discuss a number of key variables
to determine how they influence courts' decisions to award or deny
declaratory relief in duty-to-defend cases.3 83
A review of the factors listed in the top half of Table 1 reveals some
interesting, and potentially meaningful, patterns. Consider the vari-
able Types of Insurance. Among federal appellate court cases, 54.1%
of the declaratory actions involved conflicts over the meaning of
words and phrases appearing in Comprehensive General Liability
("CGL") contracts. Conversely, among the complaints ultimately re-
solved in district courts (state and federal) or state supreme courts, a
significant number involved conflicts over the language appearing in
homeowners' insurance contracts. The respective percentages are
21.5% and 26.5%. Nearly an equal number of actions in each group
centered on the terms and conditions outlined in automobile insur-
ance contracts. The reported percentages are 14.0%, 13.3%, and
383. See infra Part VII.B (surveying cases containing various factors considered by courts in
deciding whether to award declaratory relief).
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10.6%, respectively.
Table 1 also lists some relevant percentages by types of federal cir-
cuits. Complainants who commenced actions in a tribunal located in
the Fifth Circuit were more likely to obtain declaratory relief in fed-
eral courts of appeals, 20.7%, than in either state district or supreme
courts. On the other hand, complainants who filed action in a fo-
rum in the Ninth Circuit were more likely to secure ultimate relief in
district courts (state and federal) or in state supreme courts, 20.6%
and 24.7%, respectively. In addition, complainants who originated
actions in the Seventh Circuit were more likely to achieve final relief
10.4% of the time in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
5.6% in district courts, and 2.4% in the supreme courts located in
that circuit.
Types of Complaints is the final interesting variable highlighted in
Table 1. The reported percentages reveal that insured individuals
are more likely to secure final relief in both district courts (state and
federal) and state supreme courts-34.6% and 38.8%, respectively-
than in federal courts of appeals (20.7%). But, corporations or cor-
porate complainants are more likely to obtain ultimate declaratory
relief in federal courts of appeals than in district courts or state su-
preme courts. The respective percentages are 30.4%, 24.3%, and
18.8%. Finally, a slightly greater number of professional complain-
ants were able to secure a final declaratory judgment in federal ap-
pellate and state supreme courts, rather than in state or federal dis-
trict courts. The percentages are 11.1%, 10.0%, and 4.7%,
respectively.
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TABLE 2. UNDERLYING THIRD-PARTY ACTIONS: SOME SELECTED
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINANTS WHO
SUED INSUREDS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (N = 547)
State & Federal Federal Appellate State Supreme
District Courts Courts Courts
Demographic Characteristics (N = 107) (N = 270) (N = 170)
(Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Underlying Lawsuits-
Third Parties' Ethnicity
African-Americans 7.5 4.8 1.2
Anglo-Americans 64.5 64.4 77.1
Mexican-Americans - 1.1 1.0
Other 5.6 3.0 1.8
Non-Humans 22.4 26.7 19.0
Underlying Lawsuits-
Third Parties' Gender
Female, Only 17.8 18.5 20.6
Male, Only 44.9 41.1 51.8*
Both 23.4* 23.0* 18.8
Non-Human 14.0 17.0* 8.8
Underlying Lawsuits-
Third Parties' Status
Agents 1.0 1.1 1.0
Consumers 8.4 18.9* 11.2
Contractors 1.0 1.0 1.8
Corporations 11.2 11.1 5.3
Employees 15.9 15.2 8.2
Federal Government 3.7 5.2 4.1
Innocent Bystanders 25.2 22.6 28.2
Invitees 4.7 5.2 6.5
Landowners 17.8 10.4 11.8
Municipalities 1.0 2.2 2.4
Professionals 4.7 3.0 4.1
Relatives 6.5 7.4 5.3
Social Guests 9.3 10.0 8.8
Students & Pupils 5.6 .4 4.1
Tenants 1.0 4.1 2.4
Underlying Lawsuits-
Third-Party Common-Law Claims
Battery 18.7* 7.8 22.9*
Conversion 10.3 7.0 4.1
Fraud 14.0* 13.7* 8.2
Mental Distress 9.3 4.4 7.1
Misrepresentation 1.0 2.6 4.1
Rape 1.9 1.5 1.2
Sexual Molestation 7.5 4.4 5.3
Trespass to Land 9.3 10.4 5.9
Underlying Lawsuits-
Third-Party Statutory Claims
Crimes-Felonies 11.2 7.8 21.2*
Sexual Harassment 1.0 1.5 1.0
Wrongful Death 19.6 37.4* 24.7
Levels of Statistical Significance for Chi Square test: *p < .05
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Table 2 outlines some demographic characteristics of third-
party victims who alleged that insureds-e.g., lawyers, doctors, home-
owners, corporations, officers and directors, members of the clergy,
small-business owners, and educators -intentionally subjected them
to physical and mental abuse.
Third-Party Victims' Ethnicity is the first variable illustrated in Table
2. Of course, it is important to point out that among the three cate-
gories of cases, nearly a fourth of all third-party victims identified as
plaintiffs in the underlying complaints or lawsuits were either agen-
cies, associations, businesses, corporations, government agencies, or-
ganizations, partnerships, or similar legal entities. These were la-
beled "non-human. '84 The percentages for the three groups of cases
are 22.4%, 26.7%, and 19.0%, respectively.
On the other hand, among "humans," the majority of third-party
victims who were listed as plaintiffs in the underlying suits or com-
plaints were Anglo-Americans. Their percentages within the three
categories are 64.5%, 64.4%, and 77.1%, respectively. Conversely,
African-Americans were named as third-party victims or plaintiffs in
less than ten percent of the underlying suits among the declaratory
judgment actions ultimately decided in the district courts (both state
and federal), the federal appellate courts and the state supreme
courts. The reported percentages are 7.5%, 4.8%, and 1.2%, respec-
tively. The remaining percentages reveal that Mexican-Americans
and other ethnic groups also comprised less than ten percent of
third-party plaintiffs or victims in the underlying suits.
Table 2 also illustrates the distribution of third-party victims' legal
status across the three court categories. First, a significant number of
the victims were "innocent bystanders"-25.2%, 22.6%, and 28.2%,
respectively. Also, within the three groups, a fair number of
"landowners"-17.8%, 10.4%, and 11.8%-and "social guests"-
9.3%, 10.0%, and 8.8%-are listed as third-party victims.
A greater percentage of "consumers," however, are listed as victims
among the federal appellate court cases than among either district
384. In Table 2, a comparison of the "non-human" categories listed under "Third-Party Corn-
plainants'Ethnicity" and "Third-Party Complainants' Gender, "reveals an apparent discrepancy. See
supra p. 1200. Under the ethnicity variable, more "non-human" appear than under the gender
variable. Simply put, in some situations the underlying lawsuit or complaint listed the corpora-
tion, association, agency, or partnership as plaintiff; but it also clearly identified the gender of
the individuals who were allegedly injured by the insured's intentional acts. Correspondingly,
if the gender of the employee, agent, officer, director, or parishioner was known, the case was
placed in one of the following categories: "female, only," "male, only, " or "both." The same meth-
odology was used to construct the ethnicity variable. However, the ethnicity of the victim was
identified less often. Therefore, under "Third-Party Complainants'Ethnicity"a greater number of
cases appear in the "non-human" category.
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court (state and federal) or state supreme court cases. The respective
percentages are 18.9%, 8.4%, and 11.2%. On the other hand, nearly
twice as many "employees" are listed as third-party victims among dis-
trict court (state and federal) cases and federal appellate court cases,
than among state supreme court cases-15.9%, 15.2%, and 8.2%, re-
spectively. And, the same pattern occurs across the three groups
where the third-party complainants are "corporations"-11.2%,
11.1%, and 5.3%, respectively.
As previously mentioned, declaratory relief was ultimately awarded
or denied in either a district court (state or federal), a federal court
of appeals, or a state supreme court. But, underlying each action for
declaratory relief, there was a common law or statutory action against
the insured. The last two factors outlined in Table 2 are Types of
Third-Party Common Law Claims and Types of Third-Party Statutoy
Claims. These are the various claims which were alleged in the un-
derlying lawsuits.
Among the third-party victims' common law claims, there are a few
interesting patterns. A greater percentage of "battery" claims appear
in the district court and state supreme court underlying suits, 18.7%
and 22.9%, respectively. But, among district court and federal appel-
late court underlying suits, slightly more "fraud" claims appear,
14.0%, and 13.7%, respectively. Slightly more "trespass to land"
claims appear in those courts as well. The respective percentages are
9.3% and 10.4%.
Finally, "wrongful-death" was the predominant, underlying statu-
tory claim across the three groups of cases, 19.6%, 37.4%, and 24.7%,
respectively. A group-by-group comparison, however, reveals that
nearly twice as many "crime-related" underlying claims appear
among state supreme court cases than among either district court
(federal and state) or federal appellate court cases. The respective
percentages are 21.2% versus 11.2% and 7.8%.
Once again, does type of insurance contract, type of complainant
or insured, region of country, type of federal circuit, third-party vic-
tims' ethnicity and gender, and type of third-party common-law and
statutory claim truly influence whether courts grant or deny declara-
tory relief? To answer this question, this Article examines the statisti-
cal relationships between some of these variables and judicial out-
comes in the sections appearing below.
B. Bivariate Analysis of the Factors Influencing Whether Courts Award
Declaratory Relief in Duty-to-Defend Cases
Table 3 illustrates the relationship between insureds receiving de-
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claratory relief in the federal courts of appeals and each of the fol-
lowing variables: Types of insurance contracts, third-party victims'
ethnicity and third-party victims' legal status.
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Simply stated, the first statistically significants Chi square value-
20.1434-strongly indicates that federal appellate court judges know-
ingly or unknowingly allow types of contractual agreements to influ-
ence whether the insureds receive a favorable or unfavorable declara-
tory judgment in duty-to-defend cases. For example, a person
insured under officers & directors and professional malpractice in-
surance contracts was significantly more likely to receive declaratory
relief. The observed percentages are 60.7% and 68.8%, respectively.
Individuals who purchased homeowners' and CGL contracts, how-
ever, were significantly less likely to receive a favorable declaratory
judgment, 85.2% and 61%, respectively.
Second, the effect of third-party victims' ethnicity on the disposi-
tion of declaratory judgment actions in the federal appellate courts is
both surprising and statistically significant. Generally, insureds were
less likely to receive declaratory relief if the victims in the underlying
suits were either Anglo-Americans or African-Americans. The per-
centages are 57.5% and 87.5%, respectively. But, the converse of this
is quite unsettling: insureds were three times more likely to secure
favorable declaratory judgments in duty-to-defend cases if the third-
party victims were Anglo-Americans rather than African or Mexican-
Americans, 42.5% versus 12.5%.
In light of this latter revelation, is there anything within the doc-
trines of reasonable expectation, plain meaning, adhesion, and contra
proferentem, or anything associated with the equitable doctrines of un-
clean hands and in pari delicto that would lead to an expectation of
such a statistically significant ethnicity effect? Emphatically, the an-
swer is no.
Table 3 also suggests that the third-party victims' legal status influ-
ences whether federal appellate courtjudges award declaratory relief.
To be sure, insureds are less likely to receive a favorable declaratory
judgment when the underlying victim was an adult or minor, 56.6%
and 80.0%, respectively. But, when appellate court judges awarded
relief, they were twice as likely to do so when third-party victims were
adults rather than minors, 43.4% versus 19.2%. Again, should such a
discrepancy be expected among the federal courts of appeals?
Table 4 presents statistically significant relationships between two
demographic variables and insureds' likelihood of receiving declara-
tory relief in state supreme courts.
385. See generally Willy E. Rice, Judicial Enforcement of Fair Housing Laws: An Analysis of Some
Unexamined Problems that the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1983 Would Eliminate, 27 HOw. UJ.
227, 253-55 & nn.161-62 (1984) (outlining a simple procedure to calculate a Chi-square statistic
and presenting a brief explanation of a "statistically significant" relationship).
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First, the percentages show that state supreme courts wittingly
or unwittingly permit third-party victims' legal status to affect
whether they affirm or reverse lower courts' decisions to award or
deny declaratory relief in duty-to-defend cases. For instance, statistics
show that when third-party victims are "social guests," supreme courts
are significantly more likely (80.0%) to declare that insurers must de-
fend insureds accused of committing some intentional act. On the
other hand, when third-party victims are "consumers," "innocent by-
standers," or others, supreme courts are significantly less likely to or-
der liability insurance carriers to defend the underlying intentional
tort actions. The unfavorable percentages are 68.4%, 55.3%, and
53.9%, respectively.
Unexpectedly, various types of third-party claims also influence
whether state supreme courts grant or deny declaratory relief. In
Table 4, findings reveal that supreme courts are significantly more
likely to order a legal defense if third-party victims filed a "battery" or
a "wrongful-death" action against the insureds, 54.2% and 66.7%, re-
spectively. But, if claims in the underlying suits involve "criminal as-
sault" or some other intentional act, supreme courts are markedly
less likely to force insurers to defend policyholders. The unfavorable
percentages are 71.9% and 58.8%, respectively.
Without doubt, third-party claims and third parties' legal status
produced some surprising effects on whether state supreme courts
awarded or denied declaratory relief. Therefore, it is important to
examine the influence of these two variables from another perspec-
tive to determine whether these effects were truly meaningful or sim-
ply statistical anomalies. In particular, the study combined both fed-
eral appellate and supreme court cases, and then assessed the
combined effects of third-party claims and legal status on disposition.
1206 [Vol. 47:1131
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Table 5 highlights the relationship between the likelihood of fed-
eral and state courts' awarding declaratory relief and third-party vic-
tims' legal status, while controlling for, removing, or minimizing the
influence of third-party victims' claims. The findings are somewhat
revealing and statistically significant. First, consider only the cases in
which the third-party victims filed common law and statutory assault
& battery claims in the underlying suits: among those cases, there is
no significant relationship between the likelihood of state and fed-
eral judges' awarding declaratory relief and the legal status of third-
party victims. In other words, knowing that the victim in the underly-
ing suit was an adult or a minor had no statistically significant bear-
ing on courts' decisions to award or deny declarative relief.
The converse is true, however, among cases where third-party vic-
tims filed common law and statutory sexual molestation claims in the
underlying lawsuits. The reported percentages, 66.7% and 33.3% re-
spectively, strongly suggest that supreme courts and federal courts of
appeals are much more likely to force insurers to defend insureds
when the victims of the alleged sexual molestation are adults rather
than minors.
Finally, among cases where third-party victims filed common-law
and statutory criminal assault claims, a similar pattern also appears.
Both state supreme courts and federal appellate courts are signifi-
cantly less likely to compel liability insurers to defend insureds if mi-
nors allege that they were the victims of a criminal assault-92.9%.
On the other hand, courts are more likely to force insured to defend
insureds when the alleged victims are adults-46.9%.
C. Two-Stage Multivariate Probit Analysis of Factors Influencing Federal
and State Courts'Award of Declaratory Relief
An interpretation of the statistically significant relationships re-
ported in Tables 3-5 could lead one to conclude the following: sys-
tematic bias permeates federal appellate court and state supreme
court declaratory judgments. Justices permit litigants' demographic
characteristics, such as insureds' and third-party victims' ethnicity,
and gender, to determine whether they will affirm or reverse lower
courts' declarations in duty-to-defend cases. To be sure, presenting
such an unsophisticated interpretation of the reported findings
would be unwarranted. More important, without knowing consid-
erably more, such a conclusion would be highly incorrect.
What else is there to know? First, these findings are based on re-
ported federal appellate court and state supreme court cases, which
appeared in various reporters and were retrieved from two electronic
1208 [Vol. 47:1131
INSURANCE CONTRACTS ANDJUDICIAL DIscoRD
databases. Would the findings be the same among unreported cases?
Second, among reported cases, some insureds and insurers accepted
state and federal district courts' adverse declarations and decided not
to appeal those rulings. But others, however, refused to accept dis-
trict courts' adverse judgments and decided to obtain further relief in
either a federal appellate court or in a state supreme court.
So, the question is, are insureds and insurers who decided to ap-
peal an adverse ruling significantly different from those who decided
not to appeal? This question concerns a fairly common phenome-
non called "selectivity bias."8 It is uncertain whether such bias is ab-
sent, even where random sampling was used to select cases for the
database. Therefore, a test or a procedure is required to help esti-
mate the presence and effect of self-selection bias in federal-appellate
and state-supreme courts' awards of declaratory relief in duty-to-
defend cases. There is also a methodology that helps to evaluate the
concurrent and multiple effects of several factors on whether courts
order liability insurers to provide a legal defense. The procedure
that would help to accomplish these ends is called multivariate probit
analysis.3'7
Table 6 illustrates the results of a multivariate analysis among fed-
eral courts of appeals cases.
386. The potential problems associated with "selectivity bias," especially in data secured
from reported judicial decisions, has been written on extensively. See, e.g., Geoffrey L. Gillis &
Stephen J. Spurr, The Value of Life in Tort Litigation: The Advent of the Economic Approach, 75
MICH. BJ. 540, 541-42 (1996) (pointing out the problems associated with "selectivity bias" and
with the statistical models designed to test and remove this source of bias);Jeffrey M.Jakubiak,
Maintaining Air Safety at Less Cost: A Plan For Replacing FAA Safety Regulations with Strict Liability, 6
CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 434 (1997) (discussing problem of "selectivity bias" and tort-law
litigation); Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, "Redlining " and the Discriminatory Access to Loans, Credit,
and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued Lenders And Insurers in
Federal and State Courts, 1950-1995, 33 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 583, 693 n.438 (1996) (discussing the
issue of "selectivity bias"). Daniel A. Powers & Christopher G. Ellison, Interracial Contact and
Black Racial Attitudes: The Contact Hypothesis and Selectivity Bias, 74 SOCiAL FORCEs 205 (1995)
(discussing potential effect of selectivity bias on interracial contact and racial attitudes).
387. See Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section
504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REv. LITIG. 219, 286-88 nn.406-09 (1986) (discussing
statistical procedure, a multivariate probit statistical analysis, and the computer program called
HOTZTRAN that was employed to test for "selectivity bias" and to compute "simultaneous" co-
efficients).
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INSURANCE CONTRACTS AND JUDICIAL DISCORD
First, the information appearing under Decision to Initiate a Cause of
Action in Federal Courts of Appeals is not very significant from a legal
perspective. Quite simply, some of the litigants (N = 377), decided to
go to federal courts while others did not. The probit coefficients and
t-statistics, therefore, indicate whether the corresponding back-
ground variables (predictors) had any meaningful impact on the de-
cision to seek declaratory relief in federal courts. And, of course,
they did not, given that none of those t-statistics were statistically sig-
nificant.
But the findings appearing under the heading entitled, Disposition
of Declaratory-Judgment Actions Among Third-Party Female Victims, are
relevant. First, the Lambda coefficient-5.1280 is not statistically sig-
nificant. This suggests the absence of any meaningful selectivity bias
in this sample of cases. Second, only one statistically significant pro-
bit coefficient, 3.1815, appears within this group. Considering that
the coefficient is positive, it conveys the following: federal appellate
courts are markedly more likely to force insurers to defend insureds
when third-party victims are female landowners.
Of course, there is another important finding in Table 6 under the
heading, Disposition of Declaratory-Judgment Actions Among Insureds Who
Resided in the Eighth Circuit. The statistically significant and negative -
2.1268 probit coefficient indicates that the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit is significantly less likely to order insurers to defend
insureds where third-party victims accused insureds of committing
some fraudulent act.
Finding that these revelations are not statistical quirks, once again,
should these types of variables influence federal appellate court
judges' decision to grant or deny any declaratory relief?. Should they
have a bearing on whether federal courts of appeals order national
liability carriers to defend insureds? Probably not.
Because the findings among federal court cases are so compelling,
additional tests were conducted to determine whether identical or
similar multivariate effects materialized among state supreme court
cases.
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These results are presented in Table 7. First, consider the coeffi-
cients illustrated under the heading labeled, Disposition of Declaratory
Judgment Actions Among Cases Where Third-Party Victims Were Strangers.
The Lambda coefficient, .4031, is not statistically significant, suggest-
ing the absence of selectivity bias. But the positive probit coefficient,
1.9295, is statistically meaningful. It suggests the following: state su-
preme courts are substantially more likely to order insurance carriers
to defend insureds, when third-party victims, who are social guests as
well as strangers,"' accuse insureds of committing intentional acts.
Another significant finding is located under the heading entitled,
Disposition of Declaratory Judgment Actions in Supreme Courts Located in
the East. The Lambda coefficient (-3.1659) is not significant, suggest-
ing once more the absence of any meaningful selectivity bias in this
sample of cases. The negative -2.7449 probit coefficient, however, is
statistically significant and rather revealing. "Eastern courts" include
the supreme tribunals in Connecticut, Delaware, District of Colum-
bia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The negative
coefficient reveals that these courts are considerably less likely to
force liability carriers to defend if third-party victims alleged that the
insureds committed a battery.
Finally, the remaining significant statistic in Table 7 appears under
the category labeled, Disposition of Declaratory Judgment Actions in Su-
preme Courts Located in the Eighth Circuit. Again, the Lambda coeffi-
cient (-0.6884) is not statistically meaningful. But, the negative pro-
bit coefficient (-2.4891) associated with the wrongful-death category
is statistically important. This coefficient indicates that state supreme
courts located within the region of the Eighth Circuit are considera-
bly less likely to force insurers to defend the insured if third-party vic-
tims file wrongful-death actions against the insured.
At first glance, this latter finding looks suspect, given that this
presentation concerns injuries allegedly caused by insureds' inten-
tional and immoral acts rather than by insureds' negligent acts. But
the essence of a wrongful-death action is that it is a civil action. In
states located in the Eighth Circuit, 89 as well as other states,3'* wrong-
388. At first glance, one might conclude that little is added to an analysis or discussion view-
ing a third-party victim from the perspective of a "social guest" as well as a "stranger." But le-
gally, the two labels or descriptions are not synonymous. A careful comparison of the respec-
tive definitions should make the point. Compare BLACK's LAW DIGIONARY 1390 (6th ed. 1990)
(defining a social guest as a "person who goes onto the property of another for companion-
ship, diversion and enjoyment of hospitality"), with WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 1162 (10th ed. 1993) (defining a stranger as "one not privy or party to an act, con-
tract, or title; one that interferes without right").
389. The full text of Eighth Circuit states' wrongful-death statutes can be found in each
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ful-death actions generally must proceed under a theory of negli-
gence. On the other hand, in many underlying criminal actions, the
insureds would have been only charged with, or found not guilty of,
committing first- or second-degree murder or manslaughter, which
are "intentional" acts. This explains in part why wrongful-death has
been included as a "predictor" in this analysis.
But, as reported above, the supreme tribunals within the Eighth
Circuit are substantially less likely to order insurance companies to
defend insureds even though there has been no finding of criminal-
ity in the underlying suits. Are there legal principles which would
predict this result? Is this ajust result? Is this finding congruent with
the sound social policy underlying the evolution of third-party liabil-
ity insurance? The answer to each questions is an emphatic no.
CONCLUSION
This Article is designed to reach several audiences: (1) plaintiffs'
lawyers who commence duty-to-defend actions on behalf of insureds;
(2) defense counsels who try to protect the interests insurers' and in-
surance investors' interests by petitioning courts for declaratory re-
lief; (3) state and federal judges who decide whether property and
casualty companies and professional liability insurers must defend in-
sureds in underlying lawsuits; and (4) state legislators and insurance
commissioners who either review or approve the terms and condi-
tions appearing in the coverage, duty-to-defend, and exclusion
clauses in liability insurance contracts.
First, all parties listed above should remember the public policy
behind the evolution of liability contracts: Liability insurance is
third-party insurance. Lawyers, doctors, homeowners, small busi-
nesses, officers and directors, corporations, associations, partner-
ships, churches, universities, enterprises, and other organizations and
professionals purchase this type of insurance for the benefit of third-
party victims. All too often, federal and state judges, insurers, and
defense counsels either dismiss, reject, or overlook this fundamental
state's code. SeeARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102 (MICHIE 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.336 (WEST
1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 573.02 (WEST 1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (WEsT 1997); NEB.
REV. ST. § 30-809 (1943); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-03.2-04 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-5-1
(MICHIE 1968).
390. Wrongful-death statutes can be found in most state codes. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-225a (West 1997); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10, § 3704 (1997);D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-310 (1981);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 18-A, § 2-804 (WEsT 1997);MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 3-902
(1997); MAss. GEN. LAWsANN. ch. 229 § 2 (WEST 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 556:12 (1997);
NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-97 (WEsT 1997); N.Y. Esr. PowERs & TRusT LAw § 5-4.1 (McKinney
1997); 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 8301 (WEST 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-14-8 (1956); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 1491 (1997).
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fact, especially when insureds and insurers start debating whether li-
ability carriers must defend against an underlying third-party claim.
It also would be extremely instructive if all parties remember what
a Michigan appellate court wrote in Vigilant Insurance Co. v. Kambly:39'
Initially, it is unlikely that [an] insured [is] induced to engage
in... unlawful conduct by reliance upon the insurability of any
claims arising therefrom or that allowing insurance coverage...
would induce... similar unlawful conduct.... [Cloverage does
not allow the wrongdoer unjustly to benefit from his wrong. It is
not the insured who will benefit, but the innocent victim who will
be provided compensation for her injuries." '
The second point is directed to federal and state judges who de-
cide duty-to-defend controversies. Fairly recently, in Transport Insur-
ance Co. v. Faircloth993 the Texas Supreme Court correctly observed:
An insured's interests are adverse to third-party claimants.... For
policy reasons, we do not require insurance companies to perform
duties for third-party claimants that are "coextensive and conflict-
ing" with the duties they owe their insureds .... Owing such du-
ties to third parties would "necessarily compromise the duties the
insurer owes to its insured."1
94
Other supreme courts also have adopted this position."'
But this latter public policy need not prevent insurers from defend-
ing underlying suits where third parties have only alleged that in-
sureds committed an intentional act. When federal and state judges
refuse to order a legal defense, their declarations do not protect in-
sureds from third parties. Rather, those declarations only protect in-
surance companies' and investors' interests; they do not protect the
insureds' interests. Stated another way, when courts refuse to order a
legal defense, money is saved. Who benefits? Insurers and insurance
investors.
Furthermore, a careful analysis shows that unsuccessful insureds
lose twice. First, they receive no benefits from the billions of dollars
they pay to secure insurance coverage. Second, and more egregious,
they must spend additional money to defend themselves, where third-
391. 319N.W.2d382 (Mich. Ct.App. 1981).
392. Id. at 385.
393. 898 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1995).
394. Id. at 279 (citations omitted).
395. See, e.g., Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58, 74 (Cal. 1988)
("Insurance is initially obtained for the protection of the insured, and the insurer's primary
duty is to protect the interests of its own insured."); Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795,
799 (Utah 1985) ("The insured is wholly dependent upon the insurer to see that, in dealing
with claims by third parties, the insured's best interests are protected. In addition, when deal-
ing with third parties, the insurer acts as an agent for the insured with respect to the disputed
claim.").
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party claimants have only alleged that the insureds committed some
intentional act. By any reasonable measure, the courts' failure to or-
der a defense creates an unjust, financial windfall for insurance com-
panies and their investors. In addition, judges must never forget that
the greater majority of insureds can only purchase adhesion con-
tracts, which effectively prevent them from defining, redefining, de-
leting, or negotiating the meaning of terms like "duty to defend,"
and "intentional acts."
To repeat an earlier point, it is fundamentally unfair to force in-
sureds to defend themselves where there has been no finding of in-
tentional conduct in an underlying suit. In every instance, judges
should compel liability insurers to defend homeowners, small busi-
ness owners, doctors, lawyers, psychiatrists, minors, and other in-
sureds, unless insurers present clear and convincing evidence that in-
sureds had either subjective 96 or criminal397 intent to harm a third
party. And, to ensure fairness, ajury, rather than ajudge should de-
termine whether the insureds possessed the requisite intent.
The third point also is directed to state and federal judges who
declare that liability insurers have no duty to defend actions involving
allegedly intentional acts. As reported earlier, federal and state
judges are overwhelmingly less likely to order insurers to defend in-
sureds if the third-party victims are African- or Mexican-Americans,
consumers, and young children. The same is true where third-party
victims accuse the insured of committing criminal assault 98 On the
other hand, judges are more inclined to order a legal defense if
third-party victims are social guests or if victims commence wrongful-
396. See, e.g., Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So. 2d 921, 925 (Ala.
1984) ("Under [the] subjective test, an injury is 'intended from the standpoint of the insured'
if the insured possessed the specific intent to cause bodily injury to another... ."); Auto-
Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 489 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Mich. 1992) ("The policy language ....
'expected or intended by an insured person,' is unambiguous and requires a subjective in-
tent...."); Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 776 P.2d 123, 131 (Wash. 1989) ("[U]nder the word-
ing of the policy, the intent to injure is a subjective determination.").
397. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414, 422 (Conn. 1991) (concluding
that "[o]ne could not logically find that the necessary criminal intent was present but that the
intent that operates to exclude coverage under the insurance policy was not [present]"); Safeco
Ins. Co. of America v. Yon, 796 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990). In Yon, the court
found that:
[T]he elements necessary for the prosecution to prove the crime of murder in the
second degree are: (a) an unlawful killing, (b) the intent to kill, and (c) malice ....
The appellants contend that this 'subjective intent' analysis-when interpreting inten-
tional conduct exclusion clauses in insurance contracts-is distinct from the issue of
intent decided in the second degree murder trial. In this context, we disagree.
Id.
398. See Tables 3-5, supra pp. 1203-07 (illustrating the relationship between declaratory re-
lief and the ethnic, age, and legal status of the victim).
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death actions."'
These findings constitute prima facie evidence that courts are ei-
ther consciously or unconsciously allowing their less-than-positive at-
titudes about certain classes of victims to influence their rulings. It
suggests that judges who do not order a legal defense believe that in-
sureds must be punished for their intentional conduct,4 or that in-
sureds should be dissuaded from committing additional criminal or
intentional acts.40
Federal and state judges also must ensure that their preconceived
notions about the social or economic worth of African- and Mexican-
Americans, or other ethnic minorities, do not influence whether they
compel insurers to defend policyholders. Furthermore, courts uni-
versally and properly condemn insureds who conclusively molest
young children. Yet, too many courts cut off the very source of fi-
nancial support that could be used to help young victims. Simply
put, if judges truly want to help third-party victims, they should force
liability insurers to defend their policyholders.
The significance of this admonishment should be obvious:- All
third-party victims, regardless of their ethnicity, legal, professional, or
socioeconomic status, are significantly more likely to receive some
compensation if courts force insurance companies to defend under-
lying actions that involve insureds' allegedly intentional conduct. Of
course, this outcome is likely even if a jury did not decide the merits
of the underlying lawsuit. And the explanation is not difficult. Set-
tlements are more common where insurers adhere to their contrac-
tual obligation and provide a legal defense.0 2
399. See id. (citing statistic that state supreme courts are 80% more likely to declare that in-
surers must defend the insured when the victim is a social guest and 66.7% more likely to order
a defense in wrongful-death actions).
400. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So. 2d 458, 465 (Ala. 1993). In Davis, the
court stated that:
The Davises argue that.., a holding of no coverage may militate against the compen-
sation of the actual victims of assaults .... [Although] compensating the victims of
such abuse [is laudable], we recognize that a vast majority of courts has correctly
"determined that this benefit is outweighed by the effect of allowing sexual offenders
to escape [liability]." Additional support for our holding derives from "the desire to
place moral liability with the same precision with which we would place economic li-
ability.
Id.
401. See, e.g., Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1119 (Ohio 1996)
("[R]equiring an insurer to indemnify an insured who has engaged in sexual abuse of a child
'subsidizes the episodes of child sexual abuse of which its victims complain, at the ultimate ex-
pense of other insureds to who the added costs of indemnifying child molesters will be
passed.'").
402. Cf. Christine Dugas, Insurance Can Help With Legal Bills, USA TODAY, Feb. 17, 1997, at
2B (discussing that most claims under umbrella policies settle out of court). In her article,
Christine Dugas stated that:
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The final point is addressed to state legislators and to plaintiffs'
and defense lawyers. Without doubt, liability insurance policies are
adhesion contracts. Although national and regional carriers supply
the language-words and phrases, terms, conditions, exclusions, and
definitions-appearing in those contracts, state legislatures approve
the language and ultimately decide whether insurers can sell the con-
tracts to consumers. Undeniably, terms like "duty to defend," "bodily
injuries," and "intentional acts expected from the insured's position"
are causing both insureds and insurers to petition federal and state
courts for declaratory relief. It appears that this process will continue
unless state legislatures and insurance commissioners act to clarify
these terms.
In this country, there is a universal policy that an innocent third-
party victim should not bear the burden of another's negligence or
intentional act. Therefore, to help pay the cost of returning an inno-
cent third party to her position before victimization, society forces or
encourages physicians, lawyers, small businesses, corporations,
homeowners, and other consumers to purchase liability insurance.
Presently, an unacceptably large number of victims are not compen-
sated for their injuries. Many of these victims are ethnic minorities,
women, sexually abused children, patients, and clients. But state leg-
islatures can correct the problem by forcing insurers to defend their
insured whenever a third party files a claim, alleging that she was the
victim of insured's negligence or intentional conduct.
To repeat an often quoted rule: The duty to defend is broader
than the duty to pay a judgment, if the insured is found liable for
403third-party injuries.
Therefore, state legislatures should compel insurers to defend
policyholders whenever third parties allege that they were victimized
intentionally. If legislatures do not act, insurers will continue to peti-
tion state and federal courts for declaratory relief. As we have dis-
covered, an unacceptably large number of courts will continue to de-
[U]mbrella insurance policies .... sometimes called excess liability policies, provide
coverage for money a policyholder is obligated to pay because of bodily injury or
property damage caused to another person .... The vast majority of umbrella policy
claims involve automobile accidents. And most are settled out of court, insurance in-
dustry expects say.
Id.
403. See, e.g., Belmer v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 599 N.Y.S.2d 427, 429 (Super. Ct. 1993)
(stating that "[t]he duty to defend arises out of and is governed by the allegations in the com-
plaint.., and is greater than the duty to pay."); Tudor Ins. Co. v. Township of Stowe, 697 A.2d
1010, 1020 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1997) (stating that "[t]he duty to defend is separate from and
greater than the duty to indemnify"); West American Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 378 So. 2d 28, 29
(Fla. Dist. Ct. of App. 1979) (stating that"[t]he duty to defend is often said to be greater than
the eventual duty to pay under applicable coverage").
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clare incorrectly that liability insurers have no duty to defend in-
sureds, even where there has been no finding that insureds inten-
tionally injured third-party victims.

